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Over the past decade the military in a number of countries has played an import-
ant role both in bringing about changes of political regime and in resisting
pressures for change. This volume, whose compilation was undertaken within
the context of the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the
Pacific project of the Australian National University’s Department of Political
and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, brings together
a number of prominent regional specialists to take a fresh look at the military’s
changing role in selected countries of Asia and the island Pacific, with particular
regard to their performance against criteria of democratic government. The book
provides a sequel to Selochan’s earlier collection, The Military, the State, and
Development in Asia and the Pacific (Westview, 1991).
Claire Smith, Bev Fraser and Allison Ley again provided expert midwifery in
bringing the book into being and our colleagues Harold Crouch and Bob Lowry
made helpful comments on the manuscript. As always it has been difficult to avoid
being overtaken by events and we are grateful to our co-contributors for their
forbearance in providing updates and waiting out the (mostly) inevitable delays





PREFACE TO THE ANU E PRESS PUBLICATION
We are fortunate to be able to produce this title six years after the initial
publication of The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific. It forms
part of an ANU E Press series that is intended to make critical research done at
The Australian National University available to a wider readership.
The original edition of The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific
was undertaken within the context of the Regime Change and Regime
Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific project of The Australian National
University’s Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of
Pacific and Asian Studies, bringing together a number of prominent regional
specialists to look at the military’s changing role in selected countries of Asia
and the Pacific.
As the original edition sold out, we hope that this new publication will reach
an even wider audience who can reflect on the issues raised in this volume and
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Introduction: democracy and the military in
comparative perspective
Abstract for chapter 1
Authors: R. J. May, Stephanie Lawson and
Viberto Selochan
The authors aim, within the context of current discussions of
‘transitions to democracy’, to examine the central concerns of the
subject. They approach the topic within the framework of a larger
interest in the process of regime change and regime maintenance in
Asia and the Pacific since it is clear that the military has played a
major role both in bringing about changes of regime and in forestalling
change.
The principle questions addressed are first, what role has the
military played in regime change and maintenance in the countries
of Asia and the Pacific, and second, have differences in the degree
of military involvement in politics been systematically associated
with differences in the performance of the political system,
particularly its performance in relation to democratic criteria?
Their sense is that the military is likely to continue to play an important
role in the politics of the countries of Asia and the Pacific, notwithstanding
tendencies towards democratisation. They propose a shift in focus of
research from the military per se, to the activities of soldiers in the
complex of military-civil relations.
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INTRODUCTION:  DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  MILITARY
IN  COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE
R.J. May, Stephanie Lawson and Viberto Selochan
From the processes of decolonisation which dominated the political history of
Africa, Asia and the island Pacific in the mid twentieth century, most post-colonial
states emerged with constitutional structures inherited from, or at least heavily
influenced by, the Western democratic models of former colonial powers. Among
the principal general features of such constitutions were: separation of the
legislature, executive and judiciary; popularly-elected legislatures in which
competitive political party systems were expected to provide the basis for a divi-
sion between government and opposition; and the subservience of the military
(whose primary role was generally seen to lie in defending the country against
external aggression) to the civil authorities.
In the early stages of decolonisation it was expected that indigenous armies,
following the models set by the metropolitan powers which created them, would
refrain from direct involvement in politics. Nevertheless, even in those newly in-
dependent states in which the military did not gain a political inheritance by virtue
of its role in the winning of independence, rather than imbuing the armed forces
with a military professionalism which required absolute obedience to the civil
authority, colonial rule left behind armed forces more often oriented towards main-
taining internal order than to external defence, and therefore implicitly attuned
to domestic politics. This was particularly evident in states marked by strong
ethnic cleavages, where colonial policies often involved the recruitment of mili-
tary personnel from those ethnic groups which appeared most compliant (see
below).
In fact, shifts from parliamentary democracy to one-party or military-domi-
nated regimes were not long in coming. Africa had its first military coup in 1958
and there were coups in Burma, Thailand and Pakistan in the same year. A torrent
of military interventions followed during the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1945
and 1976, Nordlinger (1977:xi) estimated, more than two thirds of the countries
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of Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East had experienced varying levels
of military intervention. A study of sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 1982
alone recorded 90 plots to overthrow governments, 60 attempted coups, and 50
successful coups (Orkand Corporation quoted in Seitz 1991:65). In 1977 La
Palombara commented: ‘Military coups are now so frequent and widespread they
must be considered as significant as elections’ (‘Foreword’ in Nordlinger 1977:x);
even earlier, Janowitz (1971:306) wrote:
The intervention of the military in the domestic politics [of non-Western states] is
the norm; persistent patterns of civil supremacy are the deviant cases that require
special exploration.
Because military interventions were widely seen as a denial of the democratic
values and institutions which retiring colonial powers had hoped to establish in
the new states, considerable scholarly attention was devoted to explaining why
and how military coups occurred. Explanation was sought in the motives of coup
leaders, the structure of the military, and in predisposing and facilitating socio-
economic, political, and external conditions.1
Early scholarship sought the reason for military intervention in the relative
‘underdevelopment’ of civil political institutions. More specifically, some writers
argued that in new states the military typically was more cohesive, better organ-
ised, more ‘rational’, and more strongly committed to modernisation than the
rest of society, including politicians, and that military intervention was a predict-
able response to the inefficient and often corrupt administration, and political
fractiousness, which characterised the civil government in many new states.2 For
those who saw a strong state as a necessary precondition for economic develop-
1 There have been numerous attempts to review the copious literature on military
coups (see, for example Lowenthal 1974; Hoadley 1975; Nordlinger 1977;
Perlmutter 1980; Ball 1981; Valenzuela 1985; Kennedy and Louscher 1991). We
will not repeat that exercise here, though some features of the debate will be
highlighted.
2 Among a number of studies which broadly pursued this theme, major contributions
included Shils (1962); Pye (1962, 1966); Finer (1962); Johnson (1962); Halpern
(1963); Riggs (1964); Janowitz (1964); von der Mehden (1964); Huntington
(1968); Zolberg (1968); Daalder (1969); Dowse (1969); Lefever (1970); Bienen
(1971, 1983); Lissak (1976); Perlmutter (1977, 1981); more recently see Crouch
(1985) and Chazan et al. (1988).
For some dissenting views see Lee (1969); Welch (1974a); Mazrui (1976).
Mazrui in particular saw the military, in Africa, as likely to ‘retraditionalise’;
similarly see Crouch (1979) on the ‘neo patrimonialism’ of the military in Indonesia.
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ment, military intervention was not necessarily a bad thing (for example, see
Lefever 1970). Such a viewpoint, however, raised some big questions: in parti-
cular, if the military intervened because the institutions of civil government were
‘underdeveloped’ or not working well, what chance was there of civil institutions
ever developing? Although military coup leaders frequently presented
themselves as intervening temporarily, once out of the barracks they were seldom
in a hurry to return; moreover the actions of military rulers – banning political
activity, suspending constitutions, imposing media censorship, and so on – were
frequently inimical to the development of civil politics.
An alternative line of explanation saw military establishments as motivated
less by a culture of rationality, sound management, and modernity than by its
corporate interests. Military intervention was especially likely, they argued, when
the military was marginalised or fiscally deprived, or its interests, autonomy, or
‘professionalism’ threatened. (See, for example, Janowitz 1964; First 1970;
Bienen 1971; Hakes 1973; Thompson 1973; Nordlinger 1977; Horowitz 1980;
Rouquié 1987.)
In both these approaches the military was seen essentially as a cohesive entity
with a sense of collective identity. A third school of thought, in contrast, portrayed
the military as simply an extension of the larger civil society, subject to the same
class, regional and ethnic cleavages, prone to internal friction, and likely to side
with particular political factions at particular times. Taking this argument further,
Decalo (1976) suggested that the reasons for military coups were to be found in
the personal ambitions of coup leaders. The idea that the military was at least
potentially fragmented had particular salience in those states in which the military
had a specific ethnic bias, often the result of deliberate colonial policies of recruit-
ing from ‘martial races’ or from ethnic minorities rather than dominant ethnic
groups which might thus be given the means to challenge colonial rule (Daalder
1969; Guyot 1974; Kabwegyere 1974; Mazrui 1976; Hansen 1977; Nordlinger 1977;
Enloe 1980; Horowitz 1985; also see Gow 1991). The role of social class, on the
other hand, was contested: while some saw the military as likely to pursue the
interests of the middle class, others saw it as characteristically cutting across
class interests. (Major contributors to this debate include Huntington 1968; Lloyd
1973; Halpern 1963; Nordlinger 1977; Alavi 1979; Luckham 1979; Perlmutter
1981; Nun 1967, 1986.) Inter-generational tensions, and rivalries between age
cohorts and political factions within the military were seen to be increasingly
significant as the number of coups – especially ‘second round’ coups – increased;
Seitz (1991:70) estimated that ‘intra-military elite factionalism’ accounted for
about a third of the plots, attempted coups and coups recorded in the Orkand
Corporation study (see above).
4 R.J. May, Stephanie Lawson and Viberto Selochan
Several studies distinguished various types of coup and coup attempt, ranging
from those (typically first coups) which sought to set up new regimes, through
internal military putschs, to ‘coups’ directed against regime change (for example,
see Huntington 1968; Hoadley 1975; Chazan et al. 1988; Luckham 1991).
Of course, these various ‘explanations’ were not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive: a state in which there was an imbalance in development between the insti-
tutions of state control and those of popular participation, for example, was prob-
ably more vulnerable to intervention to assert the military’s corporate interests.
‘Isolating “The Cause” of a coup d’etat’, Welch (1974a:135) suggested, ‘is a
fruitless exercise. Personal, organisational and societal factors are intermingled’.
Moreover, as Horowitz (1980:8) suggested, different explanations were sometimes
appropriate to different levels of explanation (if in fact, they explained anything
at all). Not surprisingly, then, a growing body of case studies provided support,
in varying degrees, for all of these hypotheses, suggesting that while there were
some recurring characteristics of military intervention, the explanation of
individual cases required an understanding of their particular historical and social
circumstances.
With military or civil-military regimes becoming increasingly the norm in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, from around the mid 1970s students
of the military began to shift the focus of their enquiry from explaining coups
to a second enterprise, that of assessing the relative performance of military
regimes. Early writings on military intervention in politics tended, as we have
seen, to regard military intervention as essentially anti-democratic, but to see
military regimes as probably more capable than democratic civilian regimes of
achieving modernisation and development. A series of studies in the 1970s and
early 1980s (for example, Nordlinger 1970, 1977; Schmitter 1971; Hoadley 1975;
McKinlay and Cohan 1975, 1976; Jackman 1976; Zuk and Thompson 1982)
addressed this question in fairly broad terms but found that, in terms of per-
formance (variously defined), military regimes did not form a distinctive regime
type. Heeger (1977:247) went further, suggesting that for Africa and Asia in the
decade 1965-1975, ‘most military regimes have hindered the development of
their countries’. More recently Seitz (in Kennedy and Louscher 1991) has con-
cluded from a study of 38 sub-Saharan African states that there is ‘no significant
discernible pattern separating the economic performance of military and civilian
regimes’ (ibid.:7, italics added). Crouch (1985, 1988), addressing the record of
the military and development in Southeast Asia for the period 1970-1985, also
dismissed the particular role of the military as a decisive factor; he went on to
emphasise the significance for economic development of maintaining political
stability but concluded that in this respect, too, the military’s record was mixed.
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Measures of political performance, on the other hand, seem to show a more
definite pattern: Nordlinger (1977), for example, looking at four measures of
political performance (legitimisation, noncoercive rule, minimisation of violence,
and responsiveness to popular wishes), concluded that the performance of
military governments ‘is significantly and almost consistently poorer than that
of civilian governments’ (ibid.:197). More recently, Finer (1991), using Free-
dom House data, notes that all but two out of 36 military governments (i.e. 94
per cent) were ranked as authoritarian and lacking basic civil freedoms, compared
to 60 per cent of 73 civilian regimes. Nevertheless, the only safe – if unexciting
– generalisation seems to be that, as stated by Luckham (1991:22), ‘Military
regimes are usually but not invariably authoritarian, and authoritarianism fre-
quently but not always involves rule by soldiers’.
As more and more states came to experience periods of military rule it also
became obvious that stereotypical models of military rule were inadequate. In
some countries the military, or factions within the military, had simply made a
blatant grab for power; in others the military intervened to replace an ineffective
or corrupt civilian government with the stated intention of handing power back
to civilian rule; in still others the military and civilian authorities established a
system of joint participation in government. Consequently, a third major en-
deavour of the literature on the military in politics has been to differentiate types
of military and civil-military regime. Janowitz (1964) made an early distinction
between five types of civil-military relations, which he labelled authoritarian-
personal control, authoritarian-mass party, democratic competitive and semi-
competitive systems, civil-military coalition, and military oligarchy. Welch (1974a)
suggested a distinction between personalist, corporatist and interventionary
professionalisationist military regimes. Nordlinger (1977) distinguished military
regimes by their role, as moderators, guardians or rulers. (Similarly see
Perlmutter’s [1981] classification of arbitrator and ruler praetorian regimes.)
Perlmutter (1980), arguing that, ‘The modern military regime is distinctly and
analytically a new phenomenon, restricted to the developing and modernising
world’ (p.96), suggested a fivefold typology, dividing military regimes into cor-
porative, market-bureaucratic, socialist-oligarchic, army-party and tyrannical.
Finer (1991), confining himself to countries in which the current regime is the
outcome of a previous illegal usurption and in which the head of state is a member
of the military, and adopting a more structurally-oriented classification, divides
military governments into three sub-types: the military junta (or stratocracy), the
presidential type, and those (perhaps more properly regarded as authoritarian
civilian states) which, while founded by a military coup, have a civilian cabinet
and a (limited) competitive party system and legislature.3 What is emphasised
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by these (and other) authors, however, is not simply the variety of military regime
types (or in Finer’s terms, subtypes) but the lack of a clear dividing line between
military and civilian regimes. As Heeger (1977:243) put it:
It has become increasingly apparent that the rigid dichotomy between ‘civilian’ and
‘military’ regimes cannot be maintained . . . the transition from military rule can be
seen in one sense as a transition from one mixed system to another mixed system.
Similarly, Finer (1982:282) argued that ‘the class of “military regimes” embraces
a number of distinct subtypes which merge, gradually, into civilian regimes’, and
Bebler (1990) proposed a continuum of civil-military relations, whose oppos-
ing extremes he called ‘civilocracy’ and ‘militocracy’ and whose middle ground
was occupied by equal partnership arrangements, dual hierarchies, and ‘fused’
systems. Bebler went on to observe:
Whether officially recognised or not, the military everywhere constitutes an important
part of the state apparatus and of the political system, and the soldiers, even when
sound asleep in their barracks, participate in the political process and tacitly share
political power with civilian rulers (ibid.:262-63).4
A further aspect of the discussion of military regime types lay in the recogni-
tion that the role of the military may change over time. Huntington (1968:221)
observed:
As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy the
soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the
mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the
existing order.
3 In an earlier paper, Finer (1982) presented a ‘morphology of [32] military regimes’,
ranging from ‘military-supportive civilian regimes’, through ‘indirect-military
regimes’, to ‘military regimes proper’, based on an analysis of ‘who governs’. Also
see Luckham (1971) and Bebler (1990).
4 Also see Finer (1962, 1985); Lee (1969); Lloyd (1973); Bienen and Morell (1974);
Heeger (1977); and Perlmutter (1981); however cf. Luckham (1991: 2): ‘The more
one looks at [the military], the more it decomposes like the vanishing smile of the
Cheshire cat, into the turbulent social and political forces that swirl around it. Yet
the more one seeks to explain its role in relation to those forces, the more its military
specificity is brought (like the smile) back into focus’. Even Bebler, having intro-
duced the idea of a civilian-military continuum, argues against those who deny
the perceptual validity of the civilian-military dichotomy, that ‘in every society, at
any given moment, there is a demarcation line considered as “normal” by the leading
political forces’ (Bebler 1990:265). (Also see Nordlinger 1977:xii.)
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On the other hand, Welch and others suggested that once in power military
regimes changed systemically – in Welch’s (1974a) analysis from personalism
to corporatism to interventionary professionalism; in Perlmutter’s (1981) analy-
sis, from arbitrator to ruler and back to arbitrator. Studies of the military in Latin
America in 1970s suggested that a more fundamental, secular change was taking
place in the military’s perception of its role: increasingly, Stepan and others ar-
gued, soldiers were taking on civilian roles of administration, management and
economic enterprise.5 Stepan (1973, 1978) referred to this as the ‘new profes-
sionalism’. Such a military role expansion was evident in Southeast Asia in the
1960s, and Lissak (1976:13), writing about Thailand and Burma, spoke of ‘the
penetration of the officer corps, either collectively or as individuals, into various
institutional fields, such as economic enterprises, education and training of
civilian manpower, fulfilling civilian administrative functions, and engaging in
different forms of power politics’. In Indonesia, the ‘civilianising’ of the armed
forces had been anticipated even before 1960s.6
In part, the role expansion of the military in the Third World has reflected a
shift in predominant concern, from external defence to internal security (em-
bracing civic action programs and the growth of paramilitary forces).7 But in part
also it has been a strategy by which military regimes have sought to consolidate
and legitimate their role in government, especially where that role has been
challenged by civilians or external actors, or threatened by factionalism
from within.
This suggested a further issue for investigation: the question of ‘exit’ – how
can the army, once in power, be returned to the barracks? As early as 1962 Finer
observed that, ‘In most cases, the military that have intervened in politics are in
a dilemma: . . . they cannot withdraw from rulership nor can they fully legitimise
it’ (1962:243). In fact, of course, some coup-makers did withdraw; indeed Finer
(1985) later acknowledged that, ‘Most military regimes . . . have very short lives’,
and went on to review the practice and theory of military withdrawal in terms of
two principal alternatives – institutionalisation (essentially what other writers
have termed ‘civilianisation’) and abdication. Following Sundhaussen (1984,
5 An early review of this literature is contained in Lowenthal (1974).
6 More recent discussions of the ‘new professionalism’ of the military in Southeast
Asia are contained in Soedjati and Yong (1988) and Selochan (1990).
7 Some recent tendencies are discussed in Sarkesian (1981); Stepan (1988);
Goodman, Mendelson and Rial (1990:Part III); Zagorski (1992); Burk (1993), and
Ashkenazy (1994).
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1985), Finer suggested that the conditions for military withdrawal parallelled,
in reverse, those for military intervention, and identified two sets of dispositions
and societal conditions for withdrawal; successful abdication, he concluded,
required that the personal, corporate and ideological interests of the military be
protected, and that the party or party system to which the military handed over
be ‘organised, not unwise, and in effective control of the country’ (Finer 1985:
30). Contemporaneously with Finer’s analysis of ‘the retreat to the barracks’,
Clapham and Philip (1985) rephrased the dilemma for military regimes as being
to develop a mechanism for succession without jeopardising their own supreme
position; they saw six likely alternative outcomes – handback, civilian renewal,
authoritarian clientelism, factional clientelism, and military party state, and ‘just
another impasse’ (as when the military, under pressure, hands power back to a
weak civilian state). (Also see Finer 1962; Huntington 1968; Welch 1971, 1974b;
Bienen and Morell 1974; Heeger 1977; Nordlinger 1977; Needler 1980; Horowitz
1980; Third World Quarterly 7(1) 1985; Danopoulos 1988.)
However, as Heeger (1977:244) warned:
. . . in speaking of the military’s withdrawal from politics one risks exaggeration.
The transfer of formal political power to civilians may be accompanied by a full-
scale return to the barracks on the part of the military. More likely, however, is the
emergence of the military in a somewhat less prominent, but no less political, role.
Typically, military personnel, having seized power, sought either to consolidate
their position, penetrating civil society (sometimes setting up military-backed
parties) and discouraging opposition, or to shift from a ‘caretaker’ role by
restoring civilian governments while maintaining a guardian or veto role and
strengthening linkages with civilian politicians and business people. Cases of a
single military intervention, followed by consolidation or withdrawal, have in fact
been unusual; more common have been cycles of greater and lesser military
involvement of politics.8 ‘Proclaimed intentions’, Finer (1985:17) observes,
. . . usually bear little relationship to the outcome. Rulers who intend to hand power
back to civilians and do so are rare . . . Rulers who say they so intend but in fact
hang on to power are more common . . . Rulers who make no promises to hand back,
or openly propose permanent military rule are very common . . . But rulers of this
intention who actually succeed in carrying it out are most uncommon.
8 Thus, although Finer observes that most military regimes have very short lives, he
also notes that: ‘Few civilian successor regimes have lasted more than ten years’
(1985:29).
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At this point the literature on the military in politics converges with the burgeoning
body of writing on regime change (see, for example, Linz and Stepan 1978;
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988, 1990;
Goodman, Mendelson and Rial 1990). Specifically, the recent perceived trend
towards democratisation in parts of Latin America, Africa and Asia has revived
interest in questions of military withdrawal, though as Luckham (1991:
12) reminds us, ‘the installation of a military government [and, per contra, the
withdrawal of the military from government] by no means always adds up to a
change of regime’.
The questions raised here, and others, have, of course, been substantially
addressed both at the theoretical level and in a growing volume of case studies,
including comparative Asian and Pacific studies (among the latter, see Guyot and
Willner 1970; Hoadley 1975; Zakaria and Crouch 1985; Olsen and Jurika 1986;
Soedjati and Yong 1988; Heinz, Pfennig and King 1990; Selochan 1991b). In the
light of the current discussion of ‘transitions to democracy’, however, and
especially in view of the recent experience of some Asia-Pacific countries in
resisting democratisation (Burma, China, arguably Indonesia, Singapore and
Tonga) or moving away from it (Fiji, and arguably Malaysia), it seems worth
revisiting some of the central concerns of the literature. More specifically, we
have approached the topic within the framework of a larger interest in the pro-
cesses of regime change and regime maintenance in Asia and the Pacific (see
May 1994), since it is clear that the military has played a major role both in bring-
ing about changes of regime and in forestalling change.9
The principal questions which this volume addresses, therefore, are, first, what
role has the military played in regime change and maintenance in the countries
of Asia and the Pacific, and, second, have differences in the degree of military
involvement in politics been systematically associated with differences in the
performance of the political system, particularly its performance in relation to
democratic criteria?
Before turning to the case studies presented in this volume, however, it is
necessary to reflect briefly on some key concepts.
9 Cf. Luckham (1991:10): ‘Rather than analysing coups as such, we might do better
to consider them as part of a much wider process of transformation: firstly as a
subcategory of a broader class of regime changes or political transitions; and
secondly as one among several different channels through which military power
can influence politics’.
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Democracy and the Military
Huntington (1957), in a study based primarily on the history of the military in
Western societies), elaborated what was widely accepted as the liberal democratic
model of civil-military interaction. ‘[T]he principal responsibility of the military
officer’, Huntington said, ‘is to the state’:10
Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military
officers in politics undermines their professionalism . . .  The military officer must
remain neutral politically . . . The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet
independent of, the area of politics . . . The military profession exists to serve the
state . . . The superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact
(Huntington 1957:16, 71, 73, 76).
The idea of the subservience of the military to civilian authority, as Grundy (1968)
has pointed out, follows a tradition going back to Plato.11 Huntington, however,
challenged the simple identification of civilian control with democratic govern-
ment, and military control with absolute or totalitarian government: the military
may undermine civilian control in a democracy, he argued, acquiring power by
legitimate processes,12 and within a totalitarian system the power of the military
may be reduced by such means as creating competing military or paramilitary
units or by infiltrating it with ‘political commissars’. ‘Subjective civilian con-
trol’, he concluded, ‘thus is not the monopoly of any particular constitutional
system’ (ibid.:82). Huntington went on to distinguish five patterns of civil-mili-
tary relations, based on differing relative degrees of military/anti-military ideo-
logy, military power, and military professionalism (see ibid.: chapter 4), but as
evidenced in his later study (Huntington 1968), for Huntington military ‘inter-
vention’ represented an essential breakdown of the liberal democratic political
order.
While Huntington’s concept of military professionalism has remained influ-
ential, the spate of post-independence military coups in the new states of Africa
and Asia from the late 1950s prompted a more critical examination of the relation
between civilian government and the military. Some commentators, indeed,
10 In context, Huntington appears to equate ‘state’ with ‘government’; the signifi-
cance of distinguishing ‘state’ from ‘government’ is discussed below.
11 Also note von Clausewitz (1832/1968:405): ‘. . .  subordination of the military point
of view to the political is . . . the only thing which is possible’.
12 For a recent statement of this theme, drawing primarily on US experience, see
Johansen (1992).
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suggested that the presumed neutrality and separation of the military from poli-
tics was at best a Western concept, if not a complete fiction (see, for example
Perlmutter 1980:119; Valenzuela 1985:142; Ashkenazy 1994:178). Not only did
military intervention sometimes occur in response to the effective breakdown of
democratic civil regimes – with the ostensible aim of restoring democracy, and
often with substantial popular support – but in some new states, notably the
communist ‘people’s republics’ and the ‘guided democracy’ of Indonesia’s
President Soekarno, an alternative model of ‘democracy’ was espoused, in which
the military was seen as an integral part of the political system rather than, as in
Huntington’s formulation, an agency outside the political realm.13
That a variety of political regimes, in which the pattern of relations between
civilian politicians and the military covers a broad spectrum, should claim to be
‘democratic’ is testimony to the popularity of the term in international political
discourse. Such popularity reflects the extent to which the term acts as an agent
of political legitimation in a world where democracy is accepted, at least rhetori-
cally, as a universal ‘good’. But can military regimes ever be described as demo-
cratic? Or, indeed, are they necessarily anti-democratic? Gallie’s (1956) formu-
lation of democracy as an ‘essentially contested concept’ lends support to a rela-
tivist position, the extension of which is that democracy can mean all things to
all people. As Hewison, Robison and Rodan (1993:5) point out, this effectively
denies the possibility that any universal understandings can be reached and
serves to ‘indemnify the most scurrilous of dictatorships and to undermine the
legitimacy of democratic and reformist oppositions’. On the other hand, too
narrow a definition, especially with respect to institutional forms, is unrealistic.
One way of dealing with this definitional problem is to acknowledge that
regimes measure up differently against various criteria of democracy, and that
the idea of a continuum from more democratic to less democratic is the most useful
and meaningful approach to the problem of analysing and comparing regimes.
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990:6-7), for example, define democracy in terms of
three essential and generally accepted conditions: meaningful competition for
government office; a high level of political participation; and a level of civil and
political liberties sufficient to ensure competition and participation. They
recognise, at the same time, that ‘countries that broadly satisfy these criteria,
nevertheless do so to different degrees’ and that the ‘boundary between
13 See, for example, Albright’s (1980) critique of Huntington’s ‘conceptual frame-
work’ on the basis of the experiences of sixteen communist states. On civil-military
relations in communist states, also see Perlmutter (1982) and Herspring and Volgyes
(1978).
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democratic and undemocratic is sometimes blurred and imperfect’ (ibid.:7; see
also Dahl 1989:112; Hadenius 1992; Sørensen 1993; Lawson 1993).
For military rulers, however, the widespread association of democracy with
civilian supremacy has created a particular crisis of legitimacy. A central pillar of
modern democratic theory is the doctrine of constitutionalism which, in its
simplest form, refers to limited government, a system in which any body of rulers
is as much subject to the rule of law as the body of citizens. An important corollary
to the democratic doctrine of constitutionalism is civilian supremacy (though this
in itself is not a sufficient condition for democracy since, as Huntington pointed
out, many non-democratic governments maintain civilian control over their
military and police organisations). Democracy requires, therefore, not only that
armed forces be subject to civilian control, but that ‘those civilians who control
the military and police must themselves be subject to the democratic process’
(Dahl 1989:245). A fundamental principle of the democratic model of civilian
supremacy in civil-military relations resides in the important distinction between
the state and the legitimate government. It is to the latter that the military owes
its primary allegiance, and any implicit distinction that the military might be
tempted to draw between the goals of the government and those of the state must
provoke a serious legitimacy problem (Harries-Jenkins and van Doorn 1976); this
is so because the democracy model insists that the military’s power is legitimate
only in so far as it has been endorsed by society as a whole and that its practical
objectives are those set for it by the government of the day. Van Gils (1971:274)
states this succinctly:
Under the conditions of pluralistic democracy, the relations between the armed forces
and civilians are, at least theoretically, quite straightforward. Soldiers are public
officials. They are not the embodiment of any particular set of values. They are not
the chosen defenders of any specific social or political institution. They hold public
office on the assumption that they will provide society with a specific set of services
whenever society considers itself in the need of having such services performed.
This reflects the deeply embedded assumption of modern democratic theory, that
it is the popularly elected government, and no other body or person, that is wholly
responsible for deciding what policies are to be pursued in the name of the people.
In so doing, the government is constrained by the limits to action set out under
the law of the constitution, and is ultimately held accountable for its activities
and decisions when it faces the judgement of the people at the polls.
But what if a constitutionally and popularly elected civilian government once
in office abrogates the constitution and rejects the democratic values embodied
in it (including genuinely competitive elections)? In such circumstances – which
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have been not uncommon in post-colonial states – the military may be the only
entity within the country capable of reversing such a development and reinstating
democratic government.
While contemporary democratic theory appears to be entirely at odds with the
notion that the military has any role in unilaterally acting to ‘safeguard the national
interest’, the most common justification for military intervention is just this. Such
appeals to the national interest have frequently been coupled with references to
some perceived crisis or threat involving the security of the state or serious
economic or social problems. As Goodman (1990:xiii) observes for Latin
America:
The frequent military ascension to power has often been motivated by a perceived
need to save their nations from weak, corrupt, and undisciplined civilian leadership.
Numerous commentators on the role of the military in politics have observed
the tendency of armed forces to justify their intervention in terms of the national
interest, and thereby to identify themselves with the desiderata of nationhood.
Most have been sceptical. Lissak (1976:20), for example, notes that the military
can acquire a self image as guarantor of the fundamental and permanent interests
of the nation, thereby arrogating to itself the requisite legitimacy to assume the
right to rule. Similarly, Nordlinger (1970:1137-8) highlights the manner in which
the military’s corporate interests can be defined, legitimised, and rationalised
by a close identification with the interests of the nation, while at the same time
portraying oppositional protests to their actions as ‘expressions of partial and
selfish interests’.
Nevertheless, authoritarian rule is not exclusive to military regimes and, as the
case studies in this volume illustrate, armed forces have played a role in pro-
democracy regime transitions (see also Chazan et al. 1988; Goodman 1990; Rial
1990a). The critical factor for most commentators on civil-military relations
concerns the intention of military rulers to return to the barracks.
To legitimise their intervention, military regimes commonly contend that their
rule is only a preparatory or transitory (but entirely necessary) stage along the
road to a fully democratic political system, and promise an early return to civilian
rule, thereby recognising, Dahl (1989:2) argues, that ‘an indispensable ingredient
for their legitimacy is a dash or two of the language of democracy’. In some
cases, military rule has been justified ‘as necessary for the regeneration of the
polity to allow for stable and effective rule’; military regimes have even portrayed
their role as that of ‘democratic tutor’ (Huntington 1968; Nordlinger 1977:204-
5). Yet once out of the barracks military rulers have seldom been anxious to
relinquish power and even where there have been transitions back to civilian
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rule the armed forces have typically retained an involvement in politics and have
been more likely to intervene again if dissatisfied with the performance of civilian
governments.
Observing processes of transition from authoritarian military rule to democ-
racy in Latin America, Goodman (1990:xiv) comments that, ‘successful tran-
sitions have utilised a process of incremental rather than immediate civilian con-
trol’; he goes on to suggest:
For democracy to take root in Latin America, both military men and civilian leaders
must take on new roles. . .. Recognition that the military is one of the strongest for-
mal institutions in societies that are in dire need of political and social coherence poses
challenges to Latin American civilian leaders that are very different from those
confronted by their developed-nation counterparts (ibid.:xiv; see also Stepan 1988;
Rial 1990a, b and Varas 1990).
Goodman, however, is not explicit on the nature of these ‘new roles’, and other
contributors to the same volume suggest that recently democratised regimes in
Latin America remain vulnerable to ‘the rapid rebirth of military authoritarianism’
(Rial 1990b:289).
In Asia and the Pacific armed forces have played a role in both democratising
and anti-democratic transitions, and though, as elsewhere, their tendency as
rulers has been towards authoritarianism, patterns of civil-military relations and
degrees of authoritarianism/democracy in governance have varied widely. Any
attempt at understanding this variety must begin with an appreciation of the
particular historical and cultural circumstances under which military involvement
in politics has developed in different countries.
The Case Studies
Within this volume we have selected nine countries for detailed study. All but
one – Thailand – were former European colonies, and in all but the Thai case the
liberal democratic model of military professionalism (the model elaborated by
Huntington 1957) has at some stage been dominant. Not represented are those
communist states of Asia in which the party and the military have dominated
politics in such a way as to negate the essential conditions for democracy listed
above. In all but two of the case studies (the Philippines and Papua New Guinea)
there have been successful military coups, over a period stretching from 1932
(Thailand) to 1987 (Fiji) and 1991 (Thailand). In the two exceptional cases, there
have been several unsuccessful coup attempts in the Philippines and occasional
rumours of prospective coups in Papua New Guinea.
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Of those which have experienced military intervention, all but Indonesia have
made the transition back to at least nominal civilian rule and, with the arguable
exception of Fiji, back again to military domination; Thailand has experienced
several such cycles. While the Philippines has not experienced military rule since
independence, it has experienced martial law and repressive authoritarian rule,
under Ferdinand Marcos, and the military played a critical role both in maintaining
Marcos in power and later in the transition which removed Marcos and restored
democracy. The Philippines has not been alone in the experience of an
authoritarian civilian regime; such regimes have also been experienced in (South)
Korea, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Papua New Guinea alone has been able to
maintain a robust democracy (notwithstanding several localised states of emer-
gency and recent military action to suppress a rebellion on Bougainville), and it
has been able to do so even though it has displayed most of the social and
political features which coup theorists have suggested as preconditions and
motivating circumstances for military intervention. In four cases (Thailand, Korea,
Pakistan and the Philippines) the military, or sections of it, have been actively
involved in pro-democratic transitions, and in another (Bangladesh) the military’s
non-intervention facilitated a pro-democratic regime change. In all cases the
military itself has been subject to some degree of factionalism, and in most, ethnic
divisions in society have had an influence on the role the military has played.
The case studies presented here thus provide a rich variety of military-civil
interactions, ranging from the classic military coup to displace a civilian gov-
ernment, through military coups against military regimes and military interven-
tion to change civilian regimes, to successful popular uprisings against military
regimes.
In Indonesia the armed forces (ABRI) trace their origins to the revolution
against Dutch colonialism. Following the surrender of the occupying Japanese
forces in 1945, Indonesian nationalist leaders declared their independence and
began a protracted battle against Dutch and Allied forces which ended with the
formal recognition of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. The Indonesian armed
forces, created in 1945 to support the revolutionary struggle, were recruited large-
ly from the military force, Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland,
PETA), recruited from amongst nationalist elements by the Japanese in 1943,
but included also elements of the pre-war Dutch colonial army, Koninklijke
Nederlansche Indische Leger (KNIL), and spontaneously-formed, politically-
aligned militia units (laskar). Although lacking an effective centralised com-
mand, the military played a major role in the revolutionary war; it also inherited
a distrust of civilian politicians, who, it believed, had been too ready to negotiate
the nation’s political status with the Dutch. Not surprisingly, given its origins,
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the military in the 1950s was a highly politicised and fractious organisation.
The early post-independence years saw growing tension between those
(primarily ex-KNIL officers) who sought to build an apolitical, professional
military along Western lines, and those (mostly ex-PETA and laskar) who favoured
a continuing active role for the military in politics. This resulted, in the early
1950s, in a series of ‘coups’ within the armed forces, which shifted power to-
wards the more politicised groups. At the same time, a series of local rebellions,
and divisions within the government in Jakarta, produced political instability
and led to the imposition of martial law in 1957, and the abnegation of the consti-
tution and inauguration of a regime of ‘Guided Democracy’ two years later.
Despite a greater centralisation of authority, however, political fractiousness and
economic deterioration continued into the 1960s, and following the assassination
in 1965 of several generals by middle-ranking officers associated with the Left,
the military leadership moved against President Soekarno and his left-wing sup-
porters; about half a million Communist Party supporters were killed, the presi-
dent was removed from office, and a ‘New Order’ government, headed by Gen-
eral Suharto, was established. Suharto was installed as president in 1968.
Already in the 1950s army chief-of-staff, Colonel Nasution had put forward the
idea of a ‘Middle Way’ for the armed forces, which combined their conventional
role in the defence of the country with participation in government. After the
overthrow of Sukarno this idea was formally embodied in the principle of dwifungsi
(dual function); in the ‘New Order’ regime of President Suharto, ABRI is formally
represented at all levels of government, military officers head many state enterprises
and have business enterprises, and political support for the president is organised
through Golkar, an effective ‘state party’ which was organised in the first place within
the armed forces. With the assistance of foreign aid and investment, and a firm
attitude towards political dissenters, the Suharto regime has achieved a fairly high
level of political stability and economic performance, and as such has won some
measure of legitimacy. But despite suggestions that the regime is becoming more
open, it remains authoritarian, showing little tolerance of opposition, and there is a
general consensus that when Suharto eventually goes his successor will have to
be a person approved by ABRI.
The Burmese experience parallels that of Indonesia in a number of respects.
As in Indonesia, nationalism flowered in Burma during World War II and Burma’s
post-independence leadership had been closely associated with the anti-colonial
Burma Independence Army recruited and trained by the Japanese. Under some-
what different circumstances, but with common elements of ethnic fragmentation
and class division, Burma also went through a period of considerable turbulence
following independence in 1948 and in 1958 Prime Minister Nu stepped down,
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inviting the armed forces to set up a caretaker government. Elections were held
again in 1960 but the political party which the military supported was defeated
and two years later a military coup brought an end to parliamentary democracy
and reinstated army commander General Ne Win as head of government. With
some parallels to Indonesia’s Golkar, the military’s Burma Socialist Program Party
(BSPP) became an effective state party (other parties were banned in 1964) and
Ne Win and his military associates maintained tight control over what became –
notwithstanding the semblance of a parliamentary system after 1974 – one of the
most repressive and personalised regimes in Asia.
As in Indonesia, the Burmese army was initially composed of diverse elements.
During the British colonial period the Burmese army was recruited predominantly
from among the ethnic minorities, especially the Karen. During World War II,
when Burmese nationalists joined the Japanese-trained Burma Independence
Army and initially fought alongside the Japanese, many of the ethnic minorities
fought with the Allies. There was also (comparable to the Indonesian laskar) a
spontaneously-formed, largely-politically-affiliated Peoples’ Volunteer
Organisation (PVO) in the countryside. By the end of 1948, however, the PVO
had split and declined. With the outbreak of communal violence between
Burmans and Karens, the Karen head of the army was removed; Ne Win was
given command, and the multi-ethnic composition of the army gave way to
Burman domination. Indeed the suppression of ethnic minority revolts became
the army’s principal task.
Unlike the Suharto regime in Indonesia, however, that of Ne Win achieved
neither political stability nor economic progress. Civil rebellion has threatened
the Burmese state virtually since independence and its economy has deteriorated
to the point that Burma has become one of the world’s poorest countries. In 1988
a popular uprising occurred which seemed likely to topple the Ne Win regime;
Ne Win in fact resigned the presidency (though initially remaining as BSPP leader)
and some liberalisation seemed imminent. But in contrast to the Philippines,
where two years earlier the ‘People Power’ revolution, supported by elements
of the armed forces, had removed President Marcos, in Burma the army held
firm; although Ne Win stepped down and the country briefly had a civilian head
of state, when the government promised multiparty elections and other reforms
the military staged another coup. Since then, Burma has been ruled directly by
the military through a State Law and Order Restoration Council. Elections, which
in 1990 gave an overwhelming majority to the pro-democracy National League
for Democracy (NLD), have simply been ignored; the NLD’s leader, Aung San
Suu Kyi, was placed under house arrest and political repression has intensified.
The other country included in this volume with a long history of military in-
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volvement in government is Thailand. But unlike Indonesia and Burma, Thai-
land was never a colony and its first military coup took place in 1932 when the
army intervened to replace Thailand’s absolute monarchy with a constitutional
system. Since then Thailand has gone through cycles of military and civilian rule,
in which military intervention has been sometimes ‘anti-democratic’ (as in 1947,
arguably 1958, 1976 and 1991) and sometimes ‘pro-democratic’ (as in 1932 and
1977), but consistent in seeing the military as having a ‘guardian’ role in the
political system. That the military was able to mount a successful coup in 1991
after about fourteen years of parliamentary government and political liberalisation
suggests, as Suchit Bunbongkarn observes below, that popular commitment to
democratic norms and procedures is not strongly developed; however, the reversal
of the military takeover (albeit with the intervention of the king) suggests the
growing strength of civil society in Thailand, a development which is often
identified with processes of democratisation.
The lack of a developed liberal democratic tradition has been even more ob-
vious in the case of Korea, and Yung Myung Kim argues below that postwar
attempts to impose Western-style democracy upon an unprepared nation simply
did not work. Instead, the imported institutions of liberal democracy gave way
to the authoritarianism of the Rhee Syngman regime. In 1960 Rhee was over-
thrown in a popular uprising, but in the ensuing political turbulence the army
stepped in to reestablish control. What emerged, however, was not direct military
rule but what Kim describes as a system of ‘quasi-civilianised party politics’
headed by Park Chung Hee. Between 1961 and his assassination in 1979 Park’s
regime became increasingly authoritarian and personalised. Referring to commu-
nist threats from the north and from within, Park denounced Western democracy
as inappropriate to Korea’s ‘emergency’ security situation. But the removal of
Park Chung Hee did not bring fundamental changes in the political system. From
the struggle between conservative military elements and popular pro-democracy
forces, the New Military Group of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo emerged
victorious. This group was committed to the continuation of a dominant role for
the military in politics and saw democracy as a potential threat to political stability
and rapid industrialisation. Confrontation between the repressive regime of Chun
Doo Hwan and a growing democracy movement eventually produced a shift
towards constitutional democracy in 1987-88, though conflicts within the
opposition allowed Roh Tae Woo and a faction of the ruling party to achieve
electoral victory, and divisions within the military enabled Roh to extend his
authority there. The outcome, Kim suggests, has been a ‘limited democratisa-
tion’, producing a system ‘somewhere between military-authoritarian and civil-
ian-democratic’. But with the reversal of the relationship between the military
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and civil sectors – from one in the 1950s and 1960s where an ‘overdeveloped’
state, in which the military occupied a critical position, dominated civil society,
to one in which the military is ‘underdeveloped in comparison to the civil sectors’
– Korea appears to have moved, tentatively, towards democracy.
In the two South Asian nations, also, the interaction between military and civil
politics has been complex. Pakistan inherited the British traditions of military
professionalism and non-involvement in politics, but the military became increas-
ingly involved in decision making and eleven years after independence inter-
vened, ostensibly to end the squabbling of civilian politicians and oversee the
rehabilitation of parliamentary democracy. For the next decade Mohammed Ayub
Khan, the first commander-in-chief of Pakistan’s armed forces, ruled initially as
chief martial law administrator and later as the country’s first elected president,
before resigning and handing over power to the then army commander, Yahya
Khan. Two years later, following the defeat of the Pakistan army and the secession
of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Yahya Khan stepped down in favour of a civilian
martial law administrator, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But in 1977 a further coup removed
Bhutto and again placed the country under a martial law regime, headed by Zia
ul Haq. Having ‘legitimised’ his position in a referendum in 1984, President Zia
lifted martial law and introduced a system of ‘controlled democracy’, in which
political power was, at least nominally, shared between the military and civilian
politicians. Four years later, following the death of Zia, elections were held under
the supervision of a military-dominated Emergency Council. The victory of
Benazir Bhutto ended the military’s direct role in politics, though it continued to
play an active indirect part both during Bhutto’s period in office and in her
removal in 1990. After 1990 Pakistan was governed by a pro-military civilian
government until 1993 when Benazir Bhutto was re-elected as prime minister.
However, the military clearly still sees itself as having a ‘guardian’ role.
Indirectly, Bangladesh also substantially inherited the British Indian tradition
of military professionalism, though as in Indonesia and Burma, the circumstances
of the birth of the independent state left a division in the armed forces, between
the professionalism of the former members of the Pakistan military and the poli-
ticisation of the former Mukti Bahini militia, reorganised after independence as
a national security force attached to the ruling Awami League. But following a
brief period of increasingly authoritarian civilian rule, and growing antipathy
between the military and paramilitary forces, the army entered politics in 1975,
ostensibly as guardians of parliamentary democracy. Having achieved power and
initiated a partnership between the military and civilian politicians, General Ziaur
Rahman moved to establish a multi-party system and to civilianise and democra-
tise Bangladesh politics. However, splits with the ruling party following the assas-
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sination of Zia by a group of military officers, and opposition from within the
military to the democratisation process initiated by Zia, led to another military
intervention in 1981-82 and demands for a constitutional role similar to that en-
joyed by the military in Indonesia. Martial law was lifted in 1986 but Chief Martial
Law Administrator General Ershad continued to preside over an authoritarian
regime until 1990 when a popular uprising forced his resignation and re-
established parliamentary democracy.
In all of these Asian states military intervention came at a fairly early stage,
generally in a context of political instability or popular discontent, and not entirely
unexpectedly. In the Pacific island state of Fiji, on the other hand, the military
coups of 1987 came unexpectedly after seventeen years of stable parliamentary
government. As Lawson argues below, the coups had less to do with praetorian
challenges to civilian politics than with the army’s reassertion of the dominant
traditional-aristocratic pattern of Fjian politics following the electoral victory of
an opposition coalition dominated by Fiji Indians and ethnic Fijians from outside
the chiefly establishment. In the wake of the coups, Fiji’s constitution was
rewritten to further entrench the paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests and
consolidate the position of the chiefs. That achieved, the country returned to
civilian rule and in elections in 1992 coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka was popularly
elected as prime minister.
The remaining two countries, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, have not
experienced military rule since independence. Both inherited from their colonial
regimes (US and Australia, respectively) a tradition of military professionalism
which has been reinforced by close ties with their former mentors with respect
to training and financial assistance.
In the case of the Philippines, the armed forces were involved at an early stage
of the post-independence period in domestic security operations, and in subse-
quent years seemed at times on the verge of involvement in civil politics. The
military did not become a significant actor, however, until 1972, when, faced
with communist and Muslim insurgencies, and the prospect of being constitu-
tionally unable to stand for a third presidential term, Ferdinand Marcos declared
martial law. As Marcos sought to consolidate his authority he appointed loyal
officers to senior positions and in doing so politicised the armed forces and
created a division between the professional officers who had graduated from the
Philippine Military Academy and the ‘integré’ officers whose careers rested
largely on political patronage. When a popular uprising occurred in 1986,
protesting the declaration of a fraudulent election, senior military personnel,
including the then deputy commander of the armed forces, Fidel Ramos, broke
with Marcos and joined the opposition; this split within the armed forces (in
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contrast with the pattern of events in Burma in 1988) was critical to the success
of the so-called People Power Revolution which removed Marcos and returned
the Philippines to parliamentary democracy. After her victory in 1986, however,
the incoming president, Corazon Aquino, had to survive seven coup attempts
from elements within the armed forces, notably among the younger professional
officers who had supported the move against Marcos in 1986 and sought a role
in post-Marcos government. Ramos, reinstated as commander of the armed
forces, remained loyal to Aquino, however, and in 1992, as her chosen candidate,
was elected to succeed her. Rebel former military leaders continue to pose a minor
challenge to the Philippine government but the prospects of military intervention
now seem remote.
By the time Papua New Guinea became independent in 1975 many of the newly-
independent states of Africa and Asia had succumbed to military rule, and there
were many who foresaw the likelihood of a similar development in Papua New
Guinea. The classic preconditions for military intervention were there: a high
degree of ‘modernism’ and coherence in the military relative to the institutions
of civil society; threatened corporate interests as expenditure on the military
lagged and the size of the force was reduced; personal ambition, and a highly
fluid pattern of party politics. That a coup has not been attempted probably owes
something to the successful working of Papua New Guinea’s essentially
Westminster-style political institutions and the fact that dissatisfied or ambitious
officers (including the defence force’s first three commanding officers) have
chosen to resign from the military and contest elections (one becoming deputy
prime minister); but it probably owes a lot, also, to the intensely fragmented
topography and ethnic composition of Papua New Guinea. In recent years a
growing perception that the military’s likely role in defence against external
aggression is less significant than the role it has come to play in maintaining
internal security has led to a shift in attitudes towards the military, which has
also become more politicised. Tensions have occasionally arisen in relations be-
tween the military and the civilian government, particularly in relation to the
handling of the ongoing rebellion on Bougainville, but while the possibilities of
a more substantial civil-military confrontation cannot be entirely ruled out, the
prospects of military intervention seem remote.
Comparing experiences
It is tempting to conclude from this overview that each country’s experience is
explicable in terms of its particular historical and cultural circumstances, and to
proceed directly to the individual country studies.
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Certainly the range of civil-military interactions seems to be greater than that
among the states of Africa and Latin America, a factor which might be at least
partially explained by wide variety of colonial experiences.14 Nevertheless, some
common patterns, and some contrasting patterns, invite comparison.
Three countries – Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan – experienced fairly con-
ventional military coups in which the army intervened after several years of
fractious parliamentary politics, ostensibly to restore ‘political order’. In Burma
the army reinstated civilian politics after two years but soon after again intervened
and has remained in power since, becoming one of the modern world’s most
durable military regimes. In both Burma and Indonesia the military had played a
prominent part in the achievement of independence and soldiers had played an
early role in government. In both countries, having intervened decisively, the
military consolidated its position by expanding into civilian administration and
business and by establishing a military-dominated political party. Both regimes
have maintained strong central control, repressing opposition (especially on the
ethnic peripheries), and both have had a poor record in terms of civil and political
liberties.15
But there the similarities end. In Indonesia at least some of the trappings of a
democratic system have been largely maintained, with three effectively state-
approved parties contesting elections (which have been consistently dominated
by the military-backed Golkar); fairly purposeful policy making has achieved
an impressive rate and reasonable distribution of economic development, and
since the late 1960s a fairly high degree of political stability has been maintained.
This has contributed to a degree of performance legitimacy that has enabled
President Suharto to remain in power for almost thirty years, despite criticisms
of what Filipinos might have labelled croneyism and frequent predictions of his
regime’s imminent demise. In contrast, Burma abandoned any pretence of
participatory politics after 1962 and has waged an ongoing war against non-
14 Cf. Sundhaussen (1985). Sundhaussen begins with the proposition that ‘South-
East Asian armies have failed to follow the trend in other regions to withdraw to
the barracks’, and seeks the explanation for this (following the lead of Huntington
1968:237) largely in cultural terms: ‘… there has never been a significant demo-
cratic tradition among the people of South-East Asia … Thus the principle of civil-
ian supremacy over the military … was hardly ever a focal point in the politics of
these countries’ (ibid.:270, 277-78).
15 In the 1994 Freedom House ‘Comparative Survey of Freedom’, on scales of 1-7
(best to worst) for political rights and for civil liberties, Burma scored 7 and 7 and
Indonesia 7 and 6. See Freedom Review 25(1) 1994.
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Burman ethnic groups as well as, for some time, a communist insurrection. These
factors, coupled with a record of economic performance which by 1987 had re-
duced Burma to one of the world’s poorest countries, and a high degree of poli-
tical repression, has severely undermined the legitimacy of the regime. This
culminated in the unsuccessful popular uprising of 1988, from which emerged a
more repressive military regime. In both cases the lack of pronounced divisions
within the military (once Burma had effectively purged the army of its non-Burman
elements) has been a factor in regime maintenance, though in Burma in 1988 it
looked for a while as though a people power movement along the lines of that in
the Philippines two years earlier might force a regime change with military
acquiescence. Explaining the differences in regime performance is more difficult,
though the serious ethnic cleavages which independent Burma inherited from
the colonial period probably imposed greater obstructions to national unity than
Indonesia’s (not inconsiderable) ethnic diversity, and it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that Burma’s opting for virtual economic isolation largely account-
ed for the disastrous economic record which denied any claim the military regime
might have made to legitimacy based on performance.
In Pakistan, also, a politicised military intervened ostensibly to restore political
order. But after a decade as martial law administrator, General Ayub Khan became
elected president and what Pakistan has seen since is an increasing interpenet-
ration of military and civilian politicians, compounded by ethnic divisions, and
a succession of regimes on both sides of a mid point on Bebler’s (1990) proposed
‘militocracy’/’civilocracy’ continuum. And there seems to be nothing to suggest
that this pattern will change substantially.
In Bangladesh, on the other hand, the military initially intervened not to restore
order among fractious politicians but to remove an increasingly authoritarian
civilian regime. And having gained power the military proceeded to civilianise
and democratise Bangladesh politics. Factions of the military again intervened,
however, and though there were suggestions that Bangladesh was moving to-
wards a fused system similar to Indonesia’s dwifungsi, opposition to the authori-
tarianism of the Ershad regime instead led in 1990 to a popular uprising to restore
democracy (though for how long remains to be seen).
In the two South Asian cases, as also in Thailand, the military (or factions of
the military) has emerged as one of several key players in a fluid political system.
Having expanded its role into civil administration, business and politics, and hav-
ing formed linkages with non-military players (including linkages along estab-
lished ethnic/regional and class lines), the military seems likely to continue to
play a role in a broadly civilian-military mixed system, the nature of the role
varying over time according to the political and economic performance of the
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government of the day. Much the same might be said of Korea, where an initially
authoritarian civilian regime was overthrown by popular uprising and the military
stepped in to impose order. Since 1961 Korea has experienced a series of mixed
military-civilian, civilian-military governments, alike in their tendencies towards
authoritarianism, though civil society seems to have become stronger since the
1980s.
In Thailand, and perhaps Korea, there seems to be some validity in the general
proposition that military intervention is less likely as societies become more com-
plex and the middle class expands; the proposition seems less relevant to Pakistan
and Bangladesh – despite the often-cited common military professionalist heri-
tage of British colonialism.
Fiji presents another example of decisive military intervention, but in this case
not so much to restore ‘political order’ – since Fiji had enjoyed a considerable
period of orderly parliamentary government – as to maintain ethnic Fijian (and
chiefly Fijian) dominance. Once this had been achieved, by introducing a new
constitution and holding new elections which returned coup leader Rabuka as
prime minister, civilian rule was restored and further military intervention seems
unlikely.
The Philippines under Marcos presents one of a number of cases of an authori-
tarian, repressive regime (yet one which largely preserved the formal semblance
of democracy – elections, parties, a legislature and judiciary, a reasonably free
press) in which the military played a relatively minor role. As in Bangladesh, the
military’s substantive entry into politics came in support of popular demands for
the restoration of democracy. Having played a part in the removal of Marcos,
elements of the military clearly saw themselves as having a continuing role in
government, but notwithstanding a series of unsuccessful coup attempts the
model of military professionalism was substantially maintained. Thus, what has
to be explained in the Philippines – as in Papua New Guinea, where despite occa-
sional rumours of an imminent coup military intervention has never been attempt-
ed – is why successful coups have not occurred. In both countries most of the
classic preconditions and motives for coups have been present: imbalance be-
tween the military and civil political institutions and at least periods of arguable
political instability, threatened corporate interests of the military, and personal
ambition; factionalism within the military has also existed, though not on the same
scale (and without the obvious ethnic or class divisions) that has been ex-
perienced elsewhere. Both countries inherited strong traditions of professional-
ism, but in that they were no different from Fiji or Pakistan. An attractive line of
explanation perhaps lies in the vitality of civil politics in both countries – a vitality
which in the Philippines even the repressive regime of President Marcos failed
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to stifle – and in the sheer logistical difficulties of maintaining centralised control.
But in varying degrees both these arguments might be applied to other cases (for
example, Pakistan and Indonesia) in which coups have occurred.
Indeed the case studies in this volume produce little to support systematically
any of the common ‘explanations’ for military intervention, although elements
of all such explanations can be invoked. In explaining the individual cases, history
(especially concerning the role of the military in the colonial regime and its part
in a struggle for independence) is obviously important, as is ethnicity in some
cases (notably Burma and Fiji) and factionalism within the military (for example,
Indonesia, Bangladesh).
On the question of performance, also, generalisation is difficult. In terms of
economic performance, military or military-civilian fused regimes have performed
well in Korea and, to an extent, Indonesia (though perhaps not as well as non-
military regimes in the region such as Singapore and Malaysia), but have
performed poorly in Burma and Bangladesh (though no more poorly than the
civilian administration of the Philippines under Marcos); Thailand’s record (as
in many other respects) is mixed.
In terms of political performance, measured against the three criteria listed
above – competition, participation, and civil and political liberties – there is
stronger evidence of a military/non-military divide, but again the evidence is not
clear cut. Comparing countries, Burma and to a lesser extent Indonesia have
performed poorly against all three criteria, as have Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Korea under military rule. In Fiji, also, during the brief period of military rule
there was a decline in political competition and a deterioration of civil and political
liberties, though not to the extent experienced in the Asian states. On the other
hand, the essentially civilian regime in the Philippines under Marcos also
performed badly against the competition, and civil and political liberties criteria
and, with some qualifications, against the participation criterion, for at least part
of the period of the Marcos administration. Within the region, the civilian
governments of Singapore, Malaysia and Tonga also have far from unblemished
records.
As a rough comparative measure, the nine countries covered in this volume,
together with nine other Asian and Pacific countries, are ranked below (Figure
1) on the basis of the 1994 Freedom House ‘Comparative Survey of Freedom’
(the two Freedom House gradings, for political rights and civil liberties, ranked
on a scale (best to worst) of 1-7, have been averaged; those with a rating of 1-
2.5 are categorised by Freedom House as ‘free’; those scoring 3.0-5.5 as ‘partly
free’ and those above 5.5 as ‘not free’). The Freedom House ratings are not beyond
question (it is not obvious, for example, why Papua New Guinea is classed as
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‘partly free’, below Western Samoa and South Korea), but they are probably the
most widely accepted measure available of comparative freedom, and thus of
the degree of democracy (or relative ‘democracidity’). They show the two long-
time military-dominated regimes of Indonesia and Burma at the bottom of the
list, along with Brunei and several communist states; most of the rest (including
the two states – the Philippines and Papua New Guinea – in which coups have
either failed or not been attempted) are grouped around the middle of the range,
with Bangladesh and Papua New Guinea performing better and Thailand and
Pakistan worse – but all outranking the civilian regimes in Singapore and
Malaysia. South Korea alone is listed (contentiously, perhaps) among the ‘free’
countries.





3.0 Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea
3.5 Philippines, Fiji






7.0 Burma (North Korea, PRC, Vietnam)
(Source: Freedom Review 25(1) 1994:14-15).
What is more pertinent, however, is how changes in regime within a single
country affect political performance. Here the evidence is less opaque, but still
not unambiguous. In general, military intervention has resulted in restrictions
on both competition and participation and, sometimes with a lag but usually in-
creasingly, in limitations on civil and political liberties. The arguable exceptions
are Thailand in 1932, Korea in 1960-61 and Bangladesh in 1975, where the mili-
tary ostensibly intervened to restore civil and political liberties and increase com-
petition and participation, though even among these cases (notably Korea) it
may be argued that the tendency to democratisation was shortlived.
It should also be observed, however, that the impact of military intervention
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on different parts of the population is uneven. Typically, the impact of military
intervention is heaviest on those most actively engaged in politics, and these are
often (but not always) a social as well as political elite. When military intervention
does something to restore ‘political order’ and promote economic development,
large segments of the population may perceive themselves (as the proponents of
bureaucratic authoritarianism and its variants once argued) to be better off. It is
this, perhaps, that helps explain the longevity of the Suharto regime and the
acceptance, by much of the population, of martial law in the Philippines in 1972.
Similarly, it has been argued by some that the Fiji coups of 1987 were welcomed
by most ethnic Fijians as a reassertion of the paramountcy of Fijian (over Indo-
Fijian) interests (although Lawson’s analysis below suggests that this is an over-
simplification). The broad question of who gains and who loses from military
intervention has seldom been adequately addressed, either for the larger civil
society or for those within the military itself.
Beyond these restricted comparisons, generalisations are hazardous. Never-
theless several low-level generalisations suggest themselves.
First, by virtue of their monopoly (or at least dominant control) over the means
of coercion, and frequently because they are a relatively coherent organisation
in a fragmented society, militaries can play a major role in bringing about changes
of regime, not just in fluid political situations (such as in Burma in 1958 or Indo-
nesia in the mid 1960s) but in fairly stable ones (Fiji in 1987 [though the 1987 coups
were essentially regime maintaining], Korea in 1960-61). They may also play an
important role in forestalling changes of regime (as in Burma in 1988).
Second, in ‘explaining’ military intervention, it is evident that the relative
strength of civil and military institutions, larger divisions in society, corporate
and factional interests of the military, personal ambitions, and external factors
may all be relevant in different proportions, but none provides a reliable indicator
of military intervention (as the Papua New Guinea and Philippines cases show).
Third, while a shift along the continuum from civilian to military regime is not
strongly correlated either with economic performance or with the degree of
democracy, there is, not surprisingly, substance to the general proposition that
military regimes are oriented more towards maintaining ‘order’ – against which
criterion, however, they perform variably, with Indonesia and Thailand providing
polar examples of regime stability – and to maximising their corporate (or per-
haps more correctly their collectively individualised) interests, than to promoting
the liberal democratic values of competition, participation, civil and political
liberties, and more egalitarian distribution of wealth.
Fourth, although these case studies provide varying instances of military
withdrawal, the general conclusion seems to be that having once intervened
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military leaders are likely to seek to maintain a political role, either as guardians,
with the implication that further interventions are likely, or by the interpenetration
of the interests of military and civilian personnel in politics, civil administration
and business. This conclusion, which is amply recognised in a growing body of
literature on the morphology of civil-military regimes, suggests there is scope
for further research in at least two major areas of civil-military relations. One of
these concerns the role of the military in civilian administration and in the mili-
tary/civilian borderland of paramilitary, internal security, and law and order type
operations.16 The other has to do with the involvement of militaries institutionally,
and soldiers individually, in business. In both these areas, the almost universal
tendency towards expansion of the role of the military suggests the possibility
of gradual change in regime type without major discontinuities in government.
The military seems likely to continue to play an important role in the politics
of the countries of Asia and the Pacific, notwithstanding predicted tendencies
towards democratisation. To comprehend that role it will be increasingly neces-
sary to shift the focus of research from the military per se to the activities of
soldiers in the complex of military-civil relations. It is towards this endeavour that
our volume is directed.
16 ‘Paramilitary forces’ are a major concern of Janowitz (1977) and ‘military civic
action’ is the subject of a volume by de Pauw and Luz (1991). The role of
officially-recognised ‘vigilantes’ in the Philippines is discussed in May (1992).
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2
THE  MILITARY  AND  DEMOCRACY  IN  INDONESIA
Michael R.J. Vatikiotis
At the close of the 1980s, Indonesia’s military was in a state of flux. Over a decade
of declining political fortunes for an institution considered the fulcrum of Presi-
dent Suharto’s New Order regime was generating something of an identity crisis.
Yet as the political edifice which the military helped erect in the mid 1960s showed
signs of age and decline, the military moved awkwardly to adapt its image and
role in order to preserve its perceived position as the principal body in the political
constellation. In doing so, new interpretations of the civil-military relationship
evolved.
To understand the Armed Forces of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik
Indonesia or ABRI) – and its attitude towards democracy – it is important to grasp
the relationship between the military and the state in Indonesia. Basically, this
relationship developed under stress. The earliest independent civilian gov-
ernment of the new republic, as Kahin (1952) and more recently Salim (1991)
describe, hesitated to form a national army and prevaricated over its form. At the
same time, the armed revolutionary youth groups (pemuda) which had launch-
ed the armed struggle almost as soon as the Japanese imperial occupation collapsed
in August 1945 were suspicious of the civilian nationalists who not only hesitated
to declare independence, but were keener to organise political parties than a
national army. This reluctance on the part of the civilian government to deal with
the army in the early days of the revolution created, Salim (1991:33) suggests,
a particular pattern of civilian military relations, and all subsequent efforts to bring
the army completely under its control failed.
This bifurcation of the two most important elements of the Indonesian polity at
so formative a stage of its existence provides a useful guide to the country’s
subsequent political history.
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Essentially, the history of Indonesian government since independence has been
the progressive emasculation of the multi-party, parliamentary democracy en-
visaged by nationalist leaders, like Soetan Sjahrir, imbued in various degrees
with the European liberal socialist orthodoxy. Sjahrir, as expressed in his influ-
ential 1945 pamphlet ‘Perjuangan Kita’ (‘Our Struggle’) specifically wanted to
see Indonesia shun a one-party system under a monolithic executive.
He feared the development of a totalitarian government in Indonesia because of the
legacy of feudalistic authoritarianism which had been kept alive and reinforced by
the long period of colonial government (Kahin 1952 :166).
Herbert Feith (1962:313) argues that the adoption of a system of constitutional
democracy in the first decade of independence reflected the influence of men
like Sjahrir and Mohammad Hatta. But he is careful to distinguish between the
idea of democracy as a ‘legitimating principle’ and actual majority rule. There
was never any substance lent to the ‘characteristic principles and mechanisms
of constitutional democracy’.
Imperfectly implemented, Feith argues that this early and only era of consti-
tutional democracy in Indonesian political history was nonetheless reasonably
effective. The parliament may not have been an elected body, but cabinets were
accountable to it. The press was free, the courts operated independently, and a
semblance of non-political bureaucracy emerged.
However, disillusionment with this system quickly developed. The 1955 gen-
eral election, considered by many Indonesians to be the only genuinely represen-
tative election the country has ever held, etched out the country’s religious and
communal elements with alarming clarity. The two main Muslim parties obtained
almost 40 per cent of the vote; the Communists 16 per cent and the Nationalist
Party (PNI) just 22 per cent. The results laid bare potentially divisive forces in
the infant republic. The country was already afflicted by regional rebellions and
the army grew restless, forcing Soekarno to step in with an alternative to con-
stitutional democracy in the form of ‘guided democracy’. Indonesia turned its
back on constitutional democracy and began developing the strong executive
rule inherited by Suharto’s New Order.
The military’s attitude to this early period of post-independence politics was
very much governed by its role in the independence struggle. ABRI considers
itself the progenitor of the state , having fought a war of independence against
the Dutch from 1945-1949. As stated in Law No. 20 on Members of the Armed
Forces (1988):
The history of the Indonesian struggle has been a series of armed resistance put up
by the people against colonialism.
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As such ABRI projects itself as the guardian of the nation, a definition which,
as Finer (1974:535) points out, imbues a tradition of loyalty to the state, rather
than obedience to the rulers of the day. Indeed, as part of the soldier’s oath taken
by every member of ABRI, loyalty is sworn only to ‘the Unitary State of the
Republic of Indonesia that is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution’.
There is no mention of the government or the executive.
In crude terms, ABRI still regards itself as a people’s army. Central to ABRI
thinking, however, is a doctrine crystallised in the soldiers’ oath, or Sapta Marga,
which endows the army with guardianship of the state. To justify this, ABRI must
be shaped as a people’s army, using a strategy of close cooperation with the people.
In summary, the strategy of total defence and the Sapta Marga theoretically
positions ABRI with the people and above the state. To understand why this is
so, some consideration of national history, as seen through ABRI’s eyes, is
essential.
ABRI considers that independence was achieved by the armed struggle against
the Dutch, which not only had to contend with the colonial army, but also the
treachery of Indonesian communists, and the weakness of civilian nationalist
leaders who were prepared to fall back in the face of Dutch aggression. One of
the events of the war most drummed into army cadets is the 19 December 1948
capitulation of the civilian government after the first capital, Jogyakarta, was
occupied by the Dutch. It was only ABRI’s resolve to continue the fight ‘with or
without the government’, that persuaded the world that Indonesia would not return
to Dutch hands, the cadets are taught. The implication is clear; ABRI, not the
civilian government, saved the infant republic.
Soon after independence the army was called on to suppress a series of regional
revolts which threatened the unitary state. Barely had these revolts been sup-
pressed when another threat to the state in the shape of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) loomed. The events of 30 September 1965, which lit the
short fuse to the end of President Soekarno’s rule, saw the military once again
step in to restore order and save the nation. This view of their own history has
endowed the military with a deep suspicion of politicians and dissenting groups.
The birth of the New Order brought ABRI for the first time a leading role in
Indonesian political life. As Sundhaussen points out, the army’s entry into formal
politics came after twenty years of civil-military tensions (Sundhaussen 1982:
257). Underlying this tension, as senior commanding officers of the period have
subsequently described, was a perpetual hesitancy on the part of senior officers
to be dragged into running the country. It may have been that opportunities were
scarce, or that prior attempts at intervention were unsuccessful. But former army
chief of staff T.B. Simatupang argues that there was a distinct aversion to military
rule among the military intellectual elite:
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During the 1950s there was originally a strong reluctance and a feeling of scepticism
and uneasiness among the army leadership when the army had to perform an
expanded role in view of the continuing political instability. They were haunted by
the spectre of creating what was perceived then as a ‘Latin American situation’ in
Indonesia (Simatupang 1989:135).
Suharto and his somewhat less educated, less travelled followers were clearly
not imbued with such notions. As Crouch (1978:26) aptly points out, they rep-
resented a new class of officer from small towns in Java, less formally educated
but with strong claims to prominence because of their role in the struggle against
the Dutch. Though much questioned by his detractors, Suharto participated as
a local military commander in some of the key actions against Dutch forces in
and around Jogyakarta. If he was not, as claimed, a key figure in the campaign,
he certainly played a role.
Yet it would be incorrect to assume the New Order core group clustered around
Suharto was intent on the crude seizure of power. To this day, Suharto is adamant
that his accession to power after the 11 March 1966 Order did not amount to a
coup d’état. Rather, he argues in his 1988 ghost-written autobiography, he was
pushed along by events beyond his control:
I was pushed in an atmosphere of political conflict to step forward. Some politi-
cians were impatient for a change of leadership to the point of proposing that I assume
power just like that. I responded to this proposal at once; ‘If that’s the way things
are, I’d better step down. Such a method is not good. Seizing power by military force
will not bring about lasting stability. I am not going to bequeath a history indicating
that there was once a seizure of power by military might’ (Suharto 1989:185).
This highlights one of ABRI’s persistent concerns under the New Order. For
one of the key inputs to civil military relations has been the legitimising of ABRI’s
intervention in 1965 in ideological, nationalistic terms. At the outset there seemed
to be an awareness that Soekarno’s sudden ouster could set a dangerous pre-
cedent, and every effort was made to cloak it in constitutional trappings. Suharto
may have assumed executive powers in March 1966, but it was not until 1968
that he was formally appointed president of the republic, and not until 1971 that
a general election was held.
Delicate manoeuvres to remove Soekarno – whom many suspected could still
command substantial popularity even within the armed forces (Legge 1972:405)
– was followed by a reworking of ABRI’s doctrine. At an Army Seminar in 1966,
ABRI’s dual political and military function (dwifungsi), which was first proposed
in the late 1950s, was sharpened. Earlier definitions of ABRI’s dual role had
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sought to establish ABRI’s right to participate in national development using
the dual function principle formulated in 1958. According to Simatupang
(1989:136), it was ‘an attempt to provide a rationale . . . at the same time laying
down limitations to the expanded role’.
The events of 1965 elevated ABRI’s right to assume a non-military role from a
choice into an obligation. The seminar declared that ABRI was forced by
circumstances to stand by the people, because ‘all the people’s hopes for well-
being are focused on the armed forces in general, and the army in particular’. As
Jenkins (1984:4) points out, the 1966 seminar acted as timely ideological
justification for what in effect the army was already practising.
On reflection, though, it is important to note that civilian aspirations at the time
also helped the army assume control of the government. Civilian intellectuals and
professionals bore the brunt of Soekarno’s relentless politicisation of society;
his so-called ‘politics as commander’ strategy which forced people to choose
sides as the Indonesian Communist Party grew in strength and numbers. The
prominent writer and journalist, Goenawan Mohamad recalls :
Recurrent calls for ‘indoktrinasi’ (indoctrination) took place in almost every poli-
tical circle, with Marxism and Sukarno’s writings being the main components of the
teaching. No one, it seemed, was free from them. ‘Revolution’ became a highly
hypnotic word: it could immediately make one either combative or submissive
(Mohamad 1989:72).
The atmosphere prevalent at the time helped ABRI acquire a political role.
First, because before Soekarno’s fall, the military, with encouragement from
friendly Western powers, had begun setting up social organisations to counter
the spread of Communist influence. One of these, Sekber Golkar, eventually
formed the nucleus of the New Order’s principal mass political organisation,
Golkar.
Once in power, however, ABRI also found that popular reaction against the
politicisation of the Soekarno era aided moves to dismantle civilian political
structures, among them most of the political parties of Soekarno’s ‘Old Order’.
Quite simply, the civilian elite was willing to see the army assume power in the
hope that order and stability would be restored. Such was their desire for stability,
many civilians were blind to the implications of army rule for the function of
democratic institutions enshrined in the 1945 constitution.
It would also be misleading to assume ABRI had a plan or strategy for the
execution of their role in politics. It now seems clear from contemporary diplo-
matic reports that ABRI was divided over what to do about Soekarno’s headlong
tilt towards the Communist fold. Concern about the situation ran up against a
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reluctance to intervene and actually usurp power, probably because no one was
certain whether any attempt to do so would attract solid backing within the
military.
Once in power, the military had no clear idea of how to proceed either. Some
elements of the armed forces, probably an intellectual minority led by chief of
staff General A.H. Nasution, envisaged their political role as only temporary, in
line with the original ‘middle way’ formulation of the dual function. He was
overruled by Suharto and his group, who seemed to have an informal popular
mandate to restore order and stability as quickly as possible and using whatever
available means.
For all practical purposes . . . during the initial period of the New Order, national
leadership was identical with army leadership, not as the result of a usurpation of
power through a coup d’etat or the like, but simply because the alternative would
have been anarchy and chaos (Simatupang 1989:135).
As measure of the confused thinking about the army’s role, it is interesting to
note how some of those who participated in the early development of the New
Order are capable of reconsidering ABRI’s position.
It was never the philosophy of ABRI to perpetuate the crisis situation that existed
in October 1965. The intensity and involvement of ABRI in political life is com-
pletely dependent on the political situation of the moment. If we feel it is no longer
needed, we have to release all jobs to civilians (interview with General (retd.) Sumitro,
6 February 1988).
If thinking along these lines existed among the ranks of senior ABRI officers
when the New Order came to power, it should not be confused with the aims of
the core group clustered around Suharto, which proceeded to erect the New
Order’s political edifice. In fact, judging from the early disaffection of officers
like Nasution, Kemal Idris, H. Dharsono, and others who supported Suharto in
his rise to power, there was disenchantment over how the New Order was pro-
ceeding right from the beginning. Subsequent interviews with these men reveal
a common thread; they felt that civilian functions of the government should have
been restored and fostered. Instead, Suharto and his men proceeded slowly but
steadily to dismantle the civilian political infrastructure, first by banning the
parties which existed in the Soekarno period, and then by gradually introducing
stringent legislation controlling the freedom of political expression.
Yet if certain quarters in ABRI felt the New Order was taking the dual function
too far, neither was ABRI given a free hand to run the state. Instead, the state
became progressively dominated by Suharto and his inner circle. Probably unsure
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of ABRI loyalties, Suharto deployed tactics of divide and rule which often
favoured civilian bureaucratic interests at the expense of ABRI. Thus ABRI began
losing power almost as soon as they achieved it. To understand why, the Suharto-
ABRI relationship must be looked at in more detail.
Suharto and ABRI
President Suharto dates his official entry into the Indonesian Army on the same
day it was founded, 5 October 1945. His subsequent military career bears some
examination, because it tells us something about his own attitude towards the
army and the army in politics. Suharto drifted into the new republic’s army after
brief service in the Dutch colonial army (KNIL) and a spell in the Indonesian
militia organised by the Japanese occupation forces. Like many young men in
Java at the time, he claims to have been drawn to the cause of fighting for in-
dependence. His prior formal military experience under the Dutch and Japanese
almost certainly explains why he was given a local command in Central Java.
Suharto’s actual role in the war of independence is a subject of controversy.
The official history grants him a leading role in the 1 March 1949 ‘general attack’
on Jogyakarta, when Indonesian forces surprised the Dutch and briefly occupied
Jogyakarta. In his autobiography, Suharto relates how he was at the centre of
things, discussing strategy with the revered army commander, General Sudir-
man. Others have subsequently cast doubt on his importance during the cam-
paign, arguing that he was but one of many local commanders, and even casting
aspersions on his capabilities in the field. General Nasution claims, for example,
that Suharto was reluctant to follow orders, preferring to wait and see what others
did first.
Naturally, both sides of the story are heavily cloaked in later political inter-
pretations. Any objective assessment, however, must assume that Suharto’s pres-
ence in Central Java at the height of the war placed him in a position to partici-
pate in significant military action, and the fact that soon afterwards he commanded
troops to put down a regional revolt in Makassar suggests that his abilities and
experience were recognised by the high command.
The more interesting period of his military career began with his transfer to
Central Java in 1952. After a spell as chief of staff of the regional divisional com-
mand, he was elevated to regional commander in 1957, with the rank of full
colonel. These were difficult times for ABRI. The fledgling state was unable to
find funds to finance a fully-equipped professional army, so ABRI was encour-
aged to seek independent financing by establishing its own businesses. To do
this, ABRI officers formed business liaisons with local Chinese businessmen.
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The nationalisation of Dutch companies declared by Soekarno in 1957 also saw
many lucrative enterprises fall into ABRI’s hands.
Suharto demonstrated consummate skill at satisfying the quartermastering
demands of the division, striking up a relationship with one businessman, Liem
Sioe Long, who later became the largest corporate player under the New Order.
Here too he established the core group of officers who were later to serve as his
closest aides after 1966, men like Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Hurmurdani. The
period was therefore formative for Suharto, and determined some of the methods
he applied to his rule after becoming president. The conditions faced by Suharto
in Central Java represented the harsh realities of ABRI’s struggle to survive.
Confronted by budgetary difficulties and the threat of Communist-led insurrec-
tion, ABRI was forced to adapt and deploy unconventional methods. The terri-
torial system developed to combat regionalism and Communism ensured that
the military presence was pervasive right down to the village level. Yet it was
less a strategy of warfare than of the imposition of strict control over the
population.
To fund military operations, deals were cut with local businessmen. They
helped set up local foundations to act as fronts for the imposition of taxes on
most economic activities. The activities of Suharto’s division were so lucrative
they attracted the attention of the Jakarta high command, which had Suharto
quietly removed from the position in 1959 and sent to staff college. Suharto con-
tinued to use social foundations, yayasans, after coming to power; in fact they
became a major source of funding for the military elite, and provide the lion’s
share of funds for important political institutions like Golkar. The fact that Suharto
was effectively fired because the army considered these practices corrupt in the
late 1950s, seems to have had no effect on the perception of the system as it is
applied on a much larger scale today.
The important point is that Suharto brought with him to the presidency both
the methods and the men from this period in Central Java. Neither was looked
upon as orthodox by the intellectual military elite in Jakarta at the time. General
Nasution relates that Suharto told him in 1968 : ‘General, my politics are at the
point of a bayonet’. Nasution contends that from the beginning Suharto surround-
ed himself with men who were not from the army’s mainstream:
Soeharto became more or less presidium of the army’s political think tank, Panitia
Sospol, led by Basuki Rachmat and Sutjipto. Into this Soeharto brought in Murtopo
as his asintel (assistant for intelligence). With him came the Tanah Abang Group
(mainly Chinese Catholic students under Murtopo’s wing) with their strategic plans
for the future. Not the army. We had no plans. In this sense, the army more or less
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faded away in its influence on Soeharto (interview with General A.H. Nasution,
11 November 1989).
Nasution himself was perhaps by this stage less representative of the main-
stream. But his point underlines the extent to which the generation of officers
with more educated and intellectual backgrounds had been marginalised – or
eliminated – by 1966.
1970-1988: ABRI Under the New Order
This brief look at Suharto’s military origins provides a useful springboard from
which to examine the development of ABRI’s role and position under the New
Order. For if the New Order is considered in general terms as a military-backed
regime, closer examination of the more recent period reveals that it has been
Suharto rather than ABRI which has reaped the fruits of power. Compounding
this sense of impotency was the progressive division of ABRI thinking into two
schools: one closely associated with Suharto and enjoying the benefits of his
power and patronage, the other increasingly estranged from the ruling group and
advocating ABRI’s gradual withdrawal from politics (Jenkins 1984:255).
For much of the 1970s and early 1980s, ABRI found itself torn between these
two poles. The steady consolidation of the Suharto group saw military men attain
considerable power and prestige, but in the process, arguably, the military tenor
of the regime became diluted. If one examines the methods of men like Murtopo
and Sudharmono – two of Suharto’s closest aides over this period – much of
what they achieved was at cross-purposes with the military. Murtopo’s opsus
(special operations group) favoured unorthodox methods of intelligence and sub-
terfuge to execute policy, often leaving the military high command in the dark.
Sudharmono’s legalistic mind helped erect an array of legal props to Suharto’s
legitimacy and gradually strengthened the civilian bureaucracy at the expense
of the military. He engineered a presidential order (number 10) which deprived
ABRI of considerable financial clout by diverting lucrative government tenders
to businessmen close to the palace.
Those on the periphery of the ruling group grew steadily uncomfortable with
what they saw as Suharto’s entrenchment in power. Some have since suggested
that Suharto was not expected to last by the military elite.
I never thought he would last so long. In 1971 I expressed the view that the president
should run only for two years, because otherwise his vested interests would take
over. Suharto may also have seen the sense in this, but those around him told him to
go on (interview with General Kemal Idris, 16 January 1990).
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The effect this had on ABRI’s relationship with the leadership and the civilian
elite cannot be underestimated. Arguably, growing disaffection towards Suharto
in certain ABRI quarters by the mid 1970s lent strength to the view that ABRI
should be less engaged in politics, for this implied a distancing from the leader-
ship. In doctrinal terms, it produced by the late 1970s a move to purify ABRI’s
position in the state above all groups.
Suharto’s grasp of the implications of such a position in terms of loyalty to
the leadership prompted him to lash out at ABRI in 1980 for failing to see that
defence of the constitution could not be achieved without supporting the New
Order. Therefore, he said, ABRI must choose sides; it could not consider voting
for any group other than Golkar, of which ABRI is a component part. The impli-
cations shocked many senior officers: ABRI a part of the Golkar family? ABRI
serving the New Order? Such notions flew in the face of ABRI doctrine. But
realistically speaking, they accurately located ABRI’s position under Suharto.
Against this background of diverging views and loyalties within ABRI, ques-
tions about ABRI’s role in politics and support for a more democratic style of
government in Indonesia began to surface. From the above, it would appear that
the stimulus for ABRI’s questioning of its political role was derived from the
realisation in certain quarters that Suharto’s entrenchment in power was no longer
serving ABRI’s interests, and indeed was hindering ABRI’s own ability to serve
the people. Initial attempts to put a distance between ABRI and the Suharto
regime surfaced in the mid 1970s. Suharto was able to check these potential
threats to his position by his judicious manipulation of senior appointments in
ABRI. Those generals considered a threat were sidelined. But this served only
to define more sharply the distinction between those in ABRI who believed the
military should play a less overtly political role, and those – considered close to
Suharto – who had no intention of altering the status quo.
In his seminal monograph on the Indonesian military, David Jenkins concludes
that however divided ABRI was becoming because of the power struggle at the
top, ABRI was, as he put it, ‘dug in on the commanding heights of the political,
economic and social landscape’ (Jenkins 1984:263). The anatomy he presents
of the debate about ABRI’s role seems dominated more by semantics than sub-
stance. Arguably, the concerns were more political than real. Can the same be
said of the more recent period? Is ABRI moving any closer to significant change
in attitude towards its role in politics?
1988-1991: ABRI Faces an Uncertain Future
The end of the 1980s saw Indonesia recover its composure after the disastrous
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fall in oil prices which sent the economy hurtling into decline. A combination of
artful macro-economic reform and full support from the country’s aid donors not
only has helped the economy to recover, but also shows signs of at last living
up to its considerable potential. But with the economic boom of the late 1980s
came calls for political liberalisation. Some intellectuals saw little point in grant-
ing the private sector more freedom without accompanying political reforms.
Pressures for political reform surfaced against a background of mounting
concern in elite circles about Suharto’s tenure in office. Soon after his re-election
for a fifth term of office in March 1988, debate focused on the succession. Suharto
entered his seventieth year in 1991 showing no signs that he intended to retire
before the next election in 1993, and behaving as if he wanted to stay the course
for a sixth term. This intensified concerns about how to manage the succession
smoothly. Talk of succession has been a perennial feature of the New Order’s
political cycles, but this kind of talk surfacing so soon after Suharto’s 1988 re-
election suggested new urgency. Altogether, calls for more openness and debate
over the succession generated a highly charged political atmosphere, one in
which ABRI found itself to some extent intellectually outclassed and encumbered
by anachronistic ideas.
While senior ABRI officers continued to harp on vigilance against the Com-
munist threat and ‘national discipline’ as the keys to stability, civilian intellec-
tuals were arguing that democratisation was needed to renew and preserve the
New Order. It was not long before certain military leaders saw the political advan-
tages of adjusting to this new thinking and coopting those who were behind it.
Far from being ideologically inspired – or necessarily committed to democracy
– as will be argued below, ABRI needed a political constituency.
The year 1988 taught ABRI just how low their political stock had sunk under
the New Order. A move to pass a new soldiership law through parliament was
blocked in late 1987 after the executive branch mobilised the parliamentary
factions to raise objections to the draft. The draft bill included alterations to the
soldier’s oath which emphasised allegiance to the constitution and by implication
de-emphasised loyalty to the government of the day. It also sought to neutralise
the president’s notional powers as supreme commander by sharpening the
authority of the ABRI commander. The draft bill, for instance, proposed increas-
ing the mandatory retirement age from 55 to 60 (Vatikiotis 1987:35). Subsequent
revisions to the draft were forced on ABRI after lengthy debate in parliament,
which ironed out these conspicuous attempts – using constitutional means –
to enhance military power, and the bill was passed.
Worse was to come. When ABRI signalled its objection to Suharto over his
choice of vice president in the 1988 presidential election, they once again found
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their influence much weakened. Suharto had earlier indicated he wanted Sud-
harmono, the chairman of Golkar and state secretary, to have the job. Sudhar-
mono, the shrewd ex-Army lawyer who was the architect of much of the New
Order’s legal and bureaucratic edifice, was considered unsuitable by ABRI. As
Golkar chairman he had worked assiduously to reduce ABRI’s influence over the
party. Using the state secretariat, he had effectively drained a good deal of ABRI’s
pool of extra-budgetary funding. In the eyes of the military, Sudharmono
represented a dangerous threat to their political supremacy.
ABRI was overruled. By demonstrating so openly his disregard for ABRI’s ad-
vice, and insisting on Sudharmono becoming vice president, Suharto demonstrat-
ed that he no longer needed ABRI as a prop to sustain his power. The political
fallout made a deep impression on the military and triggered introspection on
ABRI’s role in politics and its relationship with the national leadership on one
side, and the people on the other.
ABRI’s catharsis was expressed in two ways. The political setbacks of 1988
almost immediately led to further disaffection within the ABRI leadership. Most
notably, the former ABRI commander, General L.B. Murdani, smarting from his
curt dismissal before the presidential election, signalled that his patience with
Suharto was wearing thin. He joined the ranks of the dispirited, but retained a
cabinet position as Defence minister. Showing how much more important per-
sonalities can be than institutions in Indonesian politics, as ABRI commander
Murdani overshadowed the Defence minister. Once he was in the job, the position
once more assumed importance.
Murdani, aided by his extensive intelligence network, set about laying am-
bushes for Sudharmono almost as soon as he was elected vice president.
Rumours surfaced, for example, of his involvement in the Communist uprising
at Madiun in 1948. Sudharmono took these seriously enough to publicly deny
his Communist sympathies in late 1988. For a political culture steeped in the art
of discretion, the anti-Sudharmono campaign broke all the rules. One prominent
retired general even refused to hang his portrait beside that of President Suharto.
Arguably, though, the ABRI leadership’s sniping at the vice president was
wasted ammunition. For Suharto, the advantage was two-fold: the campaign
against Sudharmono drew some of his opponents out into the open, and it also
drove a wedge into Golkar. Ironically, this was useful because it served to weaken
Sudharmono’s strong grip over the party – thus denying him a power base. He
lost the chairmanship of Golkar in November 1988, in spite of a furious campaign
mounted by his supporters. It also ensured that some of the smart – and increas-
ingly popular – civilian politicians fostered by Sudharmono would not fall into
the arms of ABRI. Interviews with senior Golkar officials, like Secretary General
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Rachmat Witoelar, and his predecessor Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, conveyed a
sense of ambiguity towards ABRI, despite the traditionally close relationship
between the two institutions. Sarwono’s view in May 1988 was:
In a tactical sense, the army is losing out. Suharto is increasingly civilian in his out-
look, if not by concept then by association (interview with Sarwono Kusumaatmadja,
16 May 1988).
The boldness of such views jeopardised popular attitudes towards the military
simply because of the influence Sarwono and other prominent civilians in Golkar
were beginning to have on the debate about the country’s political future. At
the same time ABRI also embarked on a re-appraisal of its role and standing in
society.
There seems little doubt that the younger generation of ABRI officers har-
boured misgivings about the dual function. This has been apparent since at least
the early 1980s, when Jenkins (1984:261) detected that younger officers took more
pride in their professional role as soldiers and paid less attention to their socio-
political role. The logical consequences of this trend were partly offset in the past
by the fact that many such officers once injected into the socio-political role soon
lost their misgivings about the system.
However, by the end of the 1980s the government was faced with a chronically
demoralised civil service, low on esteem because all the plum jobs went to ABRI
personnel. Civilian elements in the cabinet clamoured for the injection of more
esprit de corps and some sort of career-track policy. They argued that the govern-
ment’s economic reform programme would be jeopardised without the back-up
of a more efficient, dedicated civil service. In response, the government took steps
to limit the number of ABRI personnel in civilian posts. Ironically enough, one
man who helped implement the policy was a former army chief, General Rudini,
in his new capacity as Home Affairs minister. In August 1990 Rudini announced
that military appointments to civilian posts, known as karyawan – ‘cadres’ –
would be decreased gradually ‘in areas where they are not needed’. Already in
force was a policy which reduced the number of military district officers to 40
per cent of the total, and insisted that posts below that of deputy governor in
provincial seats must now be held by civil servants. His argument drew on ABRI’s
historical justification for political intervention :
. . . kekaryawan is a small part of the dual function. It existed because of the situation
and conditions. In 1965, after the coup, many civilian officials were afraid to exe-
cute their jobs. They were afraid of Communists. Only ABRI wanted to do the job.
After the situation stabilised, everyone agreed that kekaryawan could decrease step
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by step in areas where they are not needed (speech by General (retd.) Rudini to the
Jakarta ‘Executive Circle’, 7 August 1990).
While the actual participation by the military in civilian administration was
being reduced, there was no sign that the military was relinquishing its function
as a ‘dynamiser’ of society. Senior military officers, if anything, intensified their
efforts to influence society by speaking up on a range of political issues.
However, in a marked departure from the familiar ABRI catechism on security,
stability, and the need for national discipline, senior ABRI leaders began echoing
the debate in civilian intellectual circles about openness.
The change often seemed more of a nuance than a volte face. For example, in
a speech he made on 20 May 1987, with the title ‘National Discipline and Dev-
elopment of our Democracy’, Murdani started out with the familiar theme of
national discipline. ‘The role of discipline in national and constitutional life is
to guarantee the creation of peace and order in daily life’, he intoned. But later
in the speech he noted :
Discipline must not cause initiatives and creativity to disappear. Obedience and
loyalty must not produce passive ... people ... there is indeed the fear that the ob-
ligation to do everything with full obedience and loyalty might produce humans who
are like robots/automotons that move only when commanded (speech by General
L.B. Murdani, 20 May 1987).
By 1989, with the debate on openness in full swing in civilian intellectual circles,
Army chief of staff, General Edi Sudrajat had this to say:
Having enjoyed better education, our people want differences discussed more openly.
As such they want more active participation in the decision-making process on
national problems and in social control (speech by General Edi Sudrajat, at Magelang
Military Academy, 5 December 1990).
In December 1990 Sudrajat presided over an army seminar which attempted
to project the make-up of what was euphemistically termed the ‘human resources’
(sumber daya manusia) of Indonesia in the years ahead. Some of the seminar’s
recommendations and conclusions indicated the army’s understanding of society’s
more liberal urges:
1. The concept of development should not be static.
2. The people will become more critical and desire more participation as
society becomes more open.
3. They will want more of a say in electing the leadership.
4. Current social and political institutions are not fully developed.
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5. They are characterised by too much paternalism.
6. Education is unevenly distributed.
7. Officials must know when to step down.
8. Their period of office must be clearly defined.
ABRI’s embrace of the need for more openness, and acknowledgement of the
need for reforms in this direction took some people by surprise. In the first place,
the perception prevalent among the civilian elite was that ABRI’s continued belief
in a ‘security approach’ to the safeguard of national stability ruled out their
espousal of so-called ‘Western liberal ideas of democracy and free speech’. More
savvy commentators understood ABRI’s strategy as less to change the system as
to bring about a change of leadership:
Apparently the game, even at this late hour still seems to be to try again with words
to trigger somebody’s senses into realising that it is time indeed to change (Indo-
nesian Observer, 5 December 1990).
Indeed, some of ABRI’s actions appeared to contradict the new political rhetoric
of its leaders. Whilst tacitly supporting student demonstrations on campuses
in Central Java, West Java and Jakarta, in the course of 1989 the incidents of local
discontent were dealt with in the familiar harsh fashion dictated by the ‘security
approach’. In March 1989 a minor disturbance in the South Sumatran province
of Lampung resulted in an army assault on alleged Muslim extremists in a village,
leaving at least forty, and possibly as many as two hundred, dead.
ABRI’s decision to adopt a kinder, gentler approach to the people of East Timor
after international diplomatic pressure forced the government to open up the
disputed province in early 1989, did not bring a halt to army intimidation of those
suspected of disloyalty to the state. Faced by increasingly militant Timorese
youth in urban areas, the army showed little leniency. On 12 November 1991,
troops fired on mourners in a cemetery on the outskirts of the capital, Dili, leaving
by a later official account at least fifty dead. When a low-level insurgency re-
erupted in the North Sumatran province of Aceh in early 1990, the army’s res-
ponse was as fierce and uncompromising, leaving hundreds dead.
While ABRI debated openness and democracy with intellectuals in Jakarta,
senior officers were maintaining that when it came to threats to national security,
ABRI was above the law (attributed to a senior ABRI staff officer by a represen-
tative of a humanitarian organisation in Jakarta October 1991). In this respect,
ABRI’s true orientation with regard to the democratic tendencies emerging in
Indonesian society was not easy to define. Some observers felt that the assertive
action taken by the military against irredentist movements in Timor and Aceh
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was partly a product of knowing no other means to deal with the situation.
Political enlightenment may have seeped into the upper ranks, but at the local
command level the legacy of basic training which emphasised the use of brute
force to deal with social disturbances still prevailed. Some recognition of this
by 1990 was evident after the military sanctioned for the first time the use of
civilian university teachers to enhance the curriculum at the military academy at
Magelang.
ABRI’s Dilemma
Arguably, by the beginning of the 1990s ABRI was confronting a dilemma. The
New Order with which the military rode to power in 1966 was under pressure to
renew itself. In common with other longserving regimes in the region, it was fast
becoming a victim of its own success. There was a limit to how much longer the
people could be convinced of the need for stifling order and stability at the
expense of individual freedom to sustain national development. For once national
development had been achieved to the successful degree so evident in the
ASEAN states, the people possessed more materialistic means for assuring their
own security, however intrinsically unstable the fabric of society was deemed
to be. In this context, ABRI was torn between the reality of its role and the ideals
of its doctrine.
To resolve this dilemma, the ABRI leadership sought a way of preserving its
political pre-eminence in advance of the coming succession struggle. Thus
ABRI’s articulation of the need for more openness seemed to be driven less by
a desire to relinquish power, than by the necessity of maintaining their relevance
in politics to enhance their popularity. As suggested above, this latter period of
the New Order was characterised by a blending of society’s desire for political
change with the elite’s more narrow concerns about political succession. In this
respect, it remains to be seen whether ABRI’s commitment to political change
survives the change of leadership.
Whether the future prospects for democracy are linked to the military’s reduced
role in any future Indonesian power structure is a tempting area of speculation.
Based on the above analysis it seems reasonable to assume that ABRI will be
reluctant to yield its position as a key political institution and its role as guardian
of the state. As stated by one senior officer in 1980:
... it is clear that the armed forces would never abandon what it perceives to be its
responsibility towards the people, which is to be active in the total life of Indonesian
society (Nugroho 1980:95).
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In fact, the signs are that though its room for manoeuvre has been weakened by
Suharto’s canny use of divide and rule tactics, ABRI continues to dominate the
competition for power at the top. Few Indonesians believe that the next president
will not be drawn from among its ranks. Although the notion of a civilian vice
president gained currency towards the end of President Suharto’s fifth term, the
most likely contenders for power in a post-Suharto power-struggle are either in
the armed forces, or are retired senior officers.
Indeed, Suharto’s selection of former armed forces commander General Try
Sutrisno as vice president in March 1993 was interpreted in ABRI circles as a
signal that a military successor was guaranteed. But nothing in politics is guaran-
teed, and Suharto’s concession to ABRI esteem was skilfully counterbalanced
by his promotion of civilian interests soon after his re-election as president in
March.
As Suharto embarked on his sixth presidential term, he seemed once again to
be juggling his political support, and keeping the military at bay. The political
leeway he granted to men like Professor B.J. Habibie, the artful minister of Re-
search and Technology whose ambitious – not to mention costly – schemes for
Indonesia’s technological development irked the innately conservative military
establishment, had parallels with Sudharmono’s role in the previous five-year
period.
In political terms, the licence Suharto appeared to grant Habibie guaranteed
that ABRI would be preoccupied with attempts to block him, leaving Suharto free
to focus on his broader national and international agenda. The succession
question was, in this way, neatly shelved for the time being.
The crucial question is whether the current democratisation debate, and the
slight relaxation of freedom of expression accompanying it, is a function of this
competition for power, or a manifestation of actual progress towards more de-
mocracy in Indonesia. One of Indonesia’s most respected civilian political fig-
ures, head of Nahdlatul Ulama, the vast rural-based Islamic organisation, is
optimistic:
Once you open the door you can’t shut it completely – that’s the lesson, what hap-
pened to Nikita Krushchev after he opened the door by criticising the Communist
Party. It accumulates you see, during the Brezhnev era and after that Gorbachev and
then the emergence of Boris Yeltsin. All those things show that, however little,
sediments of democratic spirit will come through the filter and accumulate. So I don’t
think the next government will be able to reverse the situation (interview with
Abdurrahman Wahid, Inside Indonesia October 1990, pp. 4-6).
Such optimism may be justified in the light of the changing global situation,
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and specifically in the light of persistent international pressure on the Indonesian
government after the 12 November 1991 incident in East Timor. But so long as
the armed forces act as the principal agent in the filter Wahid refers to, it is hard
to imagine a radical departure from the current patterns of social and political
control practised by the New Order.
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THE  MILITARY  AND  DEMOCRACY  IN  THAILAND
Suchit Bunbongkarn
A stable democracy requires public commitment to democratic norms and pro-
cedures, a strong and institutionalised party system, and active pressure groups.
Such conditions have yet to be fully developed in Thailand. Since the ending of
absolute monarchical rule in 1932, the fragility of representative institutions and
public political apathy have allowed the military to take control of state power.
Over the past sixty years the struggle for power between men in uniform and
civilian politicians has been reflected in a series of coups and continued military
control of the state. The armed forces have been concerned not only with national
defence but with other dimensions of national security such as political stability.
Through effective control over state apparatuses, particularly the police force
and civil service, the military has dominated political decision-making; the course
of political change has not been set by civilian politicians or political parties. The
party system is far from institutionalised and its lack of mass support is clearly
evident. As a result, the separation between democracy and military rule remains
fragile in Thailand.
In the last ten years, however, Thailand has undergone dramatic changes which
perhaps have provided the preconditions for democracy: pluralism, open politics,
and rapid industrialisation. These developments have not put an end to authori-
tarian rule. A coup occurred in February 1991. The military subsequently appoint-
ed a civilian government, but pro-democracy forces have become very active in
campaigning against the pro-military constitution and General Suchinda
Kraprayoon’s assumption of the premiership. Thus, although the military con-
tinues to play an important role in politics, it faces increasing competition for
state power from civilian politicians. It is being forced to tolerate the increasing
strength of representative institutions and extra-bureaucratic forces and to adjust
its role accordingly. A ‘guardian’ role continues to be advocated by the military,
but that role is unlikely to enjoy as much public support as in the past. In
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discussing the role of the military in the democratisation process in Thailand,
the interesting questions therefore are: what role does the military have to play
in the process of democratisation, and under what circumstances will its political
role change?
Coups and the Military’s Struggles for State Power
In Thailand, coups, not elections, have become the norm for change of political
leadership and government (Bunbongkarn 1987a:42-52). Since 1932, political
change has evolved in a cyclical pattern – starting with a coup, followed by an
election and a short period of open politics, before a crisis leading to another
coup. In most cases, the coups provide a channel for the Royal Thai Army (RTA)
to exert influence on the political situation, and have little to do with political
transformation. They reflect struggles for power among the top military officers
and civil servants among the political class. Some coups have been launched to
oust civilian governments; others have been the result of competition for state
power between factions within the military establishment. Rarely have political
norms and practices been altered.
The first coup in modern Thai political history, which took place in 1932, can
be considered one of the very few military interventions which led to a regime
change, since it overthrew the absolute monarchy and replaced it with a form of
constitutional rule. Although a democratic government was not installed, some
democratic norms and practices were introduced. Subsequent military inter-
ventions were staged simply to provide opportunities for military leaders to
acquire senior political positions. The 1947 coup was a case in point. It provided
an avenue to power for a new group of army officers who were not previously
involved in politics (Samudavanija and Bunbongkarn 1985:83). These officers
were much more traditionalist than the 1932 coup leaders. Most of them did not
have the same degree of exposure to Western education and culture and they
lacked political vision and a blueprint for political development. Apart from
personal ambition, the motive behind the coup was to return to military rule and
restore the prestige of the armed forces. At the end of World War II, the armed
forces were in disarray as the government was under Allied pressure to demobi-
lise the army which had cooperated with Japanese troops in military operations
during the war. The army was humiliated and the civilian-led, anti-Japanese
underground Free-Thai Movement was the hero.
After the 1947 coup, the armed forces split into factions, each competing for
power. But although the military elite was divided by personal interest, the
military’s political dominance remained unaffected. The group supporting
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democracy was small and confined to elected parliamentarians and some
intellectuals. In the 1950s, the Thai public was politically apathetic and viewed
politics as a matter for the ruling class. Political parties were unorganised and
lacked mass support; they did not present a threat to the military.
Military rule in Thailand was further strengthened when Marshal Sarit staged
a coup in 1958 (Chaleamtiarana 1979). The distinctive characteristic of this coup
was the combination of conservatism and capitalism. Sarit, who had been a key
member of the 1947 coup group, rose rapidly to power after this coup. He later
came into conflict with senior leaders, particularly Field Marshals Pibul and Phin
and Police General Phao. Sarit launched a coup to oust those three from power
in 1957. A second coup the following year, however, dealt a heavy blow to all
liberal and progressive elements as well as to the representative institutions. Sarit
soon realised that political instability in part derived from the fact that the armed
forces lacked cohesiveness. An ideology was needed to reunify the armed forces
and to guide the direction of political change. Sarit’s response was a conservatism
which raised the prestige of the monarchy, consolidated bureaucratic rule,
abolished constitutionalism, and limited political activities.
Most analysts agree that Sarit’s military rule was detrimental to democratic
development, as democratic institutions and practices were not given a chance
to survive. Sarit believed that what the country needed most was not political
but economic development. Nevertheless his emphasis on economic develop-
ment eventually strengthened the business community and other extra-bureau-
cratic forces, which in turn contributed to the strength of civil society. An influx
of foreign investment, more systematic national economic development plans,
and the expansion of economic infrastructure strengthened the business sec-
tor. The student organisation which led the historic uprising in October 1973
gained strength from the expansion of higher education initiated during Sarit’s
period.
Coups and Democratisation
The coup in 1977 was different. While other coups were staged to enhance mili-
tary rule, this intervention was intended to allow greater democratisation, with
the promulgation of a democratic constitution, elections to a House of Repre-
sentatives, and the granting of political freedoms. The coup occurred a year after
the military had seized power from the civilian government in a volatile political
situation created by a series of clashes between left- and right-wing groups. The
civilian government emerged from an uprising in 1973 which overthrew military
rule, but the government could not cope with the political violence and internal
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bickering in the government parties, which characterised open politics. The
seizure of power by the military in 1976 terminated the three-year period of the
civilian regime and installed an ultra-rightist civilian government under the
supervision of a military junta. The new government lasted only one year before
being ousted by the same group of military leaders who had installed it.
One of the major reasons for the military staging the 1977 coup was the politi-
cal suppression practised by the government. Most liberal and progressive
groups were labelled communists or communist sympathisers and severely
suppressed. A number had to flee to the jungles, where they joined the Commu-
nist Party of Thailand. Military leaders came under pressure from various groups
in the civil society, and from a powerful faction in the army which could not
tolerate this ultra-rightist policy, to replace the government with a more liberal
one.
Following the 1977 coup parliamentary rule lasted almost twelve years, the
longest period of civilian rule since 1932 (though the government survived two
attempted coups). Political parties gained strength and legitimacy. Commitment
to democracy among the educated Thai was on the rise and the military seemed
close to accepting democratic norms and practices (Boonprasert 1990).
In February 1991, however, the military staged another coup, putting an end
to parliamentary rule. Like the coups in 1947 and 1976, the military justified the
intervention in terms of the weakness of the civilian government. It also cited
the excessive corruption of civilian politicians, which had clearly undermined the
legitimacy of the government. But the real reason behind the coup was the mutual
distrust between the military and the government. A number of leading military
officers felt insecure when Prime Minister Chatichai appointed ex-army chief
General Arthit Kamlangek as deputy Defense minister in early 1991 to tighten
control over the armed forces (Bunbongkarn 1992:132-33).
Prime Minister Chatichai came to power in 1989 after General Prem declined an
invitation to continue in the premiership. As the leader of the biggest party in
the National Assembly after the 1989 general election, Chatichai was the only
legitimate successor to General Prem. He had maintained good relations with the
military until the second year of his term, but his intention to exert more control
over the military caused concern in the armed forces.
After the coup, the military was faced with a problem of how to deal with the
growing democratic forces. Protests led by pro-democracy parties, student
organisations, and other civic groups against the draft constitution signified the
growing commitment to democracy within those groups and forced the coup
leaders to grant concessions (such as agreeing not to let active military officers
hold political posts).
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The Military’s Mission and Its Political Involvement
To hold on to power, the military had to adjust its mission and organisation to changes
in political and social circumstances. Before 1932 the armed forces’ mission was
to safeguard the king and defend the country from outside aggression. After the
People’s Party overthrew the absolute monarchy the military’s mission was changed
to that of protecting the new constitution and the new regime. The military’s
guardianship mission expanded for the first time into political affairs. It became a
key instrument of support for politicians in uniform.
Between 1932 and the end of World War II the armed forces expanded and
developed not only to meet the government’s defence needs but also to strengthen
the support for Field Marshal Pibulsongkram, who emerged rapidly after the 1932
coup as a strong political leader. After the war a communist threat provided the
armed forces with a new justification for its expansion and involvement in
national affairs. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the out-
break of the Korean War in 1950, and the Vietminh’s struggle for Vietnam’s
independence in the early 1950s forced Thailand to ally itself with the US. Post-
war Thai militarism grew to meet the challenge of communism and Thailand was
integrated into the US collective security system. The Thai armed forces were
modernised and expanded further with the assistance of the US. Between 1950
and 1971 US military assistance averaged $US46 million per year, which
represented 50 per cent of the Thai Defence Ministry’s total budget (Snitwongse
1990:91). As a result US influence was pervasive in the Thai military, especially
in education, training programs, strategic thinking and military hardware.
One aspect of US influence in the 1950s was the perception of the communist
threat. The Thai military shared the US view that the communist threat would
come in the form of overt aggression from outside. The domino theory and John
Foster Dulles’s containment policy received much attention within the govern-
ment and the military establishment. As a result, the development of the armed
forces was geared to the threat of conventional warfare.
The development of the armed forces further strengthened the political position
of the military elite. During the 1950s and 1960s civilian political forces were
unorganised, fragile and unable to challenge the military. They lacked mass sup-
port and linkages to groups in the society. The Democrat Party was the only or-
ganised political force but it was popular only in Bangkok. The military estab-
lishment was expanded in part to provide a basis of support for military leaders.
Since coups had become a method of changing government, the military
organisation was an important political resource for those officers who sought
to use the coup as an avenue of control over state power.
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Among the three armed forces, the army enjoyed the strongest growth. The
navy, which had been powerful before World War II, suffered from its abortive
coup in 1951. The air force had always been a close ally of the army and supported
the army in becoming the leading service. It is not surprising, therefore, that army
leaders have acquired more political posts than the other services.
US military assistance did not affect the political attitudes and thinking of Thai
military officers. US assistance up to the 1970s included training programs for
Thai officers at major military educational institutions like West Point and Fort
Leavenworth, and American advisers were sent to Thailand to organise training
programs for military personnel. But these programs did not result in trans-
formation of the political outlook of Thai military officers. Liberal-democratic
attitudes, military professionalism, and the concept of civilian supremacy did not
emerge within the military establishment. American assistance coincided with an
increase in the military elite’s involvement in political affairs and, perhaps because
the US made no effort to dissuade them from political involvement, the political
outlook of the military elite remained the same.
Without challenge from the democratic forces it is impossible to see the mili-
tary furthering the development of democracy in Thailand. The modernisation
and strengthening of the armed forces has led only to an increase in the political
power of the military elite, strengthening their advantage in the struggle for state
power. For three decades after World War II, the armed forces were split and
became the personal power base of military leaders. Sarit, Thanom and Prapas,
who first came into politics through the 1947 coup and reached the peak of their
power in the 1960s, were known to have used the armed forces as their support
base. Political parties like the National Socialist Party of Sarit and the United Thai
People of Thanom and Prapas did not have political significance and were used
as a façade to give their regimes the appearance of legitimacy. Personalisation
of politics bred factionalism within the armed forces.
The Communist Insurgency and Military-Initiated Liberalisation
The military’s failure to suppress the communist insurgency is one of several
important factors which contributed to the military-initiated liberalisation which
brought a relatively long period of parliamentary rule in the 1980s. Thai military
leaders were concerned with the communist insurgency from the early 1960s. But
they believed that it was external in origin and consequently that the success of
the insurgency depended in large part on the communist movement’s success
in Vietnam and Laos. To counter the insurgency in Thailand, the RTA saw im-
provement of the people’s livelihood in the affected remote rural areas as essen-
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tial. Political solutions to the problem were not considered (Snitwongse 1990:
93-94).
Marshal Sarit’s action reflected the military elite’s perception of that period.
Communist suspects were severely punished. The military launched rural dev-
elopment projects in peripheral areas where the state was not in evidence. The
military believed that the communist insurgents were merely bandits, without
an organisation, and could be easily dealt with by the police force. In 1965 when
overt armed insurgency broke out in the northeast, armed suppression was
carried out on the assumption that military means were the only way to wipe out
the communist movement. This response only fuelled the insurgency which
expanded rapidly in other parts of the country in the late 1960s. Military cam-
paigns against the communists intensified in the 1970s, but further encouraged
the spread of the armed struggle. Civic actions were carried out against poverty
and hardship in peripheral areas, but these did not stop the expansion of the
insurgency.
After 1977, when General Kriangsak staged a coup which overthrew the rightist
regime of Thanin Kraivixien, a new strategy of counter-insurgency was initiated
to replace military campaigns. Intensification of the insurgency in response to
the sweeping suppression of liberal and leftist movements during the twelve
months of Thanin’s rule became a major concern to the military. In addition, an
exodus of more than a thousand students, intellectuals and laborers to join the
Communist Party of Thailand, following the ruthless suppression of the student
protest on 6 October 1976, expanded its support base and convinced the military
that a new counter-insurgency policy was needed.
The military-initiated liberalisation began in 1978 when Kriangsak’s govern-
ment lifted the suppression order on the CPT and its sympathisers and enacted
an amnesty law for those who joined the CPT after the 1976 coup. As a result,
defectors, many former student leaders and intellectuals, left the Communist
Party and resumed their normal lives. The political offensive strategy became
official when the government of General Prem Tinasulanond issued Prime
Ministerial Order No. 66/2523. This detailed a counter-insurgency policy which
stressed the priority of political means over military actions to suppress the CPT.
It laid down operational guidelines, such as the elimination of social and eco-
nomic injustices, promotion of political participation, promotion of democratic
institutions and movements, and assurance of political freedom. In short, the
order made it clear that building full democracy was the only means to defeat
communism.
Attempts were made to implement the order. Several mass organisations were
established in rural areas to mobilise the people in support of the government’s
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insurgency suppression program. The military claimed that these organisations
were evidence of democratic development at the grassroots level since the people
were encouraged to participate in the administration and the development of their
villages. The Thai National Defense Volunteers, Volunteer Development and Self-
Defense villages, and the Military Reservist for National Security organisation
were set up as centres for mobilisation and training of villagers for democratic
participation (Bunbongkarn 1987b:53-58).
It is difficult, however, to see these projects as catalysts to democratisation in
Thailand when the administrative structure at the village and tambol (sub-district)
levels remained unchanged. Although the village headman and tambol officer
(kamnan) were elected by the people, they came under the authority of the
provincial administration, and the village and tambol administrations were parts
of the provincial administration and received their budgets from the central
government. The people were not given the authority to decide the future of their
community and the local administrative structure and the principle of develop-
ment from above remained unaffected.
The Military, Society, and Democratisation
More important, however, was the liberalisation and democratisation at the
national level. After the 1977 coup, Prime Minister Kriangsak promised to prom-
ulgate a permanent constitution within a year and hold a general election a few
months later. Pressure for liberalisation came from a group of middle-ranking
officers, known as ‘The Thai Young Turks’, which was formed within the army
after the October 1973 uprising. Their demand for democratic reform was less
ideological than pragmatic: they favoured strong leadership and coups, but lib-
eralisation and democratisation were acceptable if they could resolve national
conflict and promote political stability.
The twelve years of liberalisation and parliamentary rule after 1979 would
not have been possible without the initiative of the Kriangsak government. De-
spite liberalisation Thailand still faced instability, partly because the military
continued to maintain strong political influence throughout that period. The
military regime initiated liberalisation because it wanted to ease the political
tension which had resulted from the rightist policies of the Thanin government.
But assurance had to be given to the military that its corporate interests would
not be endangered. Open politics in this period allowed representative
institutions to develop and gradually made inroads on the military-dominated
regime. Coups staged in 1981 and 1985 showed that the military was disturbed
by the decline of the bureaucratic polity and the development of political
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parties. The army’s attempt in 1983 to have the constitution amended to allow
serving military officers and civil servants to hold cabinet portfolios was further
evidence of this. (The 1978 constitution permitted active government and
military officers to assume political posts for four years only after the 1979
general election.)
Prime Minister Prem, who took the helm of the country from 1981 to 1989, had
to maintain a delicate balance. It was a period during which liberalisation and
democratisation were put to the test. Although the military’s power was waning,
it was still powerful and was a major force in the state. But as civil society was
becoming more influential, the army had to review its role in the political arena.
While factions like the Young Turks accepted coups as a strategy, others believed
that they had to play the game by the rules. They agreed that since the Thai
political system was in a transitional phase, the military could not withdraw itself
from the political scene; it had to take part in politics to make democratisation
possible. The army’s role as political broker and supporter of the Prem
government was emphasised. Nevertheless the military was not willing to let
political parties take full control of the state. Army leaders were involved in
forming the government in order to make sure that the prime minister and other
key cabinet members were on their side. Political parties were not allowed to
interfere in matters of the military’s domain such as the defence budget, counter-
insurgency operations, personnel reshuffles, and control of the electronic media.
Stability during this liberalisation period, though delicate, was maintained because
the boundary between the military and civilian politicians was observed by both
sides.
The breakdown of the democratisation process in 1991 and the pro-democracy
protests against Prime Minister General Suchinda Kraprayoon in mid May 1992
showed that although the military was able to seize state power, as it did in the
February 1991 coup, civil society was strong enough to curb the military’s influ-
ence in government. The 1991 military intervention reflected the armed forces’
disaffection with the increasing influence of political parties and the civil soci-
ety’s attempt to exert more control over the military. It did not meet resistance
because the Chatichai government had lost the support of the people. Never-
theless, when General Suchinda resigned from the army and assumed the premi-
ership after the April 1992 election the civil society was able to force the former
army chief to step down. Opposition parties and other pro-democracy groups
launched a protest with the support of the urban middle class, including busi-
nessmen, intellectuals, and people from various professions. It was the biggest
protest witnessed in Thailand since the student uprising in 1973. The demands
of the pro-democracy groups were strengthened by the ruthless suppression of
56 Suchit Bunbongkarn
the demonstration by the military, which led to stronger public condemnation.
One of the problems of democratisation in Thailand has been that, because of
a long period of bureaucratic and military domination, a democratic regime often
has difficulty establishing legitimacy in relation to the traditional political culture.
Economic and social changes in recent years have produced a new urban, edu-
cated middle class which subscribes to the principles of democracy; but the pos-
sibility of an effective democratic government could hardly be expected. The
Chatichai government (1989-1991) gained legitimacy because it was popularly
elected, but it later lost legitimacy because it could not tackle effectively the cor-
ruption in the government. Anand’s government, which succeeded it after the
1991 coup, assumed power without legitimacy because it was appointed by the
military junta. But it went on to gain public recognition as one of the most reliable,
transparent and efficient governments. The fact that all democratic regimes in
Thailand have been weak and inefficient has affected their legitimacy. And if they
cannot improve their performance and accountability, their popular support will
be easily undermined.
With this in mind, the military has generally preferred a non-partisan prime
minister, and has given him full support in order to ensure the government’s stabi-
lity. This implies a preference, on the part of the army, for effectiveness over
legitimacy. After the 1992 general election the military wanted to continue its
control of the state and to insulate the state mechanisms from popular forces.
What the military leaders did not anticipate was the strength of the civil society.
Attempting to force the political parties and the people to accept Suchinda as
the government leader was a big mistake. It reflected the inability of the military
elite to understand the development of societal groups which were determined
to fight for democratisation and a weakening of the political power of the military.
The May 1992 Uprising and the Prospect of Democratic Development
The downfall of General Suchinda has again raised one of the important questions
which arises whenever there is a breakdown of authoritarian rule: is Thailand
going to have a stable and long-lasting democracy? The answer is probably no.
It is difficult to anticipate sustained democratisation. One reason is that changes
have yet to take place in the military establishment to make it more conducive to
democratic development. The concept of civilian control is still unacceptable
within the armed forces. More important, the military continues to insist on its
political guardian role, which implies a right to intervene whenever it feels that
national security is threatened. During the 1980s there were signs that the army
was about to accept a civilian-dominated regime, but as one expert on Thai
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security affairs said, the change in the military’s political thinking was ‘in a very
formative stage, incoherent and inconsistent’ (Snitwongse 1990:103). Thus, when
the Class 5 Group (the fifth graduating class from the Military Academy under
the West Point curriculum) assumed leadership in the RTA, liberal attitudes in
the army began to erode. Class 5 officers led by Suchinda and Issarapong
Noonpakdi, the former army chief, are not known for their liberal political ideas.
The group was first formed to counter the Young Turks group, but later trans-
formed itself into a powerful pressure group to work for the benefit and promotion
of its members. The group has firm control of the army and has not been much
affected by the pro-democracy protest and the downfall of Suchinda.
Having been resurrected, Thai civil society now poses a real threat to the mili-
tary. The business community is expanding and becoming more complex. Several
professional and societal groups, including doctors, lawyers and teachers’ asso-
ciations, are demanding an end to the military’s political involvement. It can be
argued that these popular uprisings have been largely a phenomenon of Bangkok
and other major urban areas, and that they are unlikely to have a strong impact
in the country. However, it has always been the urban people who have led public
opinion and successfully pressed for political reforms. The May 1992 uprising
was a product of the politicisation of urban groups. Now that authoritarian rule
is fading, the question of whether democratisation will be consolidated remains
to be answered. The military establishment is still unified and reform from within
cannot be expected in the immediate future. In the long run, if the politicisation
of societal groups continues, military reform will become inevitable, and as a result
political democracy will be given more chance to consolidate itself.
The triumph in the September 1992 election of the pro-democracy forces –
comprising Chuan’s Democratic Party, the New Aspiration Party (NAP), the
Palang Dham Party and Solidarity – and the subsequent establishment of the
democratic government led by Chuan, marked another important development
in civil-military relations. The armed forces have pledged to support the govern-
ment and to remain in their barracks. The military leaders once again have re-
iterated that the military will not interfere in political affairs; modernisation pro-
grams and professional development will be their main priorities. Chuan also
recognises that civil-military relations are a delicate matter and civilian control
can hardly be achieved if the prime minister and defence minister are unaccept-
able to the armed forces.
To placate the military, Chuan appointed a retired and respected general to head
the Defense ministry. In addition, he has been very cautious in dealing with
technical matters such as national security policy, strategic issues, defence
budgets, and military personnel appointments, in the hope that the relationship
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is not jeopardised. Despite these efforts, however, the relationship continues to
be delicate and a lot needs to be done to strengthen it.
Among other things, the civilian government must improve its efficiency, ac-
countability and stability. The Thai political experience suggests that the fragi-
lity of democratic governments encourages military intervention. To change the
military mind-set into a more democratic one, the civilian democratic government
must prove itself strong and responsible.
Democratic reforms should be carried out gradually. The military and other
conservative elements are not in favour of radical changes. The vote by the mili-
tary-dominated Senate in March 1994 against the government parties’ bill to
reduce the number of the senators showed that the military, though supporting
the government, would not let the democratisation process go too far or too fast.
The pro-democracy groups which advocate more drastic reform should keep in
mind that the military and the conservatives are still influential and control a
variety of political resources. Even the urban middle class, which supported the
pro-democracy groups during the May 1992 event, does not agree with radical
political reform. The politics of compromise is likely to be essential during the
initial stage of democratisation.
Democratisation involves institutionalisation of the competitive process by
which the people elect their leaders. This can be done by allowing continuity of
the representative government and elections. The military should learn how to
tolerate the democratic processes and play the game by the rules. The more elec-
tions Thailand has, the more developed the competitive process will be. Once
the process is institutionalised, coups will find no place in the Thai political
system.
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THE  MILITARY  AND  THE  FRAGILE  DEMOCRACY
OF  THE  PHILIPPINES
Viberto Selochan
On 4 July 1946 the US granted independence to the Philippines, in keeping with
its promise of self-determination for the islands after a period of Commonwealth
administration. The Philippines thus became the first independent democratic
country in Asia. During its colonial administration the US had encouraged the
development of political parties, though the two major parties which developed
differed little in ideology – the main differences concerning their attitudes to
US administration of the islands.
At independence the Philippines political system was modelled on that of the
United States, where the constitution required the armed forces to uphold civilian
supremacy. As in the US, elections were held every four years in the Philip-
pines, and presidents were limited to two terms in office. This constitutional re-
quirement was initially upheld and the military played a minor role in politics,
except to guard polling stations against fraud during elections. Threats by the
communist-inspired Hukbalahap movement soon after independence to seize
political power and disrupt national elections required the military to play a more
active role in monitoring elections. As a result of its success in curbing the in-
surgents’ threat to the country, the military was co-opted into playing a larger
role in the administration of former defence secretary, Ramon Magsaysay.
When he was elected president of the republic in 1965, Ferdinand Marcos
believed that in a developing country where the military was not occupied with
external threats, it should assist in developing the country. He used the military
in civic action programs and to enhance his chances of being re-elected. Marcos
was the first Philippines president to be elected to a second term in office. Con-
stitutionally deprived of seeking a third term, Marcos declared martial law in
1972 and facilitated the military’s playing a larger role in government. When he
was forced to leave office in 1986, elements in the military found difficulty in
adjusting to the requirements of the democratic system restored by Corazon
60 Viberto Selochan
Aquino. To assist in this process, military personnel were subjected to instruction
in democratic principles and the role of the military in a democracy. Yet Aquino
had to endure seven attempts by the military to seize political power. The survival
of her government was due to some extent to the belief among elements of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that the military must remain subservient
to civilians in a democracy. The military’s adherence to democracy was again
tested during the national elections in May 1992. There were fears that it would
attempt to seize power if the elections were seen to be fraudulent, but with free
and fair elections the military adhered to the restored democracy.
Strong leadership and a weak central state have been the hallmarks of Philip-
pine politics. Whether democracy will continue to flourish in the post-Cold-War
era, when authoritarian rule is generally in retreat, remains to be seen.
Origins of Democracy in the Philippines
When the United States colonised the Philippines in 1898 it planned to gradually
grant self-determination to the country as the principles of democracy were
imbibed by the population. As education was not widespread, the elite and the
educated benefitted most from the system instituted by the US, which was largely
executed by officers of the US army. Filipinos worked in the American adminis-
tration and quickly came to value the concept of self-government. By 1917, when
the US decided to institute its policy of ‘Filipinisation’ , the elite was ready to
assume positions vacated by departing US military officers. Between 1917 and
1935, when the Commonwealth came into existence, political parties were formed
and most of the population was educated into accepting the principles of
democracy, which meant having a ruling party and an opposition. In this respect,
the Philippines was significantly different from many Asian countries which
gained independence a few years later. As Apter (1962:154) points out: these
countries did not generally accept an opposition as a normal feature of a
democracy. The small elite who controlled the political process realised that each
party would have its turn in government. The Nacionalista and Liberal parties,
which differed little ideologically, dominated politics, and politicians switched
parties to gain office. But the democratic system that developed did not represent
the majority of the population.
The Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated in 1935 under a democratic
constitution patterned after the United States bicameral system. ‘The ideology
of American ‘democracy’ which emphasised the limitation of state power was
very different from the philosophy of the French in Indo-China, the Dutch in
the Indies and the British in Malaya. It played into the hands of the elite to whom
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the Americans, always ambivalent colonial rulers, proceeded to hand over poli-
tical power as soon as possible’ (Overholt 1986:1136).
For most Filipinos, American-style democracy meant little more than elections every
few years. Beyond this, the colonial authorities made sure that only the candidates
who represented colonial interests first and last won. This practice did not die with
colonialism. The ensuing political order, which persisted long after independence,
was one where a handful of families effectively and ruthlessly ruled a society riven
by inequality. It was democratic in form, borrowing as many American practices as
it could, but autocratic in practice (World Bank report cited in Chomsky 1991:237).
The first duty of the Commonwealth government was national security. Presi-
dent Manuel Quezon procured the services of General Douglas MacArthur, who
was about to retire as US Army Chief of Staff, to establish the Philippine military.
MacArthur and his US military advisory team used the Swiss army as a model
for the Philippine army. A military academy, patterned after the US military aca-
demy at West Point, was designed in which officers were to be instructed in the
techniques and skills of the military and taught that the proper role of the military
in a democracy was one of subservience to civilian government. In practice,
however, these ideals were not easily imparted to the new recruits, many of whom
attained their place at the academy through political patronage rather than merit
(Selochan 1990:57). Courses at the academy were oriented towards equipping
cadets to maintain internal law and order through combat techniques. The curricu-
lum did not address subjects in the humanities. Maintaining law and order, more
a policing than military function, required more emphasis on domestic politics
than military skills. Officers recruited from the Reserve Officers Training Course
(ROTC) conducted at the universities were more amenable to humanitarian con-
siderations, but they did not generally hold command positions in the military
as they were seen as part-time soldiers. Yet with a liberal education they were
possibly more attuned to the democratic process than the officers trained at the
Philippines Military Academy (PMA) under an authoritarian military system.
Officers’ adherence to democratic practices also suffered under the Commis-
sion on Appointments (CA), instituted to vet appointments under a functioning
democracy. Politicians who were members of the CA sought and gained allegi-
ance from officers in exchange for approving their promotion. Many officers con-
sequently remained indebted to politicians and were unable to conform strictly
to the military chain of command. While the Philippine military was still being
developed World War II abruptly interrupted the military training and education
program. To defend the islands, the fledgling Philippine military was incorporated
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into the United States Armed Forces for the Far East (USAFFE) under the
command of General MacArthur.
At the termination of the war, the Philippines had suffered severe damage. It
also had over one million people claiming to be guerilla fighters and thus seeking
a place in the military. Reconstruction of the Philippine economy and the
reconstitution of the military became priorities of the newly-installed government
under President Osmeña. Independence was also granted during this period. But
the country was inadequately equipped to assume full sovereignty.
The 1935 constitution, which was adopted at independence on 4 July 1946,
provided the framework within which a democratic state could develop.
The Constitution was supplemented by laws enacted by legislatures at the national,
provincial, and city/municipal levels of government. A centralised court system which
was headed by the Supreme Court performed the judicial function of the state and a
career national bureaucracy administered the policies of the government. In other
words, the political and institutional infrastructure of a democratic government was
in place in the Philippines at the time of independence. What was not altered was
the distribution of wealth, economic power and social status (Lapitan 1989:236).
The American-style democracy exported to the Philippines was bound to en-
counter problems: ‘Except in rare instances, democracy does not work when
foreign models are imposed, and many features of American democracy are ill-
suited to poor, unstable and divided countries’ (Diamond 1992:27).
The President, the Military and Democracy
Soon after independence, Philippine democracy was threatened by the commu-
nist-inspired Hukbalahap movement. The insurgents who had fought against
the occupying Japanese forces resumed their fight against the newly-installed
administration; they had little confidence in the Philippine democratic process
which they saw as favoring the ruling elite. Appointed Defense secretary, Ramon
Magsaysay was, however, determined to restore faith in democracy, and especi-
ally the electoral system. Historically, elections in the Philippines were charac-
terised by vote-buying, vote-rigging and the use of private armies to intimidate
voters. Magsaysay used the AFP extensively to ensure that the 1951 elections
were conducted fairly, and indeed they were alleged to have been the fairest in
Philippine electoral history. Although he did not completely restore the Huks’
faith in democracy, Magsaysay reformed the military with assistance from the
US and defeated the Huks.
Having worked closely with the military, Magsaysay realised that the skills of
the officers could be harnessed to develop the country. When he became presi-
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dent in 1953 Magsaysay decided to use the military in government. He appointed
active duty officers to perform a range of functions in his administration. By
1954 Congressman Bengson claimed that over 122 active duty officers were
performing duties formally the prerogative of civilians (Selochan 1990:118).
Justifying this action, the president said that he was weary of the civilian bureau-
cracy as a whole. Furthermore,
I have needed men of my absolute confidence to undertake delicate missions of
investigation and cleaning up . . . In other cases, specialised skills and technical know-
how were required for quick and official results . . . In still other instances, the new
administration came upon officers so deeply entrenched in dishonesty and corruption
that only the most ruthless, uncompromising kind of military discipline could redeem
them from the mire and restore them to gainful usefulness to our people (Magsaysay,
quoted in Abueva 1971:315).
Magsaysay, who probably would have been re-elected in the presidential elec-
tions of 1957, died in a plane crash that year. Knowing Magsaysay’s attitude to
the vice-president, Carlos Garcia, many officers who had been closely associated
with Magsaysay were reluctant to allow Garcia to assume the presidency. Abor-
tive plans to seize power before the inauguration were hastily and poorly designed
(Selochan 1990:122-23), and Garcia assumed the presidency, aware of the mili-
tary’s attitude to him and to the democratic process. For these and other political
reasons, Garcia was determined to rid the administration of officers appointed
to government by his predecessor. By this stage AFP officers were pervasive in
the government. They were in the cabinet positions normally occupied by civil-
ians. After acrimonious debate, Garcia was able to persuade some officers to
return to the AFP; others retired their commissions and ran unsuccessfully for
office in the 1961 congressional elections.
Many of the officers who had been in Magsaysay’s administration believed
that they were more capable of governing than civilians. Some officers also be-
lieved that these civilians had achieved their positions as a result of political
patronage rather than merit. That civilian politicians were corrupt was evident
from their activities during elections and from the manner in which they used
their positions to acquire favours from businessmen and the AFP. Democracy in
the Philippines, according to many of these officers, benefitted the elite who con-
trolled the political process. The majority of Filipinos, they argued, did not
understand the concept of democracy; for them it meant being paid to vote for
a candidate at elections. Many officers believed that Philippine-style democracy
could not contribute to the economic development of the country but was being
abused for the benefit of the elite. Authoritarian rule provided the means of
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addressing the situation. But the military was neither united in this view nor
capable of seizing political power.
Abrogating Democracy
A civilian politician, Ferdinand Marcos, was elected president in 1965. Marcos,
who claimed a distinguished career as a guerilla fighter during World War II (later
disproved), courted the AFP while he was a congressman, but was generally
believed to be suspicious of the AFP, which was rumoured to be planning to seize
power in 1965. These rumours were taken seriously by many including the Garcia
administration, as there was a series of successful coups in Asia during this
period. Concerned about the military’s political ambition and believing that a
closer relationship with senior officers would serve his long-term interests,
Marcos retained the Defense portfolio for the first thirteen months of his
administration. During this period he reshuffled the officer corps, promoting
officers favourable to his political agenda and retiring others less amenable. The
military was subsequently enlisted to assist in his re-election campaign. Marcos
became the first Philippine president to be re-elected in what became one of the
most violent and fraudulent elections in the country’s history. Increasingly during
his second term he became dependent on the AFP to remain in office. To serve
the interests of the president, the military harassed the opposition and violently
quelled demonstrations against the government.
Constitutionally prevented from remaining in office for a third term, Marcos
declared martial law in 1972, with the consent of the military, under the pretext of
saving the country from Communist and Muslim insurgencies. Martial law
allowed the AFP to play a larger role in government. Because democracy was so
easily abrogated it has been argued that it had not in fact taken root in the
Philippines. But then, ‘A democratic constitution does not make a democracy;
only democratic, constitutional behaviour that follows a long period of experience
and education can truly constitute democracy’ (Gastil 1985:161). Although the
1935 constitution had enshrined democratic principles and structures of govern-
ment, political practice differed considerably from the theory (Reyes 1988:268).
Marcos argued that the democratic system would not allow him to develop
the ‘New Society’ he envisaged for the Philippines. For him, the practice of
democracy was ‘energy-consuming’ and ‘time-wasting’; authoritarian rule
allowed him to make the changes he wanted without having to endure democratic
procedures (Hernandez 1985:243). Under his self-styled constitutional-authori-
tarianism the institutions of democracy were dismantled: Congress was disband-
ed, political parties were declared illegal, and civil and political rights were sus-
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pended. Freedom, a fundamental tenet of democracy, was taken away from Fili-
pinos. As commander-in-chief, Marcos directed the AFP to carry out martial law
functions. The military was, according to the principles of democracy, to remain
subservient to the civilian head of state. But the head of state had abrogated
the constitution under which he was elected and which officers were sworn to
uphold. Third World armed forces have typically justified seizing political power
in terms of preserving the constitution and the nation. In the Philippines, however,
the military was incapable of governing. Having played a large part in the
Magsaysay administration, where it developed its abhorrance of civilian
politicians, the AFP was willing to resume a role in government decision-making.
Martial law gave the military the opportunity to get rid of civilian politicians
who they believed were self-serving and had little respect for the majority of the
people. Junior officers found themselves performing duties for which they were
not adequately trained. Reservist officers were considered more capable of
performing civilian functions as they had acquired a more liberal education.
To better prepare PMA officers to perform martial law duties, Marcos short-
ened the cadetship and modified the academy’s curriculum in the early 1970s.
Courses on democratic principles had still not been introduced to the Academy,
but cadets were taught the concept of civilian supremacy over the military. Other
significant changes to the curriculum included placing more emphasis on courses
in the humanities as opposed to engineering. This, according to some officers,
was designed to better equip cadets to work with civilians and in many cases to
replace them. In fact, as martial law became entrenched in the Philippines, AFP
officers replaced civilians in many government departments, and also in private
corporations which Marcos sequestered from his opponents.
Martial law lasted from 1972 to 1981. These nine years had a profound effect
on the society and the AFP. The AFP was no longer the protector of the nation.
Instead, like a private army, it served Marcos and his cronies. Officers became
deeply involved in politics as they rigged elections and suppressed the
opposition. Self-interest led officers to pursue activities which lost them the
respect of the people. And in turn the military lost its raison d’être. More
concerned with government than military duties, the AFP was incapable of
defeating the growing Communist and Muslim insurgencies; by 1985 the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was claiming control over most of the
barangays (villages) in the country. The AFP was even incapable of performing
the functions of a conventional armed force in conjunction with American forces.
By and large the AFP remained loyal to an authoritarian civilian leader who
satisfied its corporate interests and had no intention of restoring democracy. But
some officers came to the conclusion that the prolonged period of martial law
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was working against the president. Widespread dissatisfaction among intellec-
tuals and the middle-class finally surfaced after the 1983 assassination of popular
opposition leader Benigno Aquino. Concurrently, factionalism developed in the
military as the gap between those benefitting from the system and those fighting
the insurgency in the war-torn areas of the countryside increased. The result was
that soldiers lost interest in fighting the insurgents, who they believed were
justified in their claims, though the military resented their ideology.
A consensus therefore developed among the senior military leadership that ‘if
the country was to survive as a political system’, especially with the CPP/New
Peoples Army rapidly gaining ground against the regime, Marcos had to be
replaced (Lapitan 1989:237). These views were shared by secretary of defense,
Juan Ponce Enrile, and AFP vice chief of staff, General Fidel Ramos. Plans to
replace Marcos by a military coup were hastily abandoned when he suddenly
announced on television that elections were to be held in February 1986. Surpris-
ingly, the opposition was able to unite against Marcos, backing the widow of
Benigno Aquino.
The battle to stop Marcos from cheating Aquino of victory and the defection
of elements of the AFP, including General Ramos, culminated in what became
popularly known as the ‘EDSA revolution’ of February 1986. Yet this was not
the outcome envisaged by the senior military leaders who had conspired to
replace Marcos. Defense Secretary Enrile had nurtured a group of reform-minded
officers who shared some of his frustrations with the Marcos regime. These
officers formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). With Enrile, they
planned to seize political power and install an interim military-civilian council.
Aquino was considered a likely member of the council. But when the coup was
discovered by Marcos, Enrile joined General Ramos at the armed forces
headquarters in Manila and they declared their support for Corazon Aquino.
People power resulted from this rebellion which saw the military conceding its
desires for political office to Aquino.
The accession of Aquino to the presidency, however, did not stop elements
in the military from conspiring to seize political power. Enrile’s actions while in
the Aquino government, and his subsequent links to a number of the coup
attempts, clearly demonstrated his – and the RAM faction’s – desire to have a
continuing role in government. RAM believed that its claims to a place in govern-
ment decision-making were justified because it was responsible for assisting
Aquino to achieve office (Selochan 1989:8). Enrile also believed that his role in
the rebellion against Marcos justified his having a greater role in decision-making.
Vice-President Salvador Laurel shared a similar belief, having conceded his
presidential ambitions in the interest of Aquino in 1985. Having united in
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their opposition to Marcos, divisions now appeared in the groups that were
contending for power – a pattern common in countries that have experienced
transition from authoritarian to democratic systems (Huntington 1991).
Reconstituting Democracy
Much was expected of the Aquino administration. It was anticipated that the
government would revive the institutions of democracy abrogated by Marcos
in 1972; however, Filipinos also expected the government to take steps to
eradicate economic and social inequities. The government promised to reinstate
democracy ‘but there were no specific social and economic programs that were
identified to accomplish the goal of democratisation’ (Lapitan 1989:238).
Aquino assumed office with a provisional government under a provisional
constitution. This meant that both legislative and executive power was vested
in the president until a new constitution was enacted. With the promulgation of
a new constitution on 11 February 1987, a new era dawned for democracy in the
Philippines. The constitution, which has many similarities with the 1935 Ameri-
can-inspired constitution, has a number of important provisions for the armed
forces. Most important of all is the stipulation that active duty officers cannot
participate in government.
As promised, elections for all government offices were held throughout the
islands under the new constitution by mid 1987. But similarities to the pre-Marcos
era were clearly evident as many candidates elected to office were ‘former elected
officials, relatives of powerful political families and/or members of the powerful
economic elite’ (Hawes 1989:72). Nevertheless, the elections were competitive
and all citizens had the franchise.
Educating the military (which had voted overwhelmingly to reject the consti-
tution) to democratic principles, became one of the issues to be addressed by
the ‘new’ AFP chief of staff, General Ramos. A Training Command was estab-
lished on 10 December 1986 to coordinate a range of programs to reform the armed
forces (Selochan 1990:193). The principal objective of these programs was to
restore the tarnished image of the AFP, improve morale and, under a value-
formation course, teach the military to respect human rights. Little interest was
taken in teaching the military about the need to adhere to democracy.
This did not change even when Marcos supporters and disaffected military
elements joined with RAM on July 1986 to stage the first attempted coup against
Aquino. It was not until three attempts had been made to seize power, largely
by RAM and its supporters, between July 1986 and August 1987, and after PMA
cadets had shown a willingness to join in the putsch, that any attempt was made
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to conduct courses for the AFP on the military’s role in a democracy (Selochan
1991a:109). Soon after the first coup attempt notices began appearing at all mili-
tary establishments and courses were taught at the PMA on democracy. Debates
about the military’s role in a democracy were conducted in the media as retired
officers became columnists, arguing for and against the necessity for the AFP
to uphold democracy under Aquino. Politicians were invited to talk to soldiers,
and seminars on democracy were conducted for AFP personnel. Suddenly,
democracy was an issue in the AFP.
Rhetoric, however, differed from reality as elements in the armed forces, backed
by politicians and business groups which had profitted under the authoritarian
regime and were now unable to acquire the same privileges, were implicated in
four further attempts to seize political power. The alliance of politicians and
business reflected a common economic interest (Wurfel 1989:681). The factions
they supported in the military, however, were incapable of convincing the majority
of the AFP that they would benefit from a return to authoritarian rule.
When her term in office ended on 30 June 1992, Aquino proudly claimed that
she had achieved her objective of restoring democracy to the Philippines. Elec-
tions were scheduled for 11 May 1992. With seven candidates running for the
presidency, there were expectations that the military might again attempt to seize
power. In fact, however, the elections were peaceful and former AFP chief of staff,
General Ramos, was elected to the presidency. Aquino had been confident that
democracy was now firmly in place. In her valedictory state of the nation address
in June 1992 she said: ‘This is the glory of democracy … that its most solemn
moment should be the peaceful transfer of power’.
Conclusion
Elected president in May 1992 by a quarter of the voters, General Ramos is again
faced with protecting a fragile democracy. Given his limited mandate, threats from
the RAM and the Communist movement, and a host of economic and social
problems, Ramos is likely to ensure that democratic principles are upheld in his
administration. Otherwise, challenges will quickly eventuate from those who
appear still to prefer authoritarian rule. More unified than in recent years, the AFP
leadership appears ready to accept democracy as the only system that will
contribute to the economic and social development of the Philippines. For them,
it is time that the Philippines shared in the economic dynamism of the Asia-Paci-
fic region and that the military be seen not as a supporter of authoritarianism but
as a supporter of democracy in a country that was once put forward as Asia’s
showcase of democracy.
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BURMA’S  STRUGGLE  FOR  DEMOCRACY:
THE  ARMY  AGAINST  THE  PEOPLE
Josef Silverstein
The decade of the l990s opened with the people cautiously hoping for change in
the future of Burma. After twenty-eight years of military rule, in one guise or
another, many were optimistic that the 1990 scheduled elections would begin a
process by which they would recover power and restore democracy.
Almost from the day they regained their independence from British rule in 1948,
their nation has been torn by civil war, which persists to this day, foreign invasion
and slow economic recovery from the devastation wrought by World War II. The
people were sorely tested in 1988 when they demonstrated for freedom and
change but were met with the guns and bullets of the army as it suppressed their
peaceful revolution. And even though they complied with martial law, and
participated in the election of May 1990 to vote for members of a national
assembly as a first step toward the restoration of democracy, their patience went
unrewarded as the military found one excuse after another to delay change. All
real hopes for peaceful change were dashed in September 1991, when
Major-General Tin U said, ‘We cannot say how long we will be in charge of the
state administration. It might be five or ten years’ (South China Morning Mail
11 September 1991).
On 23 April 1992 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) began
a series of actions which were intended to signal that political change was
beginning. Under a new leader, SLORC started to release political prisoners and
took the first steps toward writing a new constitution. These and other changes
provide a preview of the future political system which the military rulers in Burma
are trying to establish, a system where the military will play the leading role and
the people will be the approving chorus. The model the soldiers-in-power have
in mind derives from the present Indonesian system (The New Light of Myanmar
24, 25 June 1993). This is the political burden the people carry as they continue
to struggle to free themselves from tyranny and dictatorship.
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Democracy and its Roots
Before Burma regained independence on 4 January 1948, an uneven leadership
struggle developed between the older leaders of the prewar period and the young
men who had formed and led the wartime Burma army and the coalition nationalist
party, the Anti Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). While the former were
prepared to work within the framework of change offered by the British, the latter
were not. The people backed the AFPFL from the outset, and its legal right to lead
was confirmed in the 1947 election and in the constituent assembly.
Before the authors of the 1947 constitution took up their task they had, at least,
three traditions to draw upon. They could have returned to some form of monarchy,
such as existed before British rule (Koenig 1990:65-97). But that idea had been
rejected during the war period when the Japanese granted Burma independence
(Cady 1958:4-5) and again by Aung San, the nationalist leader, when he addressed
the AFPFL on the eve of the constitutent assembly (Silverstein 1972:
92-100). They could have created a bureaucratic-authoritarian system, after the
model the British instituted at the end of the nineteenth century or that of the consti-
tutional dictatorship fashioned by Dr Ba Maw, under Japanese tutelage, during
World War II (Christian 1945:60-76; Maung 1959: 54-62). This, too, was rejected.
They had a third model, parliamentary democracy, which the British introduced as
early as 1921 to put the nation on a course to self-rule (Christian 1945:77-105).
Most amongst the young elite were Buddhists and were influenced, to various
degrees, by Buddhism’s values and traditions. Many, however, like their leader
Aung San, were Western-educated, holders of university degrees and believers
in liberal democracy with its emphasis upon separation of church and state. They
came to maturity in a period when democracy was evolving in Burma and they were
able to study and debate the political ideas of their day – democracy, fascism,
communism – and the meaning and content of Burmese nationalism. Over-
whelmingly, they were drawn to socialism, secularism and democracy (Khin Yi 1988;
Silverstein 1980:134-161). These ideas were foremost in the thinking of Aung San
when he addressed the preconstituent assembly meeting of the AFPFL and
committed the party to their support (Silverstein 1972).
But there were divisions within the AFPFL. In a barely disguised struggle be-
tween communists and socialists rival leaders and member parties fought for control
of the AFPFL and influence in shaping the future constitution. In 1946 the
communists were expelled from the AFPFL and the ideas of the socialists, together
with those of Aung San, were influential in the writing of the basic law.
The constitution of 1947 created a parliamentary system with two legislative
chambers. It included a renunciation of war as an instrument of policy, a set of socialist-
Burma’s Struggle for Democracy: The Army Against the People 71
influenced unenforceable goals – called directive principles, a definition of relations
of the state to peasants and workers, and fundamental human rights for all.
The AFPFL leaders had a special problem in that nearly 40 per cent of the
population were members of various minority groups who lived either amongst the
Burman (the Karens and Mons) or in the hill areas which surrounded the heart-
land (the Shans, Kachins, Chins and others). Because the minorities either had been
given special treatment under British rule (the Karens formed a separate electorate
and were given a specific number of seats in the legislature) or had been excluded
from the evolving political process during the same period (the various hill peoples),
the question of uniting everyone in the territory of Burma proved vexing.
Discussions leading to promises made by the Burman leaders to the minorities
resulted in the creation of a unique federal union, which was more unitary than
federal, and led to most Karens and Karennis rejecting it. It also promised the right
of secession to the populations of two areas but denied it to all others. Failure to
solve the problems of national unity at the outset was a major cause of minority
revolts after independence (Silverstein 1980).
Internal wars tested the nation. Between 1948 and 1952 the government nearly
collapsed as it fought to recover control first of the heartland and then of the hill
areas. Yet even as it faced the threat of being overthrown and the union destroyed,
the legislature met and acted, a national election was held, the High Court and
Supreme Court upheld civil and political rights against the effort of the government
to ignore them in its determination to restore control and domestic peace, education
expanded at all levels, and the press flourished as one of the freest in all of Asia.
Religion and politics were never far apart. The 1947 constitution established
religious freedom, but in the same chapter it declared that Buddhism enjoyed a
‘special position’. As early as 1949, a Ministry of Religious Affairs was created
and ecclesiastical courts were established. The state also conducted religious
examinations and sponsored an international Buddhist celebration to commemo-
rate the Buddha’s 2500th birthday (Mendelson 1975:112).
Although the state was declared to be the ultimate owner of all the land, in fact
agricultural lands were in private hands and the farmers were free to buy and sell
and to make all farming and marketing decisions. While some economic enterprises,
such as transportation and power generation, became government monopolies,
there was a private economic sector which flourished alongside government
businesses and cooperatives.
Despite a non-aligned foreign policy and the illegal invasion and occupation of
some of its territory by remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army – causing the
government to divert resources from economic recovery and development to the
expansion of the army and the purchase of weapons – the economy slowly recov-
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ered to near prewar levels in all areas; many of the groups in revolt either ended
their war and returned home or, if they continued to fight, were driven into the
hills and the delta area. In 1956 the nation held a second national election which
generally was free and fair and produced an opposition party in parliament which
generated lively debates and moved the nation from a one-dominant-party to a multi-
party system (Silverstein 1956). The institutions of democracy began to grow in
an atmosphere of peace and stability.
But unity and stability in the AFPFL leadership did not last. In 1958 the leaders
split and, in their struggle to win control of the party and government, the rivals
provoked a constitutional crisis. Prime Minister Nu tried to resolve it through a
vote in the parliament; but even though he won, his margin was small and his back-
ing came mainly from the minorities rather than the Burman members. Having no
dependable majority in parliament, on 26 October Nu stepped down as prime
minister and recommended General Ne Win, the military commander, to form a
caretaker government and restore political conditions under which new elections
could be held to resolve the political crisis.
This was not the first time that Ne Win was brought into government. In 1949,
at the height of the rebellions, Nu asked him to serve as deputy prime minister and
take charge of several ministries following the mass resignation of the socialists
from his cabinet. Ne Win held those posts for nearly seventeen months.
The multiple internal wars in the decade of the 1950s gave Ne Win’s army the
opportunity to exercise political authority under martial law. In 1952 martial law was
proclaimed in parts of the Shan state; it lasted for two years. The army abused the
people and acted corruptly, giving rise to its reputation of ruthless and autocratic
behaviour. Whatever popularity it had in the hill areas at the outset of its rule
vanished as it exercised power.
Ne Win’s caretaker government of 1958-60 ruled without party support. It drew
upon senior military officers and respected civil servants to serve in the cabinet
and administer government offices. Ne Win scrupulously adhered to the letter of
the constitution, even demanding its amendment to allow him to serve beyond six
months as a nonelected member. But his strict enforcement of the law, insensitivity
to the people, and impatience with the democratic process, turned the public against
his rule even though his administration brought law and order to a good portion
of the country and improved the economy.
Like the government before his, Ne Win’s had no compunctions against using
religion for political ends. In 1959 it published a booklet entitled Dhammantaraya
(Dhamma in Danger), which declared that the Burmese communists posed a
threat to Buddhism, and mobilised 80800 monks to hold meetings and denounce
the local communist movement (Ba Than 1962:71). It also continued the practice
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of mixing religion and politics by placing religious affairs under the deputy prime
minister and enforcing all laws pertaining to religion.
When elections were held in 1960, the party favoured by the military suffered
an overwhelming defeat while its opponent, led by U Nu, returned to power (Di-
rector of Information 1960; Silverstein 1977). A major issue was U Nu’s promise,
if elected, to make Buddhism the state religion.
Between that election and the military coup on 2 March 1962, Nu worked hard
to strengthen democracy and address the causes of national disunity (Silverstein
1964). But before he could accomplish his goals the military struck, seized power,
and replaced democracy and the constitution with a military dictatorship.
Although the democratic experiment lasted only fourteen years, it established
an important watershed for Burmese political thought and action. Three national
elections had been held and a multiparty system proved workable; leaders coped
with major economic and political problems and adopted pragmatic solutions.
Human and civil rights generally were honoured, and when questions arose the
courts acted independently in defence of the constitution.
Divisions in the ruling party were a major cause of criticism of the democratic
process; however, it must be remembered that the AFPFL started life as a broad
coalition of conflicting leaders and ideas. In the face of multiple rebellions which
threatened to destroy the union as well as the democratic system, the leaders gen-
erally remained united. In 1958, when the nation began to enjoy real peace and
thousands of people in revolt began to put away their weapons and drift toward a
peaceful way of life, Nu tried to convert the AFPFL into a coherent and unified party;
but divisions amongst its leaders already were evident and barely concealed in
the party congress of that year. Three months later, AFPFL unity was shattered. A
similar phenomenon occurred in U Nu’s party during his last administration and
reinforced the idea that personal rivalries outweighed commitment to democratic
rule. If the people did not rise up to defend democracy against the military in 1962
it was because most of those who thought about it recognised the reality of a totally
successful lightning coup and because many of them believed that a new caretaker
government was going to be established.
The Military and its Roots
The modern military in Burma began as part of the independence struggle in the
1930s. In 1940 the Thakins, the political movement of the students and young
intelligentsia, secretly sent one of their leaders, Aung San, to China to seek aid for
their revolt. Picked up by the Japanese in Amoy, he was taken to Tokyo. There he
met leaders of the Japanese Army command who were aware of the independence
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aspirations of the Thakins; Aung San entered into an agreement with them: ‘Japan
would help Burma to gain her independence by supplying her with necessary arms’
(Ba Than 1962:15; Yoon 1973). At the same time, an underground revolutionary
movement began to form inside Burma in preparation for the anticipated uprising
against the British.
Aung San returned in 1941 and recruited twenty-nine Burmans to go secretly
with him to Hainan Island where they would be given military training by
the Japanese. These ‘Thirty Heroes’ formed the nucleus of the present Burma army.
When the Pacific War broke out, they returned to Thailand, recruited the first mem-
bers of the Burma Independence Army and followed the Japanese into Burma. Some
of their units fought the British and the experience gave them pride and confidence.
During the war the army’s name was changed, first to the Burma Defence Army,
then the Burma National Army and at war’s end, to the Patriotic Burmese Forces.
On 27 March 1945 it revolted against the Japanese and joined with the Allies in
their final phase of the war against the Japanese in Burma.
There was a second strand to the modern Burma military: the ethnic minorities
who were recruited and served in the pre-war Burma Defence Forces. During
peacetime the colonial rulers recruited very few Burmans. Only in times of emer-
gency – World War I and at the beginning of World War II – were the armed forces
open to Burman recruits.
Following the defeat of British forces in Burma in 1942, minority recruits who
did not escape to India returned to their villages in the hill areas and, there, were
regrouped by British officers who stayed behind or were dropped by parachute to
prepare for the return of the British army (Morrison 1947; Mountbatten 1960).
Shortly after the British were driven out of Burma in 1942, there were serious
clashes between the Burma Independence Army and Karens living in the delta
region. To overcome racial tensions, Aung San and other Burman leaders convinced
some Karen leaders of their determination to build racial harmony by recruiting
Karens into the new indigenous army and commissioning a few Karen officers.
Following independence, a British-trained Karen officer, Smith Dun, was named
the first head of the Burma army.
After the war, the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Mountbatten, met with
Aung San and other Burman leaders in Kandy, Ceylon, where they agreed that the
new Burma army would be created out of the two different military groups. It would
contain approximately equal numbers from both and would be organised along
racial lines on the model of the Indian Army. At the outset, it would employ British
officers while Burmese officers were being trained to British standards. The armed
force would be limited to approximately 10000 officers and men.
The two elements brought different values and attitudes to the new army. The
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Burmans drew upon the ideas of the Thakins – opposition to colonial rule, inde-
pendence and socialism. From their wartime experiences, they adopted the Japan-
ese military ideas of loyalty, instant obedience to commands from above or pun-
ishment for their failures. They also learned to respond unquestioningly to autho-
rity and not to act independently in battle, no matter what the conditions. Their
experiences in battle against the British and the Japanese gave them a sense of
self-confidence, a belief in themselves as the leaders who played an important role
in bringing the AFPFL into being, and pride in their patriotism for having fought
for the political freedom of Burma.
The minorities brought a different tradition: loyalty to the British monarch,
military professionalism, separation between politics and military affairs, and fear
of Burman domination.
There was also a third element of the military – private armies. Such forces existed
in the 1930s and were nothing new for Burma. Aung San formed the Peoples
Volunteer Organisation (PVO) from the Burman soldiers who were not taken into
the new army, as a home guard to help maintain law and order in the countryside.
But its real mission was political: to give the AFPFL a vehicle by which to intimi-
date the colonial rulers in the growing struggle for independence. Because PVO
members shared the ideas and values of and had close personal ties to the leaders
and men in the new army and the rival political parties in and out of the AFPFL –
the socialists and communists – doubts were raised in many minds as to whether
there was a real separation between the professional army, the political army and
the parties. So long as Aung San lived, the PVO remained united and loyal to him
and the AFPFL. Aung San’s assassination in 1947 left the PVO leaderless and
subject to the persuasions of rival political groups seeking to lead the nation.
The communist uprising in 1948 split the PVO, with members divided between
the government and its opposition. The PVO eventually faded as a military and
political force, but not before its involvement in the civil war nearly tipped the
scale on the side of those in revolt.
During this same period the minorities, too, were torn between loyalty to the
new state and loyalty to their ethnic groups. The Karens, in particular, experienced
a sense of abandonment by the British to their historic oppressors, the Burmans.
This helped raise their ethnic consciousness at the expense of full identity with the
new national army. In 1947 the Karens formed a paramilitary group, the Karen
National Defence Organisation (KNDO) to defend their villages. At the same time,
the other large minorities, the Shans, Kachins and Chins, gave their full loyalty to
independent Burma. In the early phases of the rebellions their loyalty to the Union
of Burma and their unwillingness to join the Karens and others in revolt was a
major factor in saving the union.
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The Kandy Agreement, which emphasised federation rather than full integration,
had a second defect. It took no account of the political divisions and competing
ideologies amongst the member groups in the AFPFL and their reflection in the
new army. Thus, when the Communist Party went into revolt on 28 March 1948,
less than three months after independence, the army began to come apart. The 1st
and 3rd Burma Rifles – two Burman battalions – deserted with their weapons and
joined forces with the revolutionaries. Two months later the PVO split, one part
joining the communists in revolt and the other remaining loyal to the government.
Following independence and the failure of the constituent assembly to solve the
problem of the Karens’ place in the new union, communal violence erupted be-
tween Burmans and Karens. As the violence increased, in January 1949 the KNDO
went into revolt. Three battalions of Karen Rifles deserted and joined the KNDO.
These events brought a change in military command; Smith Dun was placed on
indefinite leave and Ne Win was placed in charge of the army. The government
authorised the recruitment of PVOs loyal to the state, and other former World War
II soldiers to form territorial units (Sitwundans) to buttress the depleted army
(Tinker 1961:38). Under Ne Win’s leadership, a process of Burman domination in
the army began. Despite the loyal support given by Kachin, Chin and Shan bat-
talions, their units gradually were reformed with Burman officers in command and
Burman soldiers in their ranks. Aung San’s federated army gave way to Ne Win’s
Burman-dominated and integrated army. The new army became more professional
with the establishment of a military academy in 1954, and later a National Defence
College. As its size grew, so too did its strength in arms.
In the midst of the political turmoil caused by the 1958 split in the AFPFL, the
military feared that the primary loyalty of the Union Military Police (UMP) and
paramilitary forces was to political parties rather than the state and that UMP units
might take sides and even displace the army as the nation’s defender. It also was
alarmed at the divisions in the ranks of the nation’s leaders. In this deteriorating
environment the army saw itself as the only national institution ready to sacrifice
itself to preserve the union and protect the constitution.
On the eve of the formation of the caretaker government the military leaders
held a conference at which they defined the national ideology, as they understood
it, and their role in upholding it (Director of Information 1960: Appendix I),
declaring that so long as their strength remained, ‘the Constitution shall remain
inviolate’. They held that the nation’s goal was to build a political-economic system
on the principles of justice, liberty and equality. To gain that end, they set three
priorities: first, to restore peace and the rule of law; second, to construct a demo-
cratic society, and third, to create a socialist economy. They pledged to pursue the
aims of national politics as distinct from party politics. When Ne Win presented
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himself to parliament as candidate for the office of prime minister on 3 October
1958, he said:
I wish deeply that all Members of Parliament would hold as much belief in the Con-
stitution and democracy as I do. I wish deeply that all Members of Parliament would
sacrifice their lives to defend the constitution as I would do in my capacity of Prime
Minister, as a citizen and as a soldier (Director of Information 1960:547).
The caretaker government gave Ne Win a chance to put the army’s ideology and
theories into practice; and as discussed earlier, while he followed the letter of the
constitution, he violated its spirit.
Military Rule: First Phase, 1962–1974
The military justified the coup of 2 March 1962 on three grounds: to preserve the
union, to restore order and harmony in the society, and to solve the economic
problems facing the nation (Silverstein:1977:80). The men who made the coup
were not the same as those who stood close to Ne Win in the caretaker period.
Several had been sent abroad as ambassadors a year earlier. And those who
remained were divided in their view of what the military should do with power.
Brigadier Aung Gyi wanted to continue along the lines of the caretaker govern-
ment, while his rival, Brigadier Tin Pe, wanted to turn the nation immediately down
the road to socialism. A year later Aung Gyi was dismissed and Ne Win adopted
Tin Pe’s position.
If the coup leaders were divided on their immediate course, they were agreed on
abandoning their earlier commitment to the constitution and democracy in favour
of dictatorship with no limits on their right to make rules and exercise power.
A month after the coup the leaders promulgated a new ideological statement,
The Burmese Way to Socialism. In their new analysis they argued that Burma’s
problems were the result of the economic system, which not only deformed society
and the personal values and attitudes of the people, but contributed to disunity
and social unrest (Silverstein 1964:716). Parliamentary democracy also contributed
by failing to produce political stability and lent itself to misuse and personal profit
by those in power. Thus, the priorities were altered: economic change and the
creation of a socialist democracy – on the lines of the Eastern European states –
must come before all else. Gone were all pretences of upholding constitutionalism
and the liberal democracy of the past.
From the outset, the military displaced the institutions created at independence,
replaced the civilian leadership with members of their own organisation, and
substituted their thought for that of their political predecessors. The constitution
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was suspended and became inoperative in areas where the Revolutionary Council,
the military governing body, issued decrees and promulgated orders. The courts
were changed. The old parties were outlawed and replaced by the military’s own
new party, the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), the only political party allowed
after 1964. The free press eventually was outlawed and replaced by an official
publication, the Working Peoples Daily. Most of all, the federal system, while
remaining in name, in fact became a centralised administrative system. Security
Administration Councils, composed of representatives from the army, civil service
and police, replaced state political and administrative organs. The new system was
organised hierarchically with control located in Rangoon.
The changes were more than institutional. The people were cut off from contact
with foreigners as the military’s propagandists and educators sought to change
people’s beliefs, values and attitudes to those expressed in the new ideological
documents. A police state emerged; people were required to inform on one another
while a national network of domestic spies reported the activities and statements
of ordinary citizens.
To bring an end to the various revolutions still in progress, the military rulers
used both ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’, holding peace negotiations in 1963 and, following
their failure, resuming their military campaigns.
The Burmese way to socialism failed both to improve the economy and to gain
real support amongst the people. By the end of the decade Ne Win and his co-
leaders gradually shifted to a new direction.
In 1971 the BSPP was converted from a cadre to a mass party and Ne Win gave
it responsibility for writing a new constitution. Despite changes in structure, the
party remained a political vehicle for the military with General Ne Win as its head
and senior military officers monopolising all subleadership posts.
In April 1972, while the party pursued its tasks, Ne Win and nineteen senior
military officers retired from the Defence Services. At the same time the govern-
ment changed its name from the Revolutionary Council to the Government of
Burma. U Ne Win remained prime minister and most of the same senior military
leaders, now retired, continued as government heads; four civilian cabinet officers
were added to their ranks. During this period Ne Win abolished the secretariat
inherited from the British colonial system, and transferred its responsibilities to the
ministers. In terms of who led the nation, these changes were more nominal than
real as the military retained its near exclusive control of power. A new constitution
was approved by the people in a referendum in December 1973, and in elections
held the following month candidates for seats in the national assemby and the three
sublevels of government were elected. On 2 March 1974 the second phase of
military rule began.
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Military Rule: Second Phase, 1974–1988
Despite the fanfare, the military did not return power to the people. The constitution
institutionalised the power of the BSPP. It was directed to lead the nation; no other
parties were allowed. It selected all candidates for seats in the national assembly,
the Pyithu Hluttaw, and the deliberative bodies at the three lower levels; and it was
empowered to give advice and suggestions to government. If there was any doubt
that the new system was a continuation of its predecessor, Article 200 declared that
when the People’s Assembly interpreted the constitution, it had to do so in accordance
with the General Clauses Law promulgated by the preceding government.
Like the army, government was centralised and hierarchical. The various levels
of administration were tied together by the principle of democratic centralism. The
people were given rights and duties. They had the right to stand for election and
to recall their representative; they had the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; the right to freedom of speech, expression and publication ‘to the
extent that the enjoyment of such freedom is not contrary to the interests of the
working people and of socialism’ (author’s emphasis). In carrying out one’s rights,
the constitution declared that persons ‘shall be under a duty … to abstain from
undermining any of the following: (l) sovereignty and security of the State; (2) the
essence of the socialist system; (3) unity and solidarity of the national races;
(4) public peace and tranquility; (5) public morality’.
With no right to organise a political party to express legal opposition to the ruling party
and the government it controlled, with the requirement to report the speech of others as
well as one’s own conversations with outsiders, with police informers everywhere, the
rights were nominal, at best, and meaningless in this constitutional dictatorship.
The system remained intact, with relatively little change until 1988. At the Fourth
Party Congress (August 1981) Ne Win announced his intention to give up the office
of president of the nation, but to continue to serve as head of the party. As this
was where real power was located, it did not represent any real change. His potential
successor, U San Yu, was a former subordinate officer from the time he served under
Ne Win in the 4th Burma Rifles. Other nominal changes were made but, as always,
power remained in the hands of serving or retired military officers under Ne Win’s
leadership (Silverstein 1982).
The first sign of real change came in August 1987, when Ne Win startled the nation
by admitting ‘failure and faults’ in the management of the economy and called for
open discussion about the past and change. Within weeks the heavy hand of socialist
economic control was partially lifted as the government removed restrictions on the
sale, purchase, transport, and storage of foodstuffs. This was followed by
demonitisation of three units of currency, which was intended to disrupt the black
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market but in fact had a devastating effect upon the general population because most
did their business in cash and kept their reserves at home instead of in a bank.
Developments came to a climax in July 1988 while the nation was in turmoil
and an emergency party congress was in session. Ne Win announced his resigna-
tion as party head and urged the leaders to consider the creation of a multiparty
system, among other changes. He also warned the nation not to demonstrate, for if
they did, the army would not shoot over their heads.
Although the party permitted Ne Win to resign, it did not adopt his recom-
mendations. Instead, it appointed as its new leader General Sein Lwin, another
protégé of Ne Win. He had the reputation of having led his military unit in sup-
pressing dissent on the university campus in 1962, and again in 1974 where hun-
dreds of students were killed or wounded. To put down the growing national unrest,
which had been building up during the year and was about to culminate in a national
strike on 8 August, Sein Lwin ordered the military to suppress the strike of unarmed
civilians; it resulted in the death of thousands.
The resignation of Sein Lwin brought the first true civilian to leadership. Dr Maung
Maung, a legal scholar and strong supporter of Ne Win, became head of state and
sought to end popular unrest by promising elections for a multi-party system and
other reforms. But his offer came too late as dissent grew and threatened to topple
his government; more important, defections from the air force and the navy to the
side of the people were a prelude to defections from the army. During this period,
the government released criminals from jail and crime rose; at the same time, it spread
rumors that the water was poisoned and the city was unsafe. Instead of drawing the
people back to BSPP rule, this only hardened their resolve to continue peaceful
demonstrations for immediate change to a democratic multiparty system.
At this critical stage, when the people felt that they were on the verge of victory,
General Saw Maung, the head of the army, organised a coup and on 18 September
seized power and ordered the armed forces to suppress all dissent. Again, the number
killed and wounded is unknown, but is reported to have reached 3000 or more.
Thus, within a year, from Ne Win’s 1987 announcement to the Saw Maung coup,
the military’s carefully constructed constitutional dictatorship crumbled and the
army found it necessary to abandon the façade of constitutional government in
favour of naked power to restore its leadership. As in 1962, it abandoned all
pretences of legality and democracy to create a new dictatorship based on martial
law and backed by soldiers and guns.
Opposition to Military Rule: 1962–1988
Despite having complete political power and the backing of the armed forces,
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military rule in its various guises was never free of opposition. The civil war be-
tween the minorities and the government persisted even though the armed forces
increased in both size and strength. In the heartland, Buddhist monks and university
students resisted openly at various times. As the military was fashioning its
dictatorship in 1962, the monks refused to register and carry identification cards;
and in the Mandalay area some monasteries resisted with force. Eventually, in 1980
Ne Win was successful in bringing the monks and the various sects under gov-
ernment control and marked the event by holding a national celebration, granting
amnesty to dissidents and imprisoned felons.
The opposition of the university students lasted longer and was more influential
in bringing the constitutional dictatorship to an end. It began in June 1962, with
resistance to harsh new university regulations and the killing of an unknown num-
ber of students as the army dislodged them from their barricades on the campus
and blew up the Student Union Building – the historic centre of student resistance
during the British period. Skirmishes between the military and students erupted
over the next several years, with the most serious occurring in 1974. When the re-
mains of U Thant, the third secretary-general of the United Nations, were returned
to Burma, students and monks seized the coffin because the government did not
intend to properly honour his remains. They took them to the university where,
after a few days, the army used force, and killed more than a hundred students and
monks in recovering the coffin (Selth 1989).
In 1987 the students, most of whom lived on the cash in their pockets, dem-
onstrated against the demonitisation. A few months later, a minor fight between
students and townfolk grew into large-scale student-army clashes and a major
demonstration in Rangoon, which was suppressed by force, with forty-one
students known to have died of suffocation in a police van; others were killed
or jailed in the conflict.
The demonstrations of March did not end, despite the closing of the univer-
sities. When the universities were reopened in June, the students demanded an
accounting of the missing and the arrest of those who inflicted injury upon them;
this provoked new demonstrations. At the time, there were rice shortages and
skyrocketing prices of basic goods in the cities; there also was large-scale unem-
ployment. These and other issues finally brought the people onto the streets to
join the student-led demonstrations. Martial law had been declared in several
urban areas outside Rangoon. With the students at the head of the demonstrations
and demanding real change in the political system – a return to democracy and
constitutional government – the situation slipped out of the control of the military
and threatened to bring down the nearly three-decade-old dictatorship (Lintner
1989).
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On the Unity of the Army, 1948–1988
It often has been noted that throughout the period of military rule the army re-
mained united and intact. Ne Win could appoint and dismiss leaders with no fear
of army resistance. He could call upon it to carry out the most brutal suppression
of the people without fear that it would reject his command.
The officers in the Burma army have come from three sources: from the ranks;
from students and graduates of the universities of Rangoon and Mandalay, who
were given ROTC training and after entering the armed forces completed the
Officers Training School (OTS) course. Under Ne Win, the first category were the
most trusted, especially if they had served under him in his first postwar command,
the 4th Burma Rifles. They formed a close camaraderie, and such men as Aung Gyi,
Tin Pe, San Yu and Sein Lwin rose to leadership this way. The academy graduates
were intended to be the army elite; they were carefully selected and given an
education comparable to that offered at the universities. The ROTC produced
engineers and doctors mainly; however, some, upon entering the armed forces,
became line officers and they represent the best educated amongst the senior
command. Enlisted men have been drawn almost exclusively from amongst the rural
population. They have had less education generally than urban youth and the
military has offered an opportunity to live better and earn more than if they remained
peasants. They have proven to be very loyal soldiers who respond faithfully to
command. The army has also recruited soldiers from amongst some of the minori-
ties who were thought to be less political and most loyal to the national govern-
ment. The Chins are believed to be the most numerous at the present time.
The persistent unity within the army can be traced to three sources: training,
ideology, and its self-declared special position in society. As noted earlier, the initial
Burman component of the army was trained by the Japanese and absorbed its
traditions of absolute authority, brutalisation of the troops and officers who delayed
or questioned orders, and centralisation of command. This was the glue that held
the units together and punishment for individual initiative ensured that no deviation
occurred.
The special position in society was a by-product of the army’s central ideology.
It saw itself as the most patriotic and loyal body in the nation. It had fought for
independence and was in the front line of defence against both external and inter-
nal enemies. Because of its willingness to sacrifice everything for the people and
the state, it saw itself as entitled to good housing, pay and benefits. During the
democratic period, a two-class society emerged, with the army bases better built
and cared for than the housing of the ordinary people. Through the Defence Ser-
vices Institute the army expanded into the economic realm, where eventually,
Burma’s Struggle for Democracy: The Army Against the People 83
during the caretaker government, it organised and ran several large economic
enterprises. From this period, the army argued that it not only defended the nation
from its enemies but was the friend and helpmate of the farmer and worker, sharing
in the harvesting and in building roads and dams. Throughout the period of the
constitutional dictatorship this theme of friendship and partnership dominated in
the press and at public events.
For all the apparent internal unity in the army, there was dissent in its officer ranks.
In 1976, a coup against Ne Win was launched by more than a dozen junior officers.
They were intent upon returning civilian leaders to power and the military to
professional tasks. In court, the accused argued that they were dissatisfied with
the political and economic system imposed on Burma by their leaders and with the
corrupting influence of politics in the army. The failure of the coup and the
conviction of the accused placed Academy graduates under suspicion, and many
were diverted to administrative and party duties. Until 1988, military leadership
remained in the hands of officers who rose from the ranks, from the OTS and from
close association with Ne Win (Silverstein 1977); since then, Academy graduates
have risen to leadership in SLORC, and General Maung Aye, a member of the first
class at the Academy, is the second-highest ranking officer in the army.
Military Rule: Third Phase, 1988–1993
On the day before the 1988 coup, the minister of Defence ordered all members of
the armed forces to resign from the BSPP and resume performing their ‘original
duties’, working for the perpetuation of the state, for national unity and for the
consolidation and strengthening of sovereignty. This was the first step towards
ending party control, dismantling the constitutional dictatorship and reasserting the
army’s determination to rule directly. Immediately following their seizure of
power, the coup leaders explained their action as halting the deteriorating conditions
in the country and announced three immediate goals: (1) restoring law, order, peace
and tranquility; (2) easing the people’s food, clothing and shelter needs; and
(3) holding democratic multi-party elections, once the first two goals were
established. It also declared that all parties and organisations willing to accept and
practise genuine democracy could make preparations and form parties. It abolished
the state institutions and, in their place, created a State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) comprising nineteen senior military officers under the leadership
of General Saw Maung, the former minister of Defence and army chief of staff.
Also following the coup, the army dropped the original ethnic names of its
military units. This was the last step in erasing its original federal structure.
Under martial law and arbitrary decrees, parties were able to form, but they were
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limited in their access to the media, and in their ability to hold rallies and
communicate with their constituents. During the period of registration, 234 par-
ties formed and all but one went onto the electoral rolls. Only a few were genu-
inely national, with leaders who attracted a wide following and offered some sort
of program if they came to power.
The electoral law was highly restrictive and limited the ability of the parties to
campaign and get their messages to potential supporters. Yet, despite the im-
pediments to free and open campaigning established in the electoral law, the people
took full advantage of the free election and voted overwhelmingly for the party
which was recognised by all as being anti-military and pro-democracy. The National
League for Democracy, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and former General Tin U
gained 392 of the 485 seats in the new People’s Assembly, even though its leaders
were either under house or direct arrest and the party was harassed in its efforts to
reach its supporters.
Despite the coup leaders’ promises to return power to the people and permit the
People’s Assembly to convene, the military had no real intention of doing that if
the party and leaders it favoured did not win.
On 27 July 1990 they tore away their democratic mask and revealed their true
authoritarian character. In their Announcement 1/90 they declared that SLORC was
not bound by any constitution; it ruled by martial law and gained legitimacy from
international recognition both by the United Nations and individual states. It
declared that while it continued to rule, the elected members were responsible only
for drafting ‘a constitution for the future democratic state’. Nearly a month later,
General Saw Maung said in a press conference that all previous constitutions
ceased to be effective after the coup leaders seized power in 1988 (International
Human Rights Law Group 1990:26-27).
While the elected members of the People’s Assembly wait to assemble, SLORC
continues its abuse of human rights by arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of the
electees as well as citizens at large. Under Martial Law Order 1/89, military courts
were established with power to severely punish, including issuing the death pen-
alty for violators of SLORC decrees and pre-existing laws. In November 1989
Amnesty International reported that thousands of people had been arrested and
convicted; other sources reported that more than 100 had received the death pen-
alty (Amnesty International 1990a:1).
In the hill areas, the military pursues a dual policy to bring the civil wars to an
end. Since 1989, it has offered individual ceasefire agreements that allow ethnic
insurgents to retain their weapons and control local administration and economy
in exchange for halting their wars against the state. All political issues remain
unresolved until a new constitution and elected government are in place. For those
Burma’s Struggle for Democracy: The Army Against the People 85
who refuse the offer, war continues. By 1996, fourteen opposition groups had
signed. Only the Karens have refused; the Karenni resumed warfare after the Burma
army broke the agreement.
A key tactic of the military to force acceptance of an agreement is the persecu-
tion, torture, rape and murder of non-combatant old men, women and children of
the minorities. By using innocent villagers as forced labour both in warfare and
behind the lines, the army violates the human rights of civilians. These abuses are
widely documented and reported by government agencies and non-governmental
organisations.
Since 1989 the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva has pursued the
issue of human rights violations in Burma. After listening to the reports of its special
rapporteur and the testimony of representatives from various countries and non-
governmental organisations, beginning in 1991 and continuing through its 1996
sessions the Commission adopted strong resolutions. Initially the Commission
acted under a rule of secrecy, but the failure of Burma’s military rulers to give full
cooperation to its special rapporteurs and to make appreciable progress in
correcting identified abuses led the Commission, in 1993, to make public its
proceedings and reports.
SLORC’s rule in Burma has drawn the continuous attention of the UN General
Assembly since 1992. Following discussions in its Third Committee, it unanimously
adopted strong resolutions calling on Burma’s military regime to release Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi, the Nobel laureate, and other political prisoners, to halt human rights
violations, and to restore democracy.
Faced with growing hostility from the world community, and in need of foreign
aid, investment and technical assistance, on 23 April 1992 SLORC began a series
of steps it hoped would indicate that political change was in progress and that the
military’s iron grip was relaxing. Change began at the top, with General Than Shwe,
the minister of Defence and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, replacing
General Saw Maung as leader of SLORC. At the same time, SLORC announced that
political prisoners who no longer were a threat to the regime would begin to be
released. It also announced that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi could receive visits from
her immediate family, and that if she promised to end her involvement in national
politics she was free to leave the country.
Earlier in the same year, Muslims of Indian origin living in Arakan, many of
whom are citizens of Burma, harassed and under pressure from the Burma army,
began fleeing the country and seeking refuge in Bangladesh. The outflow led to a
border incident between the two states and the mobilisation of tens of thousands
of troops on both sides of the border. But tensions began to relax following the
change in SLORC leadership and on 28 April the two countries agreed to an orderly
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return of the refugees if they could prove their citizenship or right to be in Burma.
Also, about the same time, General Than Shwe announced a halt to the military
campaigns against the Karen, although he did not declare a ceasefire or take steps
to halt fighting against other minorities.
But the change that attracted most attention was SLORC’s announcement that
it would shortly begin a protracted process of writing a new constitution as the
first step towards transfer of political power. On 23 June 1992 it convened a pre-
convention assembly of forty-three selected individuals, including candidates
elected in 1990 to the parliament which they were never allowed to form, and fifteen
representatives of the military. Their assignment was to decide who should be
invited to the next stage of constitution-making, the drafting of principles and
agreeing on chapter headings (Silverstein 1992).
To prepare for this second stage, SLORC promulgated Order 13/92 which set forth
the six principles which the military rulers wanted the delegates to adopt as the
basis of the new constitution: the unity of the territory, the people and the state; a
multi-party democratic system; the incorporation of the principles of justice, liberty
and equality, and ‘the participation of the Tatmadaw [army] in the leading role of
national politics of the State in future’.
With these and other instructions, the national convention of SLORC-selected
delegates assembled in January 1993. From the start it did not go as planned. The
military managers were forced to adjourn after two days when some of the delegates
wanted to talk against the sixth principle and about other topics. The meeting
reassembled but adjourned four times during the first six months of the year. By
1994, the national convention had adopted more than 100 principles. On the future
rule of the military in government, it agreed that one-quarter of the representatives
in parliament would come from the military. They would be named by and
responsible to the Commander-in-Chief; he would also name the ministers of
defence, interior and border affairs, as well as have absolute power in times of
emergency (New Light of Myanmar, 9 April 1994). The president must have long
military experience. The armed forces budget would not be reviewed by the
parliament.
More than four years have passed since SLORC announced its intention to
oversee the writing of a new constitution. The people have yet to have a say. Their
elected representatives were screened by SLORC, and when any of them refused
to go along with the military representatives and spoke out they were disqualified;
some left of their own accord, fearing that their outspokenness might land them
in jail. On the basis of progress made thus far, General Tin U’s prediction about
the length of time that might pass before the SLORC gives way to some other
ruling body may not be too far from the mark. And when the soldiers-in-power get
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the signatures of their hand-picked delegates on the document they are readying
for them, and have the document ratified by the public, they will have the legal
basis for a new constitutional dictatorship under which they can rule indefinitely.
Conclusion
The five-decade-long history of independent Burma is one of struggle both to
establish a modern democratic political system and to unite the people under its
rule. Thus far, it has failed on both counts. But the struggle has not been in vain.
Military rule has convinced even the most sceptical that a true democracy is the
only way domestic peace, freedom and personal safety can be restored. If democ-
racy failed in its first trial, most people in Burma are more than ready to give it a
second trial.
Military dictatorship and human rights violations have destroyed the myth of
the unity between the soldiers and the people; today, the army is the most hated
and feared organisation in the country. And while the military has fashioned a jail
out of the once free country, the people, as demonstrated in the 1990 election, will
do what they can to recover the freedom they thought they achieved when Burma
became independent in 1948.
The minorities, too, have concluded that their future lies in a union with the
Burmans and not outside. They are willing to lay down their weapons and join the
Burmans in forming a viable federal state, based on equality, autonomy and
self-determination. They want modernisation and development to come to their
areas and people, but on terms they can accept and live with.
Six years ago a handful of elected representatives fled to Manerplaw, the Karen
headquarters on the Burma-Thai border, and with the backing of the Democratic
Alliance of Burma – a political front of minority and Burman groups – established
the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) as a rival to
SLORC. The leader, Dr Sien Win, is the cousin of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Although
it has not received formal international recognition, its members travel widely and
speak often to parliaments, political leaders and the press; they have a headquarters
in the US and lobby at the UN, keeping the issue of Burma before them. Both the
Burmans and the minorities want to see the military return to the barracks, leaving
politics to civilian elected representatives. Until democracy is re-established, there
will be disunity, warfare and economic decline in Burma.
Pakistan: civil-military relations
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6
PAKISTAN:  CIVIL-MILITARY  RELATIONS
IN  A  PRAETORIAN  STATE
Hasan Askari Rizvi
Pakistan can be described as a praetorian state where the military has acquired the
capability, will, and sufficient experience to dominate the core political institutions
and processes. As the political forces are disparate and weak, the military’s
disposition has a strong impact on the course of political change, including the
transfer of power from one set of the elite to another. Such an expanded role is at
variance with the traditions and temperament of the military at the time of
independence in 1947.
The Pakistan military inherited the British tradition of civilian supremacy over
the military, aloofness from active politics, commitment to professionalism, and
assistance to the civilian authorities with respect to law and order and national
calamities. Its role expanded gradually. At first, it emerged as an important actor
in the decision-making process, especially in defence and security affairs. In 1958
General (later Field Marshal) Mohammad Ayub Khan, Chief of Army Staff [COAS]
from 1951 to 1958, overthrew the tottering civilian government. He ruled under
martial law until June 1962, when a new presidential constitution was introduced
which civilianised military rule through co-option of a section of the civilian elite.
In March 1969, General Yahya Khan, COAS from 1966 to 1971, took power after
Ayub Khan’s resignation in the wake of mass agitation against his rule. Yahya Khan
abolished Ayub’s constitution and ruled the country under martial law until
December 1971, when he was forced to hand over power to a civilian leader,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, following the surrender of the Pakistani troops in East Pakistan
(now Bangladesh) to India.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was temporarily successful in asserting the primacy of civilian
government. He enjoyed popular support in the early stages of his rule while the
military’s reputation had declined dramatically owing to the East Pakistan debacle.
However, Bhutto’s assertion of civilian supremacy did not prove durable for three
major reasons. First, his efforts to personalise power rather than work towards
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establishing viable participatory institutions and processes eroded his popular
support. Second, in their determination to dislodge Bhutto, some of the opposition
leaders made it clear in the later stages of anti Bhutto agitation in 1977 that they
would not challenge the military in the event of his overthrow. Third, by 1977 the
military had recovered from the shock of 1971. When the senior commanders found
that the Bhutto regime was discredited and could not survive without their support,
they retrieved the political initiative.
This was accomplished when General Zia ul Haq, COAS from 1976 to 1988,
staged the third coup in July 1977, and governed under martial law until 1985.
During this period he tailored a political system and carefully stage-managed
partyless elections to ensure the continuity of his rule after the termination of martial
law. When Zia ul Haq died in an aircrash in August 1988, the military allowed the
constitutional process to become operative, facilitating the holding of elections
and transfer of power to an elected leader, Benazir Bhutto. However, the military
monitored the elected government’s actions and periodically commented on its
performance. Differences developed between the military commanders and the
civilian government over the government’s performance, which was considered
unsatisfactory. The military joined with the president to dismiss the government in
August 1990.
In addition to the privileges of exercising power, other considerations which impel
the senior echelons of the military to maintain interest in politics include overall
political stability, the size of the defence budget, security and foreign policy,
professional interests, especially the autonomy of the military in its internal affairs,
and corporate interests, including the privileges and benefits for military personnel,
especially senior commanders.
The Heritage
The military was organised on modern lines by the British. Towards the end of the
nineteenth century the three armies of the presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta, and
Madras were amalgamated and put under the Commander-in-Charge of India. The
Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force were organised as independent forces in 1928
and 1933 respectively; much of their expansion took place during World War II.
The British emphasised the principle of civilian supremacy over the military and
the military’s aloofness from politics. They did not let the nationalist movement in
India impair military professionalism and discipline, and the military was kept away
from the nationalist struggle. The formation of the Indian National Army by Subbas
Chandra Bose and the naval strike of 1946 could not be described as concerted
efforts to dislodge the British as these were confined to a section of the armed forces
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and took place under exceptional circumstances. The armed forces as a whole
remained loyal to the government.
A logical follow up to the decision to partition India and establish the indepen-
dent states of India and Pakistan was the division of the British Indian military.
Military personnel were given the option of joining the armed forces of either
country, with one exception: no Muslim from the area that became Pakistan could
opt for India and a non-Muslim hailing from the area that constituted independent
India could not opt for Pakistan. The division of arms, weapons and equipment
proved a more complicated affair. However, the whole task was completed in a
couple of months.
Despite the vicissitudes of partition, the military in Pakistan reorganised itself
quickly. It adopted five major strategies to overcome its initial problems. First, a
large number of British officers was retained on contract. Second, competent
officers were given accelerated promotions. Some non-commissioned officers were
promoted to the commissioned ranks. Third, a large number of released personnel
was called back. Suitable personnel of the armies of the princely states that acceded
to Pakistan were also absorbed into the Pakistan Army. Fourth, the regiments with
common traditions, common class composition and common recruiting areas were
amalgamated. Fifth, the gaps were filled by fresh recruitment (Rizvi 1986:30 34).
These measures were coupled with continued emphasis on centralisation, hierarchy,
discipline, and esprit de corps. Professionalism, training in Pakistan and abroad,
and the principle of civilian primacy continued to be the hallmark of its organisation.
The military in Pakistan views itself as the guardian of independence and terri-
torial integrity against external and internal threats. Its training program aims at
producing servicemen dedicated to national values and state symbols and who are
prepared to make sacrifices for their professional ideals. There is a strong emphasis
on the ideological foundation of leadership. Leadership traits as enunciated in Islam
are emphasised in the military. These include, inter alia, faith and trust in Allah
alone, a firm belief in the basic principles of Islam, piety, humility, honesty, bravery,
selflessness, forgiveness, competence and steadfastness. Islamic ideology, values
and history constitute an integral part of the training program (Army General
Headquarters 1990).
The Gradual Rise of the Military
What helped the military most to maintain its professional disposition was Pakistan’s
syndrome of insecurity, which is due mainly to the strained relations with India
dating back to the early years of independence. The Pakistani elite viewed India’s
policies as a threat to Pakistan’s security and survival as a nation-state. A strongly
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held view was that India wanted to subdue, if not dismantle, the Pakistan state.
Perceptions of India based on antagonism and fear influenced Pakistan’s domestic
politics and foreign policy.
Pakistan became more security conscious in the post Bangladesh period because
India had clearly demonstrated its military superiority in defeating Pakistan in the
1971 Indo-Pakistan war. Pakistan was reduced in size and it suffered from a crisis
of confidence. The power balance in South Asia, which already favoured India,
further tilted to its advantage as New Delhi embarked on a massive military
expansion in the 1970s. Moreover, despite the restoration of peace through the
signing of the Simla Accord in 1972, mutual distrust and conflicting national
aspirations often disrupted dialogue between India and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s national security policy was also shaped by Afghanistan’s irredentist
claims on Pakistani territory and intermittent troubles in the tribal areas. India’s
support for Afghanistan’s policy towards Pakistan was a source of further concern.
As Pakistan joined the US-sponsored defence alliances in the early 1950s, the Soviet
Union retaliated by openly supporting Afghan territorial claims on Pakistan. The
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the intensification
of the civil strife in Afghanistan exacerbated Pakistan’s security problems and led
it to seek support from the West and from Muslim countries.
These security compulsions had several important implications for civil-mili-
tary relations. For one, defence requirements enjoyed top priority in Pakistan.
Whether the government was under a civilian or a military leader, Islamabad always
allocated the largest percentage of its national budget to defence. When it func-
tioned, the national legislature underlined the need to maintain a strong defence
posture and supported the high budgetary allocations for defence. General Zia ul
Haq argued that defence was not merely important in its own right ‘but the eco-
nomic prosperity of a country depended on the military’s capability to defend its
geographical frontiers’ (Dawn 6 February 1987). He further maintained that the
armed forces guaranteed a secure environment for national development in indus-
try, agriculture, education and allied fields (Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly
28 February 1988).
Second, security pressures were often cited by the military governments to deflect
demands for political participation and suppress dissent. The standard official argu-
ment was that there were serious threats to Pakistan’s territorial integrity and the
opposition groups should not make political demands. The military regimes also
raised the spectre of linkages between external adversaries and dissident groups
within the country who were alleged to be serving the cause of the ‘foreign masters’.
Third, the maximum possible allocation of resources to defence facilitated mod-
ernisation of the armed forces. The military also benefited from Pakistan’s decision
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to join Western-sponsored pacts in the 1950s as well as by the reinvigoration of
Pakistan-US relations after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The
new weapons, military hardware, and extensive training that the three services
obtained under these arrangements improved their professional disposition and gave
them greater confidence.
And finally, these developments served to accentuate the imbalance between the
disciplined, cohesive and self-confident military and the weak and fragmented
political institutions. The military grew in stature and continued to enjoy respect
in society. The reputation of politicians declined and the political institutions de-
generated over time. They were unable to control the military. ‘It was too powerful
for civilians to tamper with and virtually ran itself without outside interference’
(Cohen 1987). It was therefore not surprising that when the military decided to
displace civilian governments in 1958, 1969 and 1977, it faced no opposition and
many groups welcomed the assumption of power by the military.
The Political Institutions and their Degeneration
Pakistan introduced a parliamentary system of government at the time of indepen-
dence, under the interim constitution of 1947. This system was maintained in the
1956 constitution which the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan approved after about
nine years of deliberations. However, it was not long after that the decline and
degeneration of the civilian institutions set in, making it difficult to sustain the
principle of civilian supremacy over the military.
Pakistan faced a serious crisis of political leadership within a couple of years of
attaining independence. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a charismatic leader who led the
independence movement, died in September l948, just thirteen months after
independence. His lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, partially filled the gap but he was
assassinated in October 1951. There was thus insufficient time for these leaders to
establish and legitimise participatory institutions and processes. This was in contrast
to what occurred in India where Jawaharlal Nehru led the country from 1947 until
his death in 1964. Although Nehru’s personal appeal was more powerful than the
political institutions he established, the fact that he insisted on developing
institutions and processes provided a firm foundation for the political system and
guaranteed civilian supremacy.
The Muslim League of Pakistan failed to transform itself from a nationalist
movement into a national party which could lead the way to democracy and poli-
tical stability. Given its weak and divided leadership, the lack of a clear socio-
economic program, and the absence of procedures to resolve its internal problems,
the Muslim League was not instrumental in nation building. The roots of these
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problems can be traced back to the pre-independence period. Founded in 1906
mainly by a Western-educated Muslim elite, the Muslim League could not establish
a popular base among the Muslims of South Asia until 1939-40, and functioned as
a popular mass party for only seven to eight years. As a result, it could neither bring
forward a group of leaders who had sufficient experience of working together at
the popular level as members of a party, nor evolve procedures to resolve internal
conflicts and aggregate diverse interests. It relied heavily on the towering personality
of Jinnah, and soon after his death the Muslim League began to become disunited
and lose direction. Other political parties, established mostly by those defecting
from the Muslim League, suffered from similar discord, indiscipline and weak
organisation. They were neither able to bring forward a national alternative to the
Muslim League nor evolve a broad-based consensus on the operational norms of
the polity, and thus failed to produce a coherent government.
The interim and permanent constitutions of Pakistan adhered to democratic and
participatory norms but when it came to putting these into practice the political
elite floundered and often engaged in a free-for-all power struggle. The sole objec-
tive of the ruling party was to hold on to power at any cost, while the opposition
groups sought to dislodge them by any means. Such conditions were bound to
compromise the ability of civilian governments to assert their leadership over the
military, and the military consequently had ample freedom to deal with its internal
affairs and consolidate its position. Political leaders also attempted to cultivate the
military so as to strengthen their own positions vis-à-vis their adversaries.
The civilian governments frequently relied on the army for the restoration of
authority in law and order crises and in coping with natural calamities. These opera-
tions helped to enhance the image of the military and exposed the weakness of the
political leaders. Senior commanders were able to get firsthand knowledge of the
politicians’ inability to manage their affairs. These situations provided the mili-
tary with useful experience in handling civilian affairs. The experience also pro-
vided the military with the impression that it could perform the job when the civil
governments failed and that the civilians were surviving because of the military’s
support. Three periods of martial law – 1958, 1969, and 1977 – were preceeded
by law and order disruptions and serious legitimacy crises for the existing govern-
ments. The military thus never had any problem in justifying its assumption of power
while blaming the displaced governments for political chaos, misadministration
and corruption.
The military’s strength is also a result of its strong ethnic and regional cohesion.
The Punjab provides the majority of officers, followed by the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) and the tribal areas. The army consists largely of Punjabis and
Pakhtuns (Pathans). These two groups have not only developed strong mutual ties
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but have also established links with the civilian bureaucratic elite, most of whom
have a similar ethnic background. In fact, only two COAS in Pakistan’s history
have come from outside the Punjab and NWFP areas. These were General
Mohammad Musa (from Baluchistan but not a Baluch) and General Mirza Aslam
Beg (an Urdu-speaking refugee from Uttar Pradesh, India, who settled in Karachi-
Sindh). The traditional Punjabi-Pakhtun composition of the army has been a major
source of grievance for Sindhis and Baluchs, who are under-represented in the army
and virtually absent from the higher echelons. This ethnic cohesion has, however,
enhanced the military’s efficacy in politics. Moreover, the military chiefs were given
extensions which enabled them to further consolidate their hold over the armed
forces. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, COAS from 1951 to 1958, was given two
extensions; General Mohammad Musa, COAS from 1958 to 1966, had two full
terms of four years each; and General A.M. Yahya Khan, COAS from 1966 to 1971,
extended his tenure after assuming power in 1969, but had to resign after Pakistan’s
military debacle in East Pakistan in December 1971; General Zia ul Haq, who
enjoyed the longest tenure of any COAS – from 1976 to 1988 – died in service in
an aircrash in August 1988. Those who did not get extension included: Lt General
Gul Hassan (December 1971 to April 1972, forced by the civilian government to
resign), General Tikka Khan (1972 to 1976), and General Mirza Aslam Beg (1988
to 1991). They served under civilian governments. General Abdul Waheed (1993
to 1996) retired after completion of his normal tenure, although the civilian
government offered to extend his tenure by one year.
Material Benefits to the Military
The military has become a ladder to lucrative jobs after retirement in almost all
states that have witnessed the ascendancy of the military to power. Ayub Khan relied
on this strategy after assuming power in 1958, and distributed the rewards of power
to his colleagues in the military. General Zia ul Haq resorted to this strategy in a
more consistent and extensive manner. It was during his rule that the higher echelons
of the military emerged as the most privileged caste in Pakistan.
The Zia regime was quite generous towards its colleagues in the three services.
The budgetary allocation for the defence services rose at a faster pace than during
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s period from 1972 to 1977. The army, especially its higher
echelons, received a number of material benefits such as jobs before and after retire-
ment, absorption in the Fauji Foundation (a welfare cum industrial organisation
for the welfare of ex-servicemen), assignment in the Gulf states, allotment of
agricultural land, and parcels of land for construction of houses in cantonments
and urban centres, along with facilities for loans. A number of officers who had
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been given residential plots in various housing schemes at cheap rates sold them
to civilians at exorbitant prices.
Still another material benefit the Zia regime offered to military personnel was
the appointment of military officers to top civil jobs, leading to what Finer (1978:
84) describes as the ‘military colonisation of other institutions’ whereby ‘the military
acts as reservoir or core of personnel for the sensitive institutions of the state’.
Military officers were assigned to the civil administration and to semi-government
and autonomous corporations. A 10 per cent quota of civil jobs was reserved for
military personnel and a system of regular induction into the elite group of the
Central Superior Services was introduced. The groups most commonly selected
for induction included the District Management Group (formerly the CSP), the
Foreign Service of Pakistan, and the Police Service of Pakistan. This has caused
bitterness among civilian counterparts who joined these services after tough
competitive examination.
Such policies have enabled the military to penetrate important civilian sectors
and expand their influence in the society. Material gains have also encouraged the
senior commanders to maintain interest in politics so as to protect and increase
these privileges. This has resulted in what Heeger (1977:242-262) describes as
the ‘de-mystification’ of the military. The Pakistan military is no longer consid-
ered a neutral power broker among feuding political groups. It is now viewed as
one of the contenders for power, a powerful actor deeply entangled in ongoing
political controversies.
The Political Forces and Military Rule
Despite the military’s repeated intervention in politics and the long spells of martial
law, military rule has faced a crisis of legitimacy in Pakistan. However, if the mili-
tary leadership could not obtain the much coveted legitimacy for its extended role,
the political elite was unable to counterbalance the military’s dominant role, and
an adversarial relationship developed between the two. The political leaders, bitter
at the loss of power, questioned the military’s right to rule, while the military leader-
ship regarded political leaders and parties as opportunist, corrupt and disruptive.
The bitterness in political circles intensified during Zia’s rule because politicians
were subjected to greater restriction during this period than during the two previous
periods of military rule. Zia made no secret of his contempt for politicians and
political parties, especially those who questioned his policies. He imposed a ban
on political parties in 1979, although groups which supported his military regime,
such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Muslim League (Pagaro Group), and some
orthodox religious groups, were allowed to engage in low-key political activity.
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The major goal of the Zia regime was to prevent dissident political groups from
joining together to launch a national movement. The state apparatus was effectively
used to contain political activities and to manipulate the weaknesses and differences
between political parties. Whenever politicians attempted to establish coalitions,
the central government would adopt measures to counteract them. The press was
prevented from publishing the views of politicians in opposition to Zia. Restrictions
were imposed on the movement of politicians; detention without trial, house arrest,
and restrictions on travel outside the city or province of residence were quite
common, and consequently discouraged leaders from interacting with each other.
Political leaders were also often kept under surveillance by the intelligence agencies,
which dissuaded many from establishing contact. Activists at the middle and lower
levels were periodically arrested under martial law regulations.
The efficacy of the political forces was further undermined by their internal
disharmony and organisational problems, which the government was able to
manipulate to its advantage. Thus coalitions and united fronts created by the poli-
tical parties to press their demands were often short-lived (Rizvi 1989:255-268).
Zia withdrew martial law on 30 December 1985 and restored a carefully tailored
constitutional system that civilianised his regime, facilitated the co-option of a
section of the civilian elite, and provided adequate guarantees for the entrenched
position of the ruling generals. Zia continued to exercise the initiative in the political
system through four major means. The military government did not revive the
original 1973 constitution, but introduced amendments which drastically altered
its character and greatly strengthened the position of the president vis-à-vis the
prime minister and parliament. Further, the incorporation of martial law orders and
policy decisions in the legal-constitutional structure of Pakistan under the Indemnity
Law placed checks on the powers of the civilian courts and reinforced the position
of the president. Also, the constitution was amended to allow President Zia ul Haq
to continue to serve as chief of army staff after the restoration of civilian rule, making
it possible for him to maintain the army as his exclusive preserve and giving him
a relatively free hand to deal with military and defence affairs. And finally, Zia
appointed as prime minister a little-known and weak leader, Mohammad Khan
Junejo, whom he could control. While addressing the joint session of parliament
on the eve of the withdrawal of martial law, Zia ul Haq declared that the ‘new order’
did not represent a departure from the policies of the martial law period: ‘It is no
rival or adversary of the outgoing system. It is, in fact, the extension of the system
in existence for the past several years’ (Muslim 31 December 1985).
Zia-ul-Haq jealously guarded his powers and wanted Junejo and other civilian
leaders he co-opted simply to ‘carry out orders’ or undertake ‘public relations jobs’,
rather than share power as equal partners. These leaders were often frustrated
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because of their inability to play an autonomous political role. Their frustration
was accentuated by the fact that they needed the support and blessings of the presi-
dent and the military to ward off challenges from the parties which stayed outside
the civilianisation process and described the civilian government as a façade while
Zia ul Haq continued to rule. As the civilian leadership of the post-martial law period
discretely tried to distance itself from Zia to play an autonomous role, Zia dismissed
the prime minister and dissolved the parliament in May 1988, thereby undoing the
system he himself had created. His attempt to co-opt a new set of leaders came to
an end when he died in August 1988.
The decision of the Pakistan Army not to assume power after Zia’s death faci-
litated the holding of general elections in November 1988 which brought Benazir
Bhutto to power. Several factors explain the military’s decision to abide by the
constitution. Despite the military’s repeated intervention in politics, a sense of
professionalism and discipline is still evident in the officer corps, although this
would not prevent them seizing power if they perceived it to be necessary. Second,
since Zia had already announced that general elections would be held in Novem-
ber 1988, a military takeover would have been difficult to justify in a politically
charged environment. Any postponement of elections would have reinforced the
impression that the military was the major obstacle to the restoration of a democ-
ratic system. Third, the senior commanders were conscious of the fact that the
military’s reputation had suffered through repeated involvement in politics, and
especially because of Zia’s eleven-year rule. Stories circulated about the acquisi-
tion of wealth and lucrative civilian assignments by senior active duty and retired
officers. The failure to dislodge Indian troops from the disputed Siachen Glacier
in Kashmir, and the April 1988 explosion at the ammunition depot in Rawalpindi
were often cited as clear proof of the decline of professionalism in the army. With
criticism clearly focused on their involvement in domestic politics, senior
commanders felt that a decision to honour the constitution would help restore their
reputation. Fourth, General Beg, as the new COAS, could not be sure of the support
of the army’s senior echelons. Although he had been vice COAS since March 1987,
Zia, as COAS, had kept the army as his exclusive preserve by appointing his favor-
ites to key positions. (Some of them died with Zia in the plane crash.) Beg, an Urdu-
speaking ‘Mohajir’ immigrant from Uttar Pradesh, facing a majority of Punjabi
and Pakhtun senior commanders, needed time to take stock of the situation and to
consolidate his position. Fifth, the political situation in the aftermath of the plane
crash was peaceful and stable; all major political parties and groups supported the
constitutional transfer of power. The situation was thus not conducive to staging a
coup. Any attempt to re-establish military rule at this stage would have been
premature and would have encountered resistance from political circles.
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The 1988 decision to allow a constitutional transfer of power to take place
reflected a realistic assessment of the situation by the senior commanders. How-
ever, the military did not abandon interest in the political process as it impinged
on its professional and corporate interests.
Post-Withdrawal Civil-Military Relations
The army chief continued to be a key figure in the power structure, who interacted
with the civilian government headed by the prime minister directly or through the
president. An extra-constitutional power triangle, locally known as the troika,
developed. It comprised the president, the prime minister, and the army chief; they
met frequently to discuss high policy on foreign affairs, security issues and
domestic matters. The prime minister was the weakest in the triangle, for three
major reasons. First, the constitutional amendments introduced by General Zia-ul-
Haq in 1985, known as the 8th amendment, weakened the position of the prime
minister and tilted the balance of power decisively in favour of the president, who
was given discretionary power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the
elected National Assembly if he felt that ‘a situation has arisen in which the
Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary’ (Article
58(2)(b) of the Constitution). Second, the political forces continued to be weak and
divided, which made the task of political management extremely difficult for the
prime minister. Third, the army chief represented the most powerful and entrenched
institution in the body politic. In January 1997, while the National Assembly was
dissolved, the president created the National Security Council to formalise the
‘advisory’ role of the services chiefs and the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee which placed an ‘advisory’ institutional constraint on the elected assembly
and the civilian government. The military favoured retention of the power of the
president to dismiss government because the senior commanders could persuade
the president to do so, thus saving them from directly removing the government.
The military commanders are of the view that if their interests can be protected
from the outside, there is no need for them to step in. Moreover, with growing
ethnic, linguistic and religious polarisation, increasing civil violence, and socio-
economic pressures, the direct assumption of power by the senior commanders
could drag them into the ongoing controversies and undermine their reputation. The
army’s direct involvement in the maintenance of law and order in Sindh, especially
in Karachi, during 1992-94, showed the hazard of such operations. The senior
officers are thus reluctant to involve themselves directly in civilian affairs.
The military commanders attach such importance to their professional and
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corporate interests and make sure that the civilian leadership works towards their
protection and advancement. They have a direct stake in foreign and defence
policies, especially on Afghanistan, India and the nuclear issue, and want their
perspectives to be accommodated; any major shift should be made in consultation
with them. The military commanders do not want civilian interference in the
internal affairs of the services. They jealously guard their autonomy pertaining to
postings, transfers and promotions of service personnel, the disbursement of
defence expenditure, training, and related affairs. Defence expenditure is another
important interest. They are opposed to any unilateral cut in defence spending by
the civilian government. Similarly, service privileges and perks, which have
increased tremendously during the period of direct military rule, and absorption of
ex-servicemen in civilian jobs are their permanent interests. They expect a civilian
government to maintain a minimum measure of socio-economic stability and a
functional participatory political order. Any serious crisis of governance on the part
of the civilian government threatens the military’s interests because a society in
turmoil and crisis cannot sustain its professional and corporate interests. Therefore,
the military cannot be expected to support a government that has lost credibility,
for any reason, and is confronted with street agitation.
No civilian government of elected assembly since 1988 has completed its normal
tenure of five years. Civilian governments have been dislodged by the president
with the full backing of the top brass of the military when governments developed
differences with the military and lost credibility at the popular level. Benazir
Bhutto, who assumed power in December 1988 with the consent of the military top
brass, soon developed differences with them in her enthusiasm to assert civilian
primacy. This, coupled with her political and economic mismanagement, serious
conflicts with the Punjab government led by her adversary, and mishandling of the
ethnic problem in urban Sindh, weakened her popular base, making it possible for
the president to remove her from office in August 1990. Her successor, Nawaz
Sharif, known for his pro-military disposition, ran into difficulties with the military
in a little over two years. The developments that really undermined his position
included insufficient attention to socio-economic problems and serious charges of
financial impropriety and economic mismanagement, not to speak of extremely
strained interaction with political adversaries and the confrontation his government
developed with the president. He was removed by the president in April 1993, in
the same way Benazir Bhutto was dislodged. Later, the Supreme Court restored his
government, declaring the president’s dismissal order unconstitutional. However,
the power struggle between the president and Nawaz Sharif, especially the latter’s
attempt to install a government of his own choice in the Punjab, created such
confusion and uncertainty that the top brass forced him and the president out of
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office in July 1993. An interim civilian government was appointed and new
elections were held, which brought Benazir Bhutto back to power in October.
During her second term, Benazir Bhutto avoided conflict with the military, but her
political and economic mismanagement, including complaints about corruption in
the higher echelons of the government and misuse of state resources, surpassed that
of her first term. The handling of the ethnic problem and confrontation with the
superior judiciary undermined her rule. These factors alienated the military, which
joined hands with the president to remove her from office in November 1996.
In all these dismissals, the president acted in consultation with the top brass of
the military, and there is enough evidence to suggest that the latter had come to the
conclusion that the time had come to get rid of the civilian government. On all these
occasions, troops took control of all the major government installations, including
the prime minister’s office and residence, and radio and TV stations. In the case of
the 1996 dismissal of Benazir Bhutto, the airports were closed and mobile phones
were turned off. It was a coup-like operation on all these occasions, and the interim
prime ministers were selected in 1993 and 1996 with the consent of the army.
The role of the Pakistan military has undergone major changes during the fifty
years of independence. Its traditions emphasised aloofness from active politics and
the primacy of the civilian leadership. The military gradually expanded its role,
however, first by becoming an important actor in the decision-making process, and
then by directly assuming power. It has, by now, become the most powerful
political force in the political system. Its role has changed from direct governance
to influencing the nature and direction of politics from the background.
The military prefers role over rule. If its professional and corporate interests can
be protected adequately from a distance, it will not be tempted to step in directly
and establish military rule once again. Much depends on how the political leaders
perform the task of political and economic management. The civilian government
faces two major constraints on its ability to assert its primacy. First, the regional
security environment, marked by tension and conflict, increases the importance of
the military in the decision-making process. Second, the political forces continue
to be fragmented and weak, and often tend to disregard the democratic norms. The
growing ethnic-linguistic divide and religious-sectarian cleavages, and the
proliferation of sophisticated weapons in the society, have made governance an
extremely delicate task. The civilian government needs the support and blessings
of the military to stay afloat. The military’s preponderant role in the polity is thus
assured.
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THE  MILITARY  AND  DEMOCRACY  IN  BANGLADESH
Emajuddin Ahamed
Bangladesh is at a crossroads in its march towards democratic order. Though it
started its political journey with a parliamentary system after independence, it
failed to sustain it; slowly but steadily the parliamentary government degener-
ated into an authoritarian system. As Bangladesh completes its twenty years of
independence it also completes thirteen years of military rule or governments
dominated by the military.
In late 1990, however, the political situation altered dramatically. Autocratic rule
was ultimately defeated by a popular uprising, and General Ershad had to resign.
Under the close supervision of a caretaker government headed by Chief Justice
Shahabuddin Ahmed, installed after the resignation of General Ershad, a free, fair
and neutral general election was held on 27 February 1991. A truly repres-
entative Jatiya Sangsad (House of the Nation) thus came into being. In a bid to
democratise the polity in Bangladesh the Sangsad substantially amended the
constitution. A parliamentary system of government was proposed in the Twelfth
Amendment Act in August and this was ratified by a constitutional referendum
on 15 September 1991.
In sum, the institutional framework for parliamentary democracy has been set
up in Bangladesh. The Jatiya Sangsad, comprising directly-elected represen-
tatives of the people, has been the centrepiece of national politics; a cabinet,
consisting of the leaders of the majority party, has been made accountable to the
Sangsad. The prime minister, the primus inter pares, is head of the government.
The constitutional head of state is the president, who is elected by the Sangsad.
Steps have also been taken to institutionalise an independent judicial system.
Is the institutional framework good enough for sustaining democratic order
in Bangladesh? How will the military react? In the face of the highly politicised
armed forces, what is the future of democracy in Bangladesh?
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The Nature of the Political System at Independence
Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state on 16 December 1971 after a bloodbath.
The Awami League leaders, who led the independence movement, came to power.
They had always favoured parliamentary democracy with real power vested in
cabinet, collectively responsible to the legislature. A parliamentary form of gov-
ernment was introduced in Bangladesh according to the Provisional Constitution
Order of 1972, and the political elite became the supreme policy makers. The 1972
constitution, which was passed by the Constituent Assembly on 4 November
1972, essentially continued the process. The major aspect of the 1972 constitution
is the supremacy of the Jatiya Sangsad, comprising the directly elected rep-
resentatives of the people, and a cabinet directly responsible to the Sangsad for
its actions and policies.
The Awami League, which had massive popular support, became the ruling
party. Although it was mainly a middle-class and urban-centred party, it had well-
organised student and labour fronts, and within a short period a number of
groups oriented to the Awami League, such as the Jatiya Krishak League
(National Peasants League) and the Jatiya Jubo League (National Youth League),
were organised. These groups canvassed and mobilised support for the party and
supplied policy and program inputs (Ahamed 1980:148-156).
An important trend under the Awami League regime was the gradual strength-
ening of political infrastructure at the administrative level. The senior advisers
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were all political leaders. Those who accompanied
him on tours both within and outside the country were mostly from the Awami
League and party-affiliated interest groups. In the government, the party tried to
consolidate its position. The office of the prime minister became the most
powerful one in the government. In addition to having head offices and ministries
for which the prime minister had specific responsibility, the prime minister’s
secretariat comprised offices of the principal secretary, political secretary, eco-
nomic secretary and ‘invigilation director’. The overall coordination of govern-
ment activities at the administrative level was left to the principal secretary. To
cap it all, the prime minister was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the president of the
Awami League, a great charismatic leader, the symbol of Bengali nationalism –
a formidable ‘Bangabandhu’ (Friend of Bengal). Many observers felt that real
power would remain concentrated in the hands of the political elite for a long
time to come in Bangladesh.
The Awami League, despite its political approach and the use of party channels
of control and direction, failed to handle the problems of increasing economic
crisis, social and political instability, and deteriorating security and order in the
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country. As its failure became manifest, the regime began to turn to the
bureaucrats. The bureaucrats who seemed to have lost their position of influence
and power between 1972 and 1974 came to the forefront in the early months of
1975 and emerged as the ruling elite after August.
During the first few years after independence, the Awami League regime
performed fairly well. It was able to avert a major economic crisis, mainly with
the help of massive relief operations carried out by the United Nations Relief
Operations in Bangladesh and other international agencies. Compared to the
anarchic conditions of 1971 and early 1972, the law and order situation improved
considerably. Indian troops were withdrawn by March 1972. The constitution
was passed by the Constituent Assembly within nine months of independence,
and general elections were held after only six months, according to the provisions
of the new constitution. The Planning Commission brought out the First Five
Year Plan within a year and a half. In all these matters the legend and charisma of
Sheikh Mujib played a vital role (Ahamed 1980:149).
From January 1974, however, the economic situation in the country became
critical. This was due partly to global inflation in 1972, and partly to the inef-
ficiency and corruption of the leaders of the ruling party. Though 86 per cent of
industries and 87 per cent of foreign trade were nationalised, distribution was
conducted by private traders who were issued permits and licences. A substantial
number of these permits and licences were issued to Awami League workers,
who, in turn, sold them to traders, and consequently became the owners of large
sums of ‘unearned income’. Most of the administrators of the nationalised in-
dustries were recruited from amongst party leaders and workers who had very
little knowledge of management or administration. Production, as a result, de-
clined to an unusually low level. While production declined, the smuggling of
jute and food grains to India reached alarming proportions, thus draining agricul-
tural products out of the country. In the process, the economy was virtually in a
state of collapse, and the situation was aggravated by the worst floods in Bangla-
desh history in July and August 1974. During the floods the price of consumer
goods rose rapidly, and by September 1974 the rise was about 600 per cent over
the 1969-70 price level. Sheikh Mujib declared that there was a ‘near famine
condition’ in the country (Ahamed 1980:151-52).
The economic crisis in Bangladesh was compounded by political problems.
Class conflicts, which had for so long been subjugated by the demand for regional
autonomy, emerged as the crucial problem. The real threat to political and social
stability in Bangladesh during the Awami League regime came from the radical
forces. They attempted to bring about a ‘second revolution’ through armed
struggle. There were several radical revolutionary parties in Bangladesh; most
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of these had been working as underground organisations during the Ayub era
(1958-1969). Some surfaced after independence.
They argued that the Bangladesh Revolution of 1971 was an ‘unfinished one’.
When the War of Independence was being transformed into a truly people’s
liberation war and the radical forces were coming to the forefront, the ‘land-based
bourgeois government of India’ in league with the ‘Soviet Social Imperialist
Power’ interfered, and the Awami League leadership, which represented the
exploiting classes in Bangladesh, came to power. Their strategy was to replace
the puppet regime by force (Maniruzzaman 1976).
The revolutionary parties trained armed cadres to overthrow the Awami League
regime through guerrilla warfare, and started sabotaging communication links
and killing Awami League leaders and other ‘enemies’ of the revolution. The
exact number of secret political killings during that period is not known. One
government estimate put the figure at over 6000, including four Awami League
MPs. Along with secret killings, there was a sharp rise in armed robberies from
private houses, looting of banks and shops, and attacks on police stations
(Ahamed 1980:157).
The regime’s initial response to the increasing violence consisted of threats,
appeals and normal police action. In its attempts to combat radical political parties
the Awami League relied mainly on party channels of control and direction, but
this had limited success because the Awami League itself was plagued by faction-
al strife. Soon after independence the Awami League’s student and labour
fronts were divided over the question of whether to introduce ‘pure socialism’
or a mixed economy. Senior leaders also became involved in the controversy,
and the effectiveness of the party suffered greatly.
The factional strife was exacerbated first by Mujib’s political approach to eco-
nomic management, which led to the speedy growth of a new class of rich com-
pradors, who were divorced from the forces of production. Further, Mujib’s prag-
matic approach to socialistic principles practically immobilised the party. To
overcome this ineffectiveness, the Awami League formed an alliance with such
less-radical parties as the National Awami Party (M) and the Pro-Soviet Bangla-
desh Communist Party. This alliance too proved ineffective, and Bangladesh
slowly but steadily turned into a praetorian polity (Nordlinger 1977:7-8, 75-76).
The revolutionary forces could have been confronted by ideological clarity
at the political level and by governmental performance at the societal level. The
Awami League regime, however, failed on both counts: the political ideology of
1 Formulated by Sheikh Mujib’s nephew, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, Mujibism im-
plied a variant of socialism with anti-imperialist but democratic overtones.
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Mujibism,1 which was initiated to counteract the radical forces, was not
intellectually refreshing; its performance, especially after the famine of 1974,
fell below expectations. For survival, the regime had to resort to repressive meas-
ures; that, however, proved counterproductive. As a last resort, the government
declared a state of emergency on 28 December 1974 and suspended the funda-
mental rights granted by the constitution for an indefinite period. The emergency
provided for special powers of arrest, curtailed the powers of the judiciary, and
muzzled the press. In January 1975, on the initiative of Sheikh Mujib and report-
edly against the wishes of most of the members of the Jatiya Sangsad, the consti-
tution was amended to provide for a presidential form of government. Sheikh
Mujib was subsequently vested with executive powers and authorised to declare
Bangladesh a one-party state. Later Sheikh Mujib closed all but four newspapers,
two English language and two Bengali. He also founded the national party, the
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), patterned on Nyerere’s
Ujama (African Socialism).
In fact, this final act not only considerably reduced the support base of Mujib
in Bangladesh but removed much of the legitimacy of his rule. The banning of
the communal parties such as the Muslim League, Nizam-i-Islam, and Jamat-i-
Islam for their negative and anti-people role during the War of Independence
alienated the rightist elements. The liberals favoured a Western-style
parliamentary democracy; they were alienated when the Awami League regime
adopted socialistic principles. When in the face of an acute economic crisis Mujib
adopted a pragmatic approach, which considerably watered down his brand of
socialism, the radical forces became antagonised. Even the young radicals of
his own party left and formed a new party. The formation of BAKSAL was
resented by both the liberals and radicals.
The precipitating factor for military intervention was, as suggested by several
scholars, the personal grievances of the coup leaders, some of whom were dis-
missed by Mujib for performing duties ordered by him. The pre-dawn coup, which
was staged on 15 August 1975 and eliminated most members of Mujib’s family,
except his two daughters, was masterminded by three majors who had developed
bitter personal enmity against him. They captured power and declared on national
radio ‘the end of an era of tyranny’ (Ahamed 1990).
The Emergence of the Military as the Ruling Elite
In a post-colonial state like Bangladesh the military tends to be dominant not
only because these states have inherited an overdeveloped bureaucratic structure
and its institutionalised practices, but also because of the nature of its institutional
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framework (Ahamed 1988:49-50). Organisation provides the armed forces with
discipline and cohesion, hierarchy and centralised command; the institutional
structure gives them power. It is no wonder therefore that the military became a
dominant force in Bangladesh.
The armed forces of Bangladesh were not a well-knit establishment in the
beginning, however, and could not emerge as a decisive factor in Bangladesh
politics during the early years. This was due partly to the socio-political envi-
ronment after independence and partly to internal schism and cleavages among
the officer corps, which were effects of the bloody Independence War that con-
tinued from March to December 1971. The bureaucratic elite, both civil and mili-
tary, was not held in high esteem in the society because of its association with
military rule in Pakistan during the previous twelve years. Bureaucracy was in
fact a much hated word in the political lexicon of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib often
became livid with anger when he denounced bureaucracy. Moulana Bhasani,
another prominent Bengali leader, did not complete a public speech without
making a stinging attack on the bureaucracy.
Yet a large number of civil servants and military officers played a key role in
the political struggle in the 1960s and in the Independence War. Many of them
were aligned with the Awami League and personally remained on good terms with
Sheikh Mujib during the Ayub era. Some of them supplied secret information to
the Awami League leadership and provided data which helped Mujib to sharpen
his case for regional autonomy. The Agartala Case,2 which was believed to have
been staged in 1968 mainly to defame Mujib, implicated a number of civil servants
and military officers.
Civil servants and military officers willingly lent their full support to Mujib’s
call for civil disobedience and non-cooperation, which paralysed the entire
administration in East Pakistan in March 1971. When the Pakistan army launched
its brutal attack on the night of 25 March, the Bengali military officer corps became
one of the targets. During the Independence War military officers took
responsibility for training the Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters) at various training
centres both within and outside Bangladesh, and they themselves fought against
the Pakistan army.
Despite this political role, the military could not consolidate its position after
independence and did not emerge as a cohesive force for several reasons. In the
2 The Agartala Conspiracy Case, in which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was charged
along with thirty-four other Bengali politicians, civil servants and military officers
with conspiring to bring about East Pakistan’s secession in collusion with India,
was initiated by the Pakistan Home Ministry on 6 January 1968.
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first place, the size of the armed forces was quite small. In 1975 there were about
36000 men in the defence services in Bangladesh, of whom 30000 were in the
army, 500 in the navy and 5500 in the air force. In addition, there were 30000
men in the Bangladesh Rifles and 16000 in the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (National
Security Force), which were paramilitary forces. Of those 36000 men, about
28000 (including 1000 officers) were ‘repatriates’ from West Pakistan; the
remainder belonged to the former East Bengal Regiment and the new group
recruited from amongst the Mukti Bahini. Though the number of officers was
above 1200 in 1975, the number of officers above the rank of major was not
more than 250 (Ahamed 1980:141).
While the size of the armed forces was small, the level of internal rivalry and
cleavage was high. Conflicts between the Bangladesh Rifles and regular defence
forces (former East Bengal Regiment) had continued since independence, and it
assumed alarming proportions in 1972. Even the regular forces became involved
in internecine conflicts. Some of the repatriate officers were either uncere-
moniously retired, or were placed under officers who were junior to them in the
Pakistan defence forces but had been promoted for participating in the Indepen-
dence War. The officers who took part in the Independence War were offered
two years’ seniority and treated preferentially. This differential treatment caused
animosity among the freedom fighters and repatriates.
The repatriates regarded most of the freedom fighters as basically secularists,
socialists and Pro-Indian, while the freedom fighters stereotyped the repatriates
as opportunists and pro-Pakistanis. To the repatriates the War of Independence
was fought with Indian resources and the victory was served by Indians to the
Bengalis on a silver platter; to the freedom fighters, the repatriates basked in the
Pakistani sun while the whole Bengali nation was locked in a life and death
struggle. The freedom fighters, on the other hand, complained that repatriates
were greedy enough to enjoy the fruits of independence without suffering for
and contributing to it (Ahamed 1988:52-56).
The numerical superiority of the repatriates also made the freedom fighters
feel insecure. The repatriates complained that they were not given full pay for
the twenty-month period that they had to remain in the Pakistan concentration
camp before being repatriated to Bangladesh in September 1973. This feeling
of being discriminated against on the part of the repatriates, and consequent acri-
mony between the two groups, badly affected the morale of the military officers,
accelerated the process of polarisation, and strained the command structure of
the defence services. The armed forces in Bangladesh were also divided at the
initial stage in terms of ideology. The repatriates retained much of the conser-
vative outlook that characterised the armed forces in Pakistan, while the bulk of
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the freedom fighters were highly politicised and somewhat radical in their views.
The two groups also held distinct views with regard to the institutional framework
the armed forces should take in the future. One group favoured the retention of
the conventional army on the pattern of British India or the Pakistan armed forces.
The other group advocated that the armed forces be transformed into a kind of
productive army on the pattern of the Chinese People’s Army. A few officers,
advocating this view, joined the underground wing of a political party, the Jatiya
Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) and organised cells of the Biplobi Shainik Sangstha (the
Revolutionary Soldiers Association) on the model of the Soviet of Soldiers which
developed in the Tsarist army before the Communist Revolution in 1917. The
two best-known advocates of the concept of productive army were the two valiant
freedom fighters, Colonel Abu Taher and Colonel Ziauddin. These factors suggest
that the armed forces in Bangladesh could not emerge as a decisive factor in
politics at the beginning because of internal rivalry, ideological conflicts and intra-
group feuds (Lifschulz 1979:85-88).
While the armed forces could not take advantage of their organisational
strength, they could clearly perceive that their corporate interests were not safe
in the hands of Awami League regime. The military elite resented the fact that
the government did not take quick and effective measures for the reconstruction
of the training institutes and cantonments destroyed during the Independence
War. Consequently the defence services remained poorly equipped. Expenditure
on defence services was not only minimal but was gradually reduced. In the 1973-
74 budget, expenditure on defence was little more than 16 per cent; in 1974-75 it
was reduced to 15 per cent, and in 1975-76 it was less than 13 per cent.
The establishment of a new militia, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (National Security
Force), organised under the direction of the prime minister’s office and attached
to the Awami League, introduced a parallel organisation to the regular armed
forces. The government seemed to be more interested in the development of the
militia than in the armed forces. It was planned that this militia would be increased
annually so that by the end of 1980 its strength would be 20000. It was also
planned that one regiment of the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini would be placed under
the command of each district governor.
Most of the groups in the defence services in Bangladesh shared a common
anti-Indian orientation. This was so for several reasons. First, most of the mem-
bers of the armed forces who fought during the War of Independence strongly
believed that the Indian Army just walked in when the war was nearly over at
the end of 1971, thereby robbing the Bangladesh military of the glory of liberating
their motherland. Second, many senior military officers believed that the govern-
ment-in-exile at Mujibnagar signed a secret treaty with the Indian government,
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which was detrimental to the sovereignty of Bangladesh. They also believed that
Sheikh Mujib became less interested in the development of the defence forces
because of that treaty. Third, many senior army personnel felt that the Jatiya
Rakkhi Bahini was planned and designed by the Indian Army for the safety of
the Awami League regime. The poorly-equipped defence services were also bitter
about the fact that the Indian Army took away all the sophisticated weapons left
by the Pakistan Army. This anti-Indian feeling gradually developed into an anti-
Mujib feeling because of Mujib’s pro-Indian foreign policy.
Despite their grievances against the Awami League regime, the defence
services in Bangladesh remained practically immobilised because of the schism
and cleavages that affected them during the early years. When they were asked
by the prime minister to go to the aid of the civil authorities, and conducted a
number of successful operations, they not only regained their sense of unity and
cohesion but also came to believe that their services were indispensable. From
July 1973 to July 1974 there was a number of combined military operations be-
tween the Rakkhi Bahini and the police, such as checking for smuggling at the
border, handling ‘extremists’, and maintaining law and order. As internal threats
mounted, and were successfully managed, the military officers began to believe
that only the Bangladesh Army could save the country. Officers’ growing par-
ticipation in the day-to-day affairs of the state made them not only sensitive to
political power but also aware of the basic weaknesses of the regime, particularly
the corrupt practices of some top ranking leaders, and of their unpopularity. Thus
when a pre-dawn coup was staged on 15 August 1975 by a handful of junior
officers (twenty to twenty-five majors and captains) with the help of two
battalions of the armored corps and 1500 soldiers, it came as no great surprise.
The August 1975 coup paved the way for the emergence of the military as the
ruling elite. The Zia regime (1975-1981) helped them, albeit unwittingly, to attain
a new height of maturity; the Ershad regime turned out to be a period of consoli-
dation. The August coup may be regarded as a pacesetter in that it was closely
followed by a series of counter coups or coup attempts. The seeds of all those
were sown in the August putsch.
The 3 November coup was essentially a pre-emptive bid to prevent the radical
forces from taking over control of the armed forces. It, however, failed to take
roots. Khaled Mosharraf and the other ringleaders were overwhelmed by the
7 November Soldiers’ Uprising, which in effect catapulted Major General Ziaur
Rahman to political power.
General Zia, having assumed power by default rather than by design, was
confronted by serious problems from his own constituency: the highly politicised
army. Though before the 7 November uprising Zia was the recognised leader of
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the freedom fighters and as such was highly respected and loved by his comrades-
in-arms, he had something of a falling out with them after the death of Colonel
Taher (who was arrested, subjected to a prison trial and hanged on Zia’s orders),
because Taher was mainly instrumental in organising what happened on 7 No-
vember. Then Zia turned to the repatriates and managed to strike a balance
between the freedom fighters and repatriate officers of the defence services.
As a soldier, Zia’s loyalty to and reliance on the military was deep. Unlike his
predecessor, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who kept political elements separate from
the military, Zia pursued a policy of welding these together and tried to incor-
porate military personnel into different sectors of national life. The salary of both
the jawans (privates) and officers was enhanced; the system of rent payment
for accommodation was modified to their benefit; and Zia created openings for
the assignment of retired military officers to lucrative jobs in other sectors.
On 1 March 1979, 25 of the 625 officers in the senior policy pool, responsible
for policy-making in the secretariat, were military officers. Of 101 chairmen or
managing directors of public corporations in June 1980, 42 were military officers
or retired serviceman. In January 1981, 22 of the 40 district superintendents and
additional superintendents of police were army officers. Moreover, 500 retired
military officers were employed in industry, indenting business, foreign trade,
and supply and contracts under the patronage of the government. Quite a few
military officers were allotted residential plots in the developed areas of the city,
and were even granted liberal loans for building houses by the House Building
Finance Corporation. With all of these actions, Zia’s critics argued, he was con-
sciously following the Indonesian model of partnership between the military and
civilian sectors: civilians being the junior partners (Ahamed 1988:124-25).
General Zia laid the foundations of a number of civilian institutions such as
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and Gram Sarker (village government).
He also initiated a number of participatory programs such as canal digging and
eradicating illiteracy through literacy squads which were established in early
1979. He introduced a multi-party system in the country, and before the presi-
dential elections in June 1978, when he was elected president of the country, Zia
resigned from the post of the chief of army staff. During his time, general elections
were held in February 1979 to form the Jatiya Sangsad. A process of
civilianisation was launched by President Zia in late 1977. One can, however,
argue that the civilianisation process culminated in the primacy of the military.
One of the reasons why Zia was killed in the abortive coup of 30 May 1981,
some scholars have argued, was his ‘over-democratising’ of the political system.
The measures taken by Zia not only raised the expectations of the military, but
gave them a stake in the polity. The military thus emerged in the 1980s as a
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powerful socio-economic group, much more confident than any other sector in
Bangladesh society.
This political consciousness of the military began to take shape at two levels
during the Ershad regime. Deeply entrenched at the centre of power, they could
not afford to be indifferent to the forces shaping politico-economic decisions at
the highest level, and thus became positively involved in a process which was
expressly political. Second, from the early 1980s they began demanding a con-
stitutionally-incorporated active role in the governance of the country (New York
Times 14 November 1981).
The military, if it had wanted, could have seized political power in the wake of
the Chittagong coup of 30 May; however it refrained from doing so for good
reasons. The senseless and dastardly assassination of Zia by a section of the
armed forces not only endeared Zia to the nation but also created a kind of
abhorrence towards men-in-uniform. The repatriate generals under the leadership
of General H.M. Ershad weighed this carefully, and by way of buying time lent
support to the constitutional change of government. The generals also knew that
the viability of the successor government during a period of uncertainty could
be ensured largely through their support. Thus they extended liberal support to
the Sattar government, ensuring continued military domination over the policy-
making structure.
Justice Abdus Sattar, the 75-year old successor to Zia, in his campaign
speeches for the November 1981 presidential elections, emphasised among other
things his close association with the late president and as such his enjoyment
of the trust and respect of the country’s armed forces (Ahamed 1988:132). The
military elite thus threw their weight behind Justice Sattar’s candidature. Zia’s
policy of fusing the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and the military into the
bedrock of a stable political system was endorsed by the military. Moreover, the
structural weaknesses of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), an outcome
of Zia’s ‘open arms policy’ of welcoming divergent political elements ranging
from the progressive left to the fundamentalist right, were also perceived by the
military as advantageous to their corporate interests. The BNP, which had been
held together mainly by Zia’s charismatic personality and political power, was
likely to yield wider scope for bargaining to the military after the death of its leader.
Though the corporate interests of the military remained the crucial factor,
internal dissension and factional cleavages within the ruling party provided the
sought-after occasion for the generals. The BNP was developed rapidly by its
leader, General Zia, mainly with a view to extending his power base beyond the
cantonments. While he was alive, factional cleavages did not surface. His sad
demise, however, seemed to have lifted the lid, leading to a sudden outburst of
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conflicting views and interests, and the proliferation of antagonism and dissidence
within the BNP. Thus, within a year of Zia’s death, the Bangladesh polity verged
on the brink of praetorianism (Perlmutter 1977:104-107). It was anybody’s guess
whether the military, which emerged as a well-knit and self-confident force after
the Chittagong incident, would assume political power at an opportune moment.
The generals did not have to wait long; only four months after the landslide victory
of Justice Sattar in the presidential elections of 1981, Bangladesh experienced a
bloodless coup. The military, under General H.M. Ershad, wielded political power
from then until 6 December 1990, when a violent popular uprising forced Ershad
to resign.
Politicisation of the Armed Forces
A high level of politicisation of the armed forces is evident in Bangladesh. The
15 August 1975 coup, by a handful of junior officers with the help of two bat-
talions of armoured corps, was the first indication of the armed forces’ overt
intention to play a political role. It was followed by a series of coups and counter-
coups until 30 May 1981 when General Zia was brutally killed by a group of about
twenty mid-level officers at Chittagong in another abortive coup. Bangladesh
was placed under martial law for the second time under Lieutenant General H.M.
Ershad from March 1982 to November 1986. The military-dominated civilian
regime remained in power until December 1990.
The military ruled Bangladesh for more than nine of the twenty years of its
independent existence; another four years were under the shadow of martial law,
with men-in-uniform in the background. What is more significant is that the mili-
tary not only assumed a political role, but claimed that they had a right to do so.
Before the assumption of power in March 1982, Major General Ershad demanded
that the military be accorded a constitutional role to ensure the protection of the
political system (Ershad 1981:12; New York Times 14 November 1981).
The process of politicisation of the armed forces in the post-colonial state of
Bangladesh is linked with the organisational framework of the military in British
India and the orientation of its officer corps. In Western countries the concept
of the military as a more or less politically neutral body has emerged mainly
because democratic institutions have evolved over a longer period of time with
little involvement of the military. Moreover, as an apparatus of the state, military
organisations were designed mainly to handle external defence. The British Indian
Army, which was the predecessor of the armed forces of all the South Asian
states, was by contrast trained from its very inception to be ‘the custodian of law
and order’ with a view to promoting imperial interests. It was thus essentially in
The Military and Democracy in Bangladesh 113
opposition to the national interest and demands, and its organisation was always
subject to political considerations. The roots of politicisation of the armed forces
can therefore be traced to this peculiar conception of its role.
For the supreme purpose of securing and perpetuating colonial interests in
India, the British army’s policy had been to capitalise on existing religious
antagonisms between the minorities through a policy of ‘divide and rule’. The
British Indian military’s deployment strategy was based on the dictum: ‘Keep
your Sikh regiments in the Punjab, and they will be ready to act against the
Hindoos; keep your Hindoos out of the Punjab and they will be ready to act
against the Sikhs’ (Philip 1962: 508).
With the nationalist movement gaining ground increasingly in India from the
latter part of the 19th century, an intense effort was made by the colonial govern-
ment to indoctrinate Indian troops in general and the officer corps in particular
with an anti-political and anti-democratic orientation. They were taught that
politicians were no more than ‘rabble rousers’ and ‘disruptionists’, and that their
activities merely undermined the social order and systemic solidarity. Thus the
British Indian military officers in the course of time were not only thoroughly
anglicised but also rendered anti-national, anti-political and anti-democratic.
Analysing this aspect of the British Indian military, many scholars came to
believe that among military officers assimilation displayed itself not merely in
‘the exquisitely tailored lounge suits of officers in mufti, in a penchant for under-
statement, for beautiful silver, and for cavalry moustaches’, but also in their belief
that politicians were no more than ‘scallywags’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1964).
After independence, the organisation of the armed forces in India, and their
systems of training and recruitment, underwent profound changes; but the armed
forces in Pakistan continued to be organised and trained on basically the same
lines as in British India (Khan 1963:220-235). A general headquarters (GHQ) was
set up as the central agency responsible for the administrative affairs of the
various defence services. Training institutions such as the Pakistan Military
Academy or Air Force Academy were established on the same lines as at Sand-
hurst in Britain and Dehradun in India. The new military leaders continued to be
recruited from the same bases; the armed services personnel continued to remain
in the cantonments, which were physically and culturally distanced from the
civilian sectors, having a sense of being a part and yet apart from the society in
which they lived (Alavi 1966). This duality in attitudes of the soldiers towards
their society and their professional expertise created an ambivalence in their
attitude towards the political institutions in Pakistan. The root causes of the mar-
tial law clamp-down in Pakistan in 1958 can be traced to the dynamics which were
generated in the Pakistan Army because of training, organisation and the
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orientation of its officer corps.
After the conclusion of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the
US in 1954, the Pakistan Army acquired sophisticated American military tech-
nology. Acquisition of new technology enhanced not only the Pakistan military’s
striking power but also its bargaining strength. Soon after, it began to penetrate
the civilian government of Pakistan. Thus, ultimately by staging a coup and
assuming dictatorial powers in 1958, General Ayub Khan established the supre-
macy of the men-in-uniform in Pakistan.
Most of the Bengali military officers, who played crucial roles in seizing
political power in Bangladesh in the 1970s, were recruited during this period
and were trained and socialised under the shadow of Ayub Khan’s martial law
regime. The proclamation of martial law in 1958 had far-reaching effects on the
Bengali military officers in many ways. Officers became conscious of the role
the military could play in the political system; they also became sensitive to poli-
tical power. They became conscious of the regional imbalance in the armed
forces, too, and they began to realise that the Bengali officers in the Pakistan
Army were not accorded equal treatment. Bengali officers also felt that a policy
of discrimination was practised against them in matters of pay, promotion and
other perquisites. These discriminatory policies made the Bengali officers not
only resentful, but also vociferous in their complaints against the West Pakistani
ruling elite. In the 1960s their complaints became louder when by default Bengali
bureaucrats, both civil and military, became the chief spokesmen for Bengali
interests in the absence of free political processes. This role politicised them
further. The Agartala conspiracy case bears ample testimony (Ahmed 1991:91-
110).
The most important factor in the intense politicisation of the Bangladesh armed
forces was the War of Independence of 1971. The fact that a large number of
officers and jawans, throwing aside their professional norms and indignantly
breaking the canons of military discipline and chain of command, rose against
the establishment and joined the war, was itself a revolutionary step. Under
normal circumstances, all of them would have been court-martialed, but after
independence they became war heroes and were greeted with warm-hearted glee
and pride by the nation. Moreover, the new strategy of guerrilla warfare, devised
in a conference of sector commanders at Teliapara in July 1971, had the double
effect of further politicising the armed forces and radicalising them to a great
extent (Ahamed 1988 :43-45).
In sum, the Bangladesh Army, which was the lineal descendant of the British
Indian and Pakistan Army, inherited not only the institutional framework of its
predecessors but also their orientation against civilian rule and their sensitivity
The Military and Democracy in Bangladesh 115
to political power. The War of Independence removed the distance between the
civilians and armed forces personnel, and made them aware of the nature of weak
political leadership and fragile political institutions.
Popular Attitudes to Democracy
Though the armed forces in Bangladesh have been highly politicised, the people
of South Asia have been deeply committed to democratic order. During the British
rule in India, Bengalis were in the forefront of democratic movements in the 1920s
and 1930s. The All-India National Congress and the Muslim League, which had
been mainly responsible for the partition of India and Pakistan, were led by
Bengali political leaders in the formative phases. The freedom movement in British
India, in a sense, was a movement for a democratic polity and was deeply rooted
in the democratic ethos.
The Lahore Resolution of 1940 appealed to the people of East Bengal mainly
because of its democratic overtones: it espoused the principle of national self-
determination; it also laid stress on internal autonomy. Pakistan came into being
in 1947 on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. The continuance and full flowering
of parliamentary democracy became the pet demands of the East Pakistanis after
that, and most of their movements were firmly grounded in democratic ideals.
Seven of the historic twenty-one points of the United Front, a grand coalition of
the opposition political parties in East Pakistan organised with a view to focusing
their demands and fighting the ruling Muslim League in the 1954 provincial
elections, were closely related to the proper functioning of the parliamentary
system in East Pakistan (Jahan 1972:45-47).
The famous Six-Point Program, which ultimately led to a full-fledged nation-
alist movement among Bengalis in the late 1960s, began with a call for the estab-
lishment of a federation in Pakistan on the basis of the Lahore Resolution; it
also demanded a parliamentary form of government with the supremacy of the
national assembly, directly elected by the people on the basis of universal
adult suffrage (Ahamed 1989:32-43). The main motivating force for Bengali
involvement in the War of Independence in 1971 was their desire for a democratic
system, a desire blatantly denied by the Pakistani ruling elite during the post-
election years.
But while the people of Bangladesh are committed to a democratic order, the
political parties, which are the positive instruments for a working democratic
system, are not yet properly prepared for the job. Though Bangladesh has scores
of political parties, only a handful of these are institutionalised, well-knit and
organised at the grassroots level, and having definite policies and programs of
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action. This is due partly to political history and tradition and partly to the socio-
economic structure of the country.
In South Asia political parties have never been decisive instruments for framing
public policy or for projecting alternatives. Except for short interludes, moreover,
political parties have had few opportunities for functioning openly since competi-
tive politics has been restricted. During the colonial period political structures
were merely embryonic, and their operations were mostly extra-legal. Even after
independence in 1947 the ruling elite continued to maintain many of the restric-
tions which had been imposed on the free flow of political activities during the
colonial period. During military rule, political parties and party activities were
usually the first casualties.
Democracy is essentially a system of alternative programs and policies propa-
gated by political parties. When a particular set of programs and policies fails to
command the support of the people alternative programs and policies are tried.
Elections are formal procedures to choose programs and policies at a particular
point in time. Bangladesh has, however, inherited a political tradition where mass
movements and elections are entwined. During the last four decades there were
a number of political movements, which crystallised certain issues and mobilised
political forces. Elections were then held, not to choose between the alternative
programs and policies, but merely to pick the winning political forces.
Though a vast majority of voters participated in these elections, they took sides
not merely as party supporters but also as supporters of the crucial political move-
ments; some of these took the form of national movements. These elections,
strictly speaking, became plebiscites. The election of 1946 on the Pakistan issue,
the 1954 elections on the autonomy question, the elections of 1970 on the basis
of the Six-Point Program, and those of 1991 under the caretaker government were
meant to serve other functions; they were more legitimising plebiscites than
elections. Each was unique, and had distinct appeals to the voters.
Not only is the political history and tradition not congenial to the growth of a
stable party system in Bangladesh, but neither are the socio-economic
conditions. The endemic poverty of the people, intense factionalism among the
various social groups and classes, and a network of patron-client relationships
reaching from the grassroots to the central politico-bureaucratic elites at the
national level, have resulted not only in organisational weakness and a very low
level of institutionalisation in the polity, but also in institutional fragmentation.
Under such circumstances no political party can serve as the effective allocator
of values or platforms for conflict resolution or a meaningful focus of civic loyalty.
Political loyalty has been directed to persons, to the loci of patronage. Since
political loyalty has been channelled towards patrons or centres of patronage,
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persons who can seize the principal patron roles and sustain the flow of material
benefits to the clients are likely to receive the conditional allegiance and support
of the client network. That explains why some of the opposition leaders change
their position overnight and become staunch supporters even of a regime domi-
nated by the military. A political party cannot retain the support of a substantial
portion of the voters and remain underdeveloped.
Prospects for Democracy and the Role of the Military
Analysing all these factors, some scholars at home and abroad have suggested
that the Bangladesh polity might well be on the road to persistent praetorianism
with an occasional civilian-military façade (Baxter and Rahman 1991:59). The
popular uprising of 1990, with the direct participation of most of the political
parties in Bangladesh, and subsequent events, however, give grounds for opti-
mism. Though Bangladesh has yet to build a political system based on consensus
and compromise, it has come a long distance in that direction.
The political parties, despite their stunted growth and lack of institutionalisa-
tion, have now arrived at a consensus on the nature of the political system in
the country. Nothing short of a representative parliament is acceptable. The
government must be accountable to the parliament. The judicial branch must be
independent as the bulwark of basic human rights. The press must be free. The
consensus has been evident in the rejection of seven-party and five-party
alliances to participate in either of the Sangsad elections under Ershad and also
in the eight-party alliance’s refusal to take part in the 1988 Sangsad election.3
These demands, having been repeatedly voiced from different party platforms
during the last decade, became the core of the consensual agreement reached
by the three political alliances on 19 November 1990. These alliances, working
as the motivational force behind the popular uprising, were instrumental in
bringing it to its logical conclusion on 6 December 1990. In a society character-
ised by endemic violence and intense factionalism, thanks to the willing co-
3 Most of the political parties which were opposed to General Ershad’s usurpation
of political power and his autocratic rule formed two alliances in 1983: a fifteen-
party alliance centred on the Awami League, and a seven-party alliance centred
on the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). On the issue of participation in the
1986 general election the fifteen-party alliance broke up, forming an eight-party
alliance centred on the Awami League, and a left-leaning five-party alliance. These
three alliances played a crucial role in ousting General Ershad from power in
December 1990.
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operation of all the political parties the general election of February 1991 turned
out to be absolutely free, fair, neutral and peaceful. The Twelfth Amendment Act,
reintroducing the parliamentary system of government, was enacted in an envi-
ronment of unprecedented cordiality among the political parties on 6 August
1991. The parliamentary committees of the fifth Sangsad, designed to institution-
alise parliamentary control over the different ministries, have started functioning.
The orientation of the armed forces in Bangladesh also seems to have under-
gone some change. They treated the movement against Ershad from October to
December 1990 as a political problem and wanted it to be solved politically, Gen-
eral Ershad’s insinuation of a more active role for them notwithstanding. Most
coups are internally generated by local cleavages and power conflicts, but
external encouragement or discouragement can be crucial to their success or
failure. In Bangladesh, American assistance has been of crucial importance to
the success of the post- Mujib regimes, and the 15 August 1975 coup was a turn-
ing point in the warming of Bangladesh-US relations. The triumph of democratic
order globally, and especially in South Asia, may help further deepen the
changing orientation of the armed forces in Bangladesh.
An alternation of military and military-dominated civilian regimes in Bangla-
desh thus may not be the only prospect. A democratic order is more likely to strike
its roots into the political soil of Bangladesh if the political parties can maintain
the emerging consensus and politics of compromise.
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PATTERNS  OF  MILITARY  RULE  AND  PROSPECTS  FOR
DEMOCRACY  IN  SOUTH  KOREA
Yung Myung Kim
The role of the military in South Korean politics poses some interesting questions
for the study of civil-military relations in developing societies. The military has
dominated Korean politics for an unusually long period of time – nearly thirty
years. On the other hand, recent trends towards democracy in Korea appear to
be more deeply entrenched historically than in many other recently democratised
polities, especially those in Latin America. This chapter attempts to clarify some
more obvious issues related to these characteristics of civil-military relations and
democratic transition in South Korea (hereafter Korea). Specific issues to be
addressed include: the nature of the political system after independence which
provided a structural framework for the military’s political dominance; the inter-
nal characteristics of the military, reflecting and interacting with the overall poli-
tical structure, which induced military officers to assume supreme power in
Korean political economy; the reasons for the eventual demise of military rule
and the beginning of civilian control of the military; and future prospects for
democracy in Korea and the military’s role in it.
Methodologically, a distinction may be drawn between structural and motiva-
tional factors in explaining the complex phenomenon of civil-military relations.
The former help explain overall trends in civil-military relations; the latter are
relevant to the more specific behavior of political actors. In this chapter, we will
concentrate on structural factors, especially those affecting the balance of power
between the military and civilian sectors, because our interest is in overall
patterns of civil-military relations rather than specific political events.
The Emergence of Military Rule
There is no shortage of academic studies of the causes of military coups d’état
which identify various factors at different levels of analysis – intra-military,
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societal, and international (Finer 1962; Huntington 1968; Janowitz 1964; Decalo
1976; Y.M. Kim 1985). However, the basic reason why the military not only inter-
venes in but dominates the politics of developing societies for considerable peri-
ods of time should be found primarily in the structure of relationships between
the military and civilian sectors. Military rule in Korea illustrates clearly the almost
inevitable consequence of unbalanced power relations between the military and
civilian sectors following the creation of a newly independent state; with the
division of the Korean Peninsula, the military was developed disproportionately
to the civilian sectors.
It should thus be noted at the outset that the military was overdeveloped com-
pared to any other sector in Korea at the time of the coup of 16 May 1961. The
Korean military started as the Korean Constabulary, established by the American
military government (1945-1948) for the purpose of maintaining domestic stability
mainly against agitation by leftist groups. The military gained increased socio-
political importance because of the division of the nation during the Occupa-
tion period. The Korean War (1950-1953) provided an important background to
the military’s dominance of Korean politics, although its intervention in politics
did not take place until several years after the end of the war. A major reason for
this was the time-lag between the creation of the Republic and the military on
the one hand and the politicisation of military officers on the other. As a result of
the war, the size of the military grew to a spectacular extent (from 100000 in
1950 to 700000 in 1956, although it was reduced by 100000 in 1957), but its
institutional, technological, and organisational development was even more sig-
nificant. Assisted by massive US aid, the military developed into the most mod-
ernised and Westernised sector in Korea during the 1950s. The civilian sectors,
especially universities and the bureaucracy, were also experiencing modernisa-
tion, but they were less organised and less modern in outlook, smaller in size,
and limited in political and economic participation (Lee 1968:150). Later, with
rapid industrialisation, the civilian sectors modernised more rapidly than the
military, but reversing the military’s political dominance, once it had taken root,
proved complicated and time-consuming, as was tragically manifested in the
Kwangju Uprising of 1980.
At a societal level, the political situation created the structural conditions for
long-term military rule in Korea: the Republic was founded upon an imported
ideology of liberal democracy, but Korea’s political tradition lacked experience
of this Western system; as a result, liberal democracy quickly degenerated into
the authoritarianism of Rhee Syngman’s 1948-1960 patrimonial rule. The effort
of the succeeding Chang Myon government to re-establish a democratic
system was bound to fail because its leadership could not control the political
Patterns of Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea 121
turbulence created by the April Uprising of 1960 which toppled the Rhee regime.
Imposing liberal democracy upon an unprepared nation simply did not work.
What it did was to provide the basis for the emergence of military rule, initiated
by younger officers who denied the idea of liberal democracy entirely and instead
sought single-mindedly the objectives of economic growth and effective
leadership. The coup which took place on 16 May 1961 cannot be fully
understood without considering the coup leaders’ motivations, which stemmed
from the political discontent over the lack of opportunities for promotion and
specific political circumstances created after the April Uprising. However, even
if those conditions had not occurred, it seems likely that the Korean military would
have taken a major role in politics at some time.
In a sense, the coup of 1961 proved to be an historical turning point which
temporarily put an end to political struggles amongst the diverse forces which
sought to fulfil different objectives of ‘nation building’ in the newly independent
country. In this struggle, the military’s alternative – capitalist industrialisation
combined with authoritarian control – gained supremacy and dominated Korean
society for some time.
Changes in Military Rule: The Park Chung Hee and
Chun Doo Hwan Regimes
After the 1961 coup, officers governed South Korea for two years under the
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. They eventually turned the system
into a kind of quasi-civilian one, providing party politics in which coup-leaders-
turned-civilians occupied supreme positions. But this quasi-civilianised party
politics became increasingly a device for Park’s personal accumulation of power.
The personalisation of power came to define the characteristics of Korean mili-
tary rule in the 1960s, culminating in the promulgation of the Yushin Constitution
in October 1972.
Why did Korea’s military rule turn out to be quasi-civilian and personal, rather
than direct and institutional, as was the case with its Latin American counterparts?
Answers are to be found in the internal characteristics of the Korean military at
the time of the coup: the Korean military was not sufficiently institutionalised
to put its political domination on a formal basis; the coup was executed by fac-
tions centred on the eighth class of the Korean Military Academy, and the in-
fighting among the coup leaders was substantial (S.J. Kim 1971:112-118; Lovell
1975:183-188). Factional disputes during the years of direct rule were essentially
struggles for more power sharing, but they also reflected different conceptions
of the coup leaders’ role in politics. At the time of the coup, the officers, although
122 Yung Myung Kim
having to a considerable degree a ruler mentality, did not have a clear ideology
or set of policy programs to implement after seizing power. In other words, they
had not yet developed the kind of ‘new professionalism’ which Latin American
officers developed from the late 1950s (Stepan 1973); all they possessed was
unequivocal anti-communism and vague conceptions of reform, intra-military and
societal. The younger officers who planned and executed the coup were more of
a ‘ruler’ type (Nordlinger 1977: 26-27) and, thus, intended to stay in power
indefinitely. Senior officers, who were involved at later stages of the coup, were
‘moderators’ (ibid.: 22-24) who wanted to return to the barracks after ‘cleaning’
the polity. Because of internal struggles among coup leaders, the regime’s charac-
teristics turned out to be eclectic; it was, after a considerable period of direct
military rule, a quasi-civilian regime.
Quasi-civilianisation and factionalism provided the conditions for Park’s
accumulation of personal power. Quasi-civilianisation came with the inauguration
of Park Chung Hee as president after his narrow electoral victory against Yun Po
Sun, former symbolic president in the Chang administration. It generated party
politics around the ruling Democratic Republican Party and divided opposition
parties, which merged in 1967 to form the New Democratic Party. Over a long
period, however, party politics became a device for prolonging and concentrating
the president’s political power. The political role of parties decreased and the ever-
strengthening bureaucracy and security forces took over their role.
The weakening of party politics and strengthening of the bureaucracy was
directly related to the concentration of power in the hands of the president. Park
lacked Rhee’s personal charisma and failed to consolidate his power base from
the outset. But he possessed the rare capacity to tilt the power balance toward
himself in entanglements within the ruling group. He removed the possibility of
revolt from within the military and utilised party politics for his own ends. After
seizing supreme power, he removed any possibility of an independent power base
being formed by using his classic tactics of ‘divide and rule’ within the military
and the party (S.J. Kim 1971).
A turning point in Park’s consolidation of personal power came with the consti-
tutional revision of 1969, which was executed despite considerable resistance, not
only from opposition politicians and students/intellectuals (who represented the
political opposition at the time) but also from within the ruling group, especially
from Kim Jong Pil. The constitutional revision allowed Park a third term as
president and signalled much more systematic and formidable institutional
arrangements aimed at giving Park indefinite control of power – the proclamation
of the Yushin system. With this, the façade of party politics introduced after the
1961 coup virtually disappeared and Park’s life-time authoritarian rule was
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guaranteed. Authoritarian control was strengthened and power became highly
personalised. Park justified the authoritarianism by emphasising administrative
efficiency which he deemed indispensable for reunification and economic growth.
Competing explanations have been given for the emergence of the Yushin
system, which was similar to the bureaucratic authoritarian system in Latin
America (Kang 1983; Im 1987; Y.M. Kim 1986). Clearly, however, it represented a
culmination of the personalisation of power which developed after the inaugu-
ration of Park. With the advent of the Yushin system, a military-authoritarian
regime changed into a more personalised authoritarian one. This change required
massive political repression of civil society and of elite politicians. In order to
maintain political control, as well as using outright repression, the president
employed the ‘ideology of security’, referring to the threat of North Korea.
Personal control, combined with quasi-military-mobilisation, made possible his
(and the military’s) long-term domination of Korean society, a condition which
was absent in most other developing countries.
The Yushin system eventually collapsed with the assassination of Park Chung
Hee by one of his close associates, Kim Jae Kyu, the chief of the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (another institutional device created for quasi-civilian rule).
Yet, the demise of the personal ruler did not result in the demise of military rule;
rather, another military group, often called the New Military Group, occupied the
power vacuum created by Park’s death. To understand why this happened we
should first look into the causes of the breakdown of the Yushin system.
The Yushin system resembled the bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) system in
Latin America, but its power base was more personal than the latter. At the same
time, it shared characteristics with the pre-war militarist system of Japan, in that
the state systematically employed the security threat, real or perceived, as a
means of mobilising and controlling civil society.
The ‘Total Security System’, the term coined by the military regime, was
another aspect which distinguished the Yushin system from the Latin American
BA regimes. The regime’s rationale for the proclamation of the Yushin system
was in terms of national security and economic growth, as well as the administra-
tive efficiency deemed indispensable to accomplishing the first two objectives.
During the Yushin years, from 1972 to 1979, the whole country was systemati-
cally organised into a kind of garrison state, which ultimately contributed to
strengthening the authoritarian ruler’s political power. It is true the Korean pen-
insula was at the time on military alert, and many Koreans shared the govern-
ment’s threat perception in the mid 1970s when a large part of the Indochina pen-
insula was under communist control. This not only facilitated the state’s con-
trol over the society, but effectively weakened the opposition (Sohn 1989:82-83).
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Combining personalisation of political power and militarisation of the society,
Park Chung Hee stifled any semblance of liberal democracy, the façade of which
was created after the 1961 coup. He denounced the ‘Western system of democ-
racy’ as inappropriate to Korea’s ‘emergency’ situation and instead presented
‘Korean-style democracy’ which emphasised efficiency and national harmony
under a great leader (Park 1978). Needless to say, the Korean-style democracy
was an antithesis of genuine democracy, and was directed toward perpetuation
of Park’s personal power.
However, this coercive system could not be imposed upon civil society indefi-
nitely. In addition to the general problems of BA regimes, such as the inefficacy
of coercion as a basis for long-term political control, and the breakdown of the
ruling coalition in the midst of political-economic crisis (O’Donnell 1979), per-
sonalisation of power produced a political problem more salient than in more
institutionalised Latin American BA regimes, namely the problem of political
succession. Because the consolidation of personal power prevented the regime
from preparing for post-Park transition, Park’s political options were much too
limited when popular revolt erupted in 1979; he could not find an effective poli-
tical successor who would maintain the existing political and economic structures
while easing the pressures of popular discontent. The regime was unable to re-
spond effectively to growing political challenges from the combined forces of
students, intellectuals, workers, and opposition politicians. The situation was
further aggravated by personal animosities between close associates of the presi-
dent, his chief body guard, Cha Ji Chul, and Kim Jae Kyu, his assassin. It was
aggravated by a dispute about which option to take to resolve the political crisis.
The hardliner Cha’s option of brutal suppression was gaining presidential appro-
val when both of them were murdered by Kim, who was considered the moderate.
Despite the passing of personal rule, the basic structures of the polity, the soci-
ety, and the economy remained the same; if there was any change, it was toward
a deepening of the existing system, although there were naturally changes in
political recruitment. The basic reason for this was that Park’s death and the
breakdown of the Yushin system did not come about by popular uprising but
from within the power bloc. What was toppled was an individual ruler, and not
the system itself. This was mainly because the opposition forces lacked sufficient
power resources to use the death of the ruler to change the regime. The Yushin
system had become outdated and was losing its dynamism, but the socio-political
and, above all, military structures which defined the system remained intact. In
a way, it proved the resilience of the Korean style ‘Total Security System’.
After brutal struggles between military-authoritarian and civilian-democratic
forces during 1979-1980, the eventual victor turned out to be the New Military
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Group centreed around Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, who were to become
the next two presidents. What was this group? During his one-man rule, Park
Chung Hee, while firmly controlling the military with a combination of ‘stick
and carrot’, had allowed a selective group of senior officers to accumulate power
as long as they were loyal to him. This politicised a segment of the officer corps
and provided them with a basis for resuming power after Park’s assassination
by the military. The locus of power resided in a group named Hanahoe, of which
both Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo were leading members. Members of the
group were graduates of the Korean Military Academy and were from North
Kyongsang Province. It was supposed to be an informal fraternity society but,
under tacit permission of the president, it accumulated political power and finally
emerged as the most powerful group after Park’s death.
Officers’ ideological orientations were also undergoing change during Park’s
rule. Within the military there emerged growing interest in non-military political
and social issues. Through curriculum changes in the institutions of higher mili-
tary education, such as the National Defence College, military officers systemati-
cally studied political and social issues (J.H. Kim 1978). For them, the concept
of national security should be expanded to include defence against internal en-
emies such as communist agitators. Although the officers’ major concerns lay
still in the area of national defence against possible invasion from North Korea,
they were developing aspects of the ‘new professionalism’ found in their Latin
American counterparts. As a result, they strengthened and systemised a ruler
mentality which provided an ideological basis for reintervention in politics.
Compared to the military’s ideological, organisational, and physical strength,
democratic forces lacked the organisational cohesion necessary to force the
military to remain in the barracks. Students, workers, and intellectuals were
incapable of accomplishing what they wanted, namely political democratisation
and a more equitable distribution of wealth, because they lacked organisation
and effective leadership. Added to this was the division in the leadership of the
opposition party between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. Power imbalance
between the military and democratic forces was further widened by the withdrawal
of support for the democratic movement by the middle class, which had more
interest in political stability and economic growth than in democratisation. As a
result, the breakdown of the Yushin system did not develop into more than a
violent transfer of power from one authoritarian regime to another. The Chun
regime retained essential characteristics of the Yushin regime, though there were
also significant differences between the two.
While the 1961 coup was accepted by the general populace as an almost inevi-
table result of political crisis, Chun’s seizure of power was simply not accepted
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by everyone in Korea, for reasons discussed below. The immense political cost
of Chun’s rule was manifested in the bloodshed in Kwangju. He tried to compen-
sate for weak political support by coercion (and lip service to social reform). Thus,
the degree of political repression was considerably higher after his assumption
of power than immediately after the 1961 coup (although somewhat lower than
under the Yushin system).
However, Chun’s coercive rule was met by strengthened opposition, which
grew in size and was better organised and ideologically radicalised. This was an
inevitable consequence of social diversification and a long history of political
opposition but, more directly, a result of the brutal suppression of the democratic
movement in Kwangju and of growing anti-Americanism derived from the alleged
role of the US there. Consequently, democratic challenges to the Chun regime
grew much stronger than those to the Park regime.
Regime characteristics were also different. Park Chung Hee consolidated per-
sonal control over the state apparatus and political society which Chun could
not emulate. Chun, for his part, accumulated some degree of personal power over
the ruling bloc, but the possibility of his long-term rule was effectively blocked
from the very beginning because he argued that a single term president presented
possibly the only source of political legitimacy. In addition, the institutional
development of the military by then rendered one-man rule extremely difficult.
As a result, soon after Chun’s inauguration the issue of political succession
became prominent within both the ruling and opposition camps.
Although Chun’s control of the military was relatively firm, it cannot be said
that he established personal control over it. Rather, the New Military Group
constituted a collective leadership around the senior leader, Chun, again
reflecting the military’s institutional development as compared to 1961. Although
it could not, either, be regarded as an institutional military regime, in which the
military’s institutional norms and procedures dominated the regime structure, the
Chun regime certainly possessed some of the characteristics of such a regime.
This fact was significant in the transition from Chun’s rule; Chun’s fall did not
require the sort of violence which was necessary in the transition from Rhee and
Park because under his rule power was not entrenched exclusively in a personal
dictator. Especially toward the end of Chun’s rule power was more or less divided
among the ruling group, and internal friction within the ruling group played a
significant role in determining the direction of political transition.
The most significant difference between the two regimes probably lay in the
historical functions each was bound to perform. While Park’s regime, for all its
contradictions, played positive roles in economic development and political stabi-
lity at an earlier stage of nation building, Chun’s rule was essentially redundant
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in that the historical function of military-authoritarian rule had virtually evapo-
rated. Chun tried to reverse the historical flow toward a more open political and
economic system and, in so doing, paid the price with the lives of hundreds of
citizens. As a result, the Chun regime lost its political legitimacy. This was not
compensated for by government’s efficacy in policy implementation; in fact, a
powerful democratic movement erupted in spite of the economic boom in the latter
half of Chun’s term. Lack of political legitimacy produced constant and severe
opposition during Chun’s rule.
Democratisation and the End to Military Rule?
With the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo as president in 1988, Korean politics appear
to have entered a new era of democratic transition. This transition is not just a result
of the transfer of power from Chun to Roh but a consequence of long-term structural
changes in the relationship between the military and civilian sectors.
During the course of almost thirty years of military rule, the Korean economy
and society were fundamentally transformed; society became diversified, class
forces grew and became better organised, and the democratic orientation of the
general populace strengthened. With these changes, the military was no longer
the most advanced sector of Korean society. Structural changes were already
evident when a massive struggle erupted between the military and civilian forces
in 1980, but the New Military Group appears not to have been aware of this
change, believing that it could still lead and dominate Korean society. The year
1987 was different from 1980; Chun’s term was about to terminate, although
rumors lingered that he would seek to stay in power. The remaining problem was
how to reorganise the political structure for the post-Chun period. Harsh
authoritarian rule was out of the question from the beginning; the democratic
movement had strengthened, and the military certainly wished to avoid brutal
struggles such as the Kwangju Uprising.
The result was a combination of democratic pressures from the opposition
camp (basically the same members as in 1980, but better organised and far more
radicalised) and the political tactics of the ruling group, which made for limited
democratisation. Democratic forces issued a powerful challenge but the ruling
group did not employ the armed forces to put down the challenge, because senior
officers as well as the president were not willing to risk such action and the US
government was putting pressure on the regime for a peaceful transition of power.
Roh Tae Woo, representing a moderate faction of the ruling party, used the situ-
ation to turn the tide toward his group. Roh proclaimed that he would agree to
presidential elections, which the opposition had long demanded, and promised
128 Yung Myung Kim
the release of Kim Dae Jung and other opposition leaders. (It was recently reveal-
ed that this political concession was initiated by Chun rather than Roh. See S.I.
Kim 1992.) As a result, the struggle for democratic transition moved from the
streets to the political parties. In subsequent presidential elections the opposition
was once again hopelessly divided between archrivals Kim Young Sam and Kim
Dae Jung. In a factionalised contest Roh earned electoral victory with only 36.6
per cent of total votes. His victory was only possible because of the division of
the opposition and, thus, his political legitimacy was shallow from the beginning.
Democratisation in Korea displays some features unique among recently
democratised countries. Most obviously, while in other countries the ruling party
lost power for a variety of reasons, in Korea it retains power as democratisation
was achieved by one faction, a moderate faction, of the ruling group.
How, then, can the ruling bloc still hold power in Korea despite massive chal-
lenges from the majority of the electorate, and why does the Roh government
try to convince people that it represents their democratic wishes? The answer
to the first question can be found in the weakness of the opposition. Even when
the military is willing to give up power, its withdrawal from politics cannot be
completed unless there are political institutions, notably political parties, capable
of assuming power (Finer 1985:75-76). In Korea, the opposition party has lacked
this capacity mainly because it has been divided into two intransigent rival
camps. In the case of the second question the answer lies in what was discussed
previously, the evaporation of historical functions of authoritarian rule. Roh Tae
Woo appears to understand that it is now impossible for any group in Korea to
continue authoritarian rule. He tries to consolidate political support with plans
for democratic reform, although it is hard to initiate because the veto power of
entrenched interests, including the president’s own, is still very strong. The
passing of authoritarian rule, combined with lack of alternative democratic
leadership, ultimately led the process of political transition in Korea into a kind
of compromise (a compromise by default), a limited democratisation initiated
by opposition forces but soon taken over by the existing power bloc.
After inauguration, Roh consolidated his grip on the military by a series of
changes in key positions. Officers’ political attitudes also seem to have been
changing. There were instances of discontent about decreased political status
among officers, inevitable in the democratisation process; but they were over-
come and the president’s control of the military now seems to be stable enough.
Korean officers appear to understand that another intervention in politics would
be futile. They vividly remember what happened to Chun’s brutal takeover of
power and, more fundamentally, they perceive irreversible changes in the
relationship between the military and the civilian sectors.
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Within the military itself there also seems to be less inclination towards political
intervention; disharmony between age and rank, premature promotions, and
factional struggles, which were the essential causes of the officers’ political dis-
content, seem to have virtually disappeared (Hong 1990:136-138). Officers still
find some sources of discontent, such as narrow opportunities for promotion,
but this is not likely to lead to direct intervention in politics.
However, while the structural conditions which would facilitate military rule
have now disappeared and officers’ motives for direct political action have also
significantly diminished, it is still doubtful whether the democratic polity in Korea
is securely institutionalised.
To be able to answer this we need to understand exactly what are the charac-
teristics of the Roh regime. Roh Tae Woo was clearly a leading member of the
New Military Group which staged the coup against the formal military authority,
and brutally suppressed people demanding democracy. The military is still a pow-
erful force in Korean society; it wields strong influence in Korean politics and
ex-officers still dominate key areas of politics and society. It is thus difficult to
consider the Roh government genuinely civilian. But, on the other hand, it can
scarcely be described as a military regime (even a quasi-civilian military regime)
either, because it does not depend primarily on the physical force of the military
for its political control. Politics in Korea is now managed through a kind of civil-
ian-led liberal democratic procedure in which elections and public opinion are
significant. Seen in this light, the present regime stands somewhere between mili-
tary-authoritarian and civilian-democratic (and hopefully developing from the
former to the latter).
Prospects and Conclusions: Toward a Democratic Polity with
Civilian Control of the Military?
As has already been argued, the basic reason for the unusually long term of mili-
tary rule in South Korea lies in an unusually spectacular gap in power resources
between civilian forces and the military. Overdeveloped state apparatus,
including the military as well as police and bureaucracy, consolidated a pre-
emptive control over the underdeveloped civil society. This phenomenon is not
uncommon in post-colonial societies (Alavi 1979), but it was especially evident
in Korea because the South has been in constant military tension with the North,
and the military has thus occupied a more critical position than in other post-
colonial societies.
Nevertheless, it is paradoxical that once the democratisation process began,
the chances for the military’s reintervention in politics appear to have become
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more remote in Korea than in, say, Latin America, where the military was forced
out of political power but society is still conflict-ridden. Certainly, since Roh’s
inauguration, Korean politics is in disarray with factional struggles and unfulfilled
democratic dreams, while the economy is also in considerable difficulties with a
growing trade imbalance, inflation, and class conflicts. Yet, these issues do not
appear likely to bring the military back into politics in the foreseeable future. The
structure of the relationship between the military and civilian sectors has been
reversed; now the military is underdeveloped in comparison to the civilian
sectors, and political power will never again be derived primarily from naked
physical force.
In this regard, the Korean cycle of authoritarianism and democracy appears
to be longer than in most developing countries (though resembling Spain and
Portugal where democracy is more or less consolidated after long periods of
dictatorship by personal rulers). Korea now seems to have entered the first stage
of democratisation after a long period of authoritarian rule. But whether democ-
racy will be institutionalised and civilian control of the military consolidated in
the short run is another question; short-term reversals of events (which may be
derived from conjunctural and motivational factors) are always possiblities in a
long-term cycle (which is determined by structural factors).
For the foreseeable future, Korean politics will demonstrate democratic
tendencies, with a clear limit to the participation of diverse interests (especially
those of the have-nots) in the political process. Limited democratisation may well
be a worse alternative, because it will incite discontent among radical and
reactionary forces at the same time. What is important in this situation is effective
political leadership to control demands by the diverse forces to a degree accept-
able for the maintenance of the nascent civilian political structure, and at the same
time pursue democratic reform and more equitable social transformation. When
political leadership lacks this capacity, the military, and other discontented forces
as well, will impose political pressure in one way or another, even if an outright
coup is not plausible.
Civilian control of the military, a minimum requirement of consolidation of
democracy, depends upon the internalisation of ‘democratic professionalism’
among officers, according to which the military accepts ‘not only the political
subordination of the armed forces to the democratically determined will of the
nation, but also their professional subordination to constitutionally designated
state authorities’ (Fitch 1989:134). It is too early to determine whether Korean
military officers have internalised democratic professionalism. Political orienta-
tions of Korean officers are hard to clarify because there are deficiencies in
empirical analysis, but the opinions and actions of several senior officers during
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democratic transition showed that they still retained the essential features of the
new professionalism. It would be unreasonable to expect that Korean military
officers will abandon this political attitude in the short term. Their political atti-
tudes are rapidly changing, but this change was imposed upon them by demo-
cratic transition. To achieve a more positive acceptance of democratic civilian
authority by the military, changes must occur not only in officers’ political orien-
tations but also in political institutions and overall social structure as well.
The military versus democracy in Fiji: problems for
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THE  MILITARY  VERSUS  DEMOCRACY  IN  FIJI:  PROBLEMS
FOR  CONTEMPORARY  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT
Stephanie Lawson
Like many former British colonies, Fiji inherited a form of Westminster parlia-
mentary government. The ‘parent model’ was modified to the extent that it in-
corporated a number of provisions designed to secure a special position for in-
digenous Fijians vis-à-vis the Fiji Indian community. This deviation from modern
democratic norms was meant to stabilise Fiji’s ‘plural society’ by ensuring equal
representation in the House of Representatives for the two major ethnic groups.
For the first seventeen years following independence it seemed that this model
had achieved broad acceptance by most parts of the polity. During this time, the
office of government was held continuously by the Fijian-dominated Alliance
Party led by one of Fiji’s paramount chiefs, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. In April
1987, however, the Alliance Party was defeated at the polls by a coalition, led
by Timoci Bavadra, comprising the relatively new multiracial Labour Party and
Fiji’s oldest political party, the National Federation Party, which had always at-
tracted the bulk of Fiji Indian support. Less than six weeks after the elections,
the new government was overthrown by a military coup and Fiji’s form of parlia-
mentary democracy followed the path of failure experienced by so many post-
colonial states. Both democracy and its corollary model of civil-military relations
were shown to have been acceptable to Alliance leaders and supporters, as well
as key elements in the military, only so long as the Alliance retained office as
government. In other words, those democratic norms associated with the doctrine
of constitutionalism and the principle of alternation in government lacked a secure
foundation.
The military intervened again some six months later when coup-leader Rabuka1
1 As a lieutenant-colonel, Sitiveni Rabuka was then the third-ranking officer in the
Royal Fiji Military Forces. He became commander of the Fiji Military Forces and
was promoted to the rank of major-general.
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accused civilian leaders, including his own traditional paramount chiefs, of failing
to follow through his initial ‘objectives’, namely, the absolute entrenchment of
‘indigenous rights’. In subsequent developments the 1970 constitution was abro-
gated, Fiji declared a Republic, a civilian administration installed, and a new
constitution promulgated in the name of the ‘Sovereign Democratic Republic of
Fiji’. The first general elections following these events were held in 1992, and
the rigid discriminatory electoral and parliamentary provisions ensured the return
of a government sympathetic to the stated objectives of Rabuka’s coup. Given
this scenario, it might be thought that the conditions for future civilian supremacy
– albeit within a traditionalist/nationalist Fijian framework – have been firmly
re-established while, conversely, those conditions most conducive to
praetorianism have weakened considerably. But this depends ultimately on the
strength of the new civilian institutions. These purport to rest on a ‘traditional’
Fijian foundation of authority, and chiefly leaders have the advantage of being
able to evoke powerful symbols of legitimacy. But the appeal of these symbols
and the institutions they now support is limited to a minority of the population.
Furthermore, the recent history of Fiji suggests that, at the very least, the future
role of the Fiji Military Forces will be to act as covert guardian of the ‘national
interest’. In the terms ordained by Rabuka’s ‘objectives’, this national interest
necessarily precludes a return to more democratic constitutional forms which
would allow adequate participation in politics by the entire body of citizens –
both Fijian and Fiji Indian.
This study takes as its primary focus the notion of ‘regime vulnerability’ as
applied to the civil institutions of government in Fiji both before and after the
coup. In adopting this approach we shall of course consider the past, present,
and future role of the military with particular emphasis on its relationship with
civilian authority. As a necessary preface to this study, we must clarify first what
is meant by ‘regime vulnerability’, especially in terms of the comparative strength
or weakness of civil institutions.
Regime Vulnerability
Following its early articulation by Finer (1962), the idea that the level of political
culture in a given society (and the concomitant strength of its civil institutions)
is decisive for the regime’s vulnerability to military intervention has underscored
a host of later studies (for example, Huntington 1968; Perlmutter 1981; Rapoport
1982; Luckham 1971; Eide and Thee 1980). And although the general notion
has no necessary or exclusive link with the collapse of post-colonial democratic
regimes in the Third World, many of the case studies undertaken within this
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context address precisely the ‘failure of democracy’ problem. Further, Finer’s
conceptual framework clearly supports the assumption that Western democracies
have achieved a ‘mature political culture’ through which civilian institutions are
strongly legitimated, whereas political and social institutions elsewhere are
relatively weak and lacking in legitimacy (see Berghahn 1981:69). In much of
the literature on Fiji that has burgeoned since the coup, the assumptions under-
lying Finer’s basic proposition have received implicit support. Various justifi-
cations offered by Fiji’s military leader, and many supporters of his initial inter-
vention and subsequent role in the process of constitutional change, have also
served to reinforce the images projected by Finer’s claims.
The utility of the concept of regime vulnerability has attracted some criticism,
especially in terms of its explanatory and predictive force. Luckham (1971:10),
for example, points out that the criteria for determining the strength of civilian
institutions assumes, in many cases, precisely that which needs to be explained.
He refers to several of the criteria proposed by Finer, and especially to the require-
ment that there must be ‘publicly agreed procedures for the transfer of power’
(ibid.:11). Luckham suggests that the coup itself may, in some circumstances,
‘become a publicly recognised and quasi-legitimate means for the transfer of
power’ (1971:11). One implication of this is that the presence of publicly agreed
procedures per se does not serve adequately to distinguish ‘weak’ civil institu-
tions from ‘strong’ civil institutions. But Finer’s basic criterion is rescued from
any ambiguity in its application if we simply add the premise that publicly agreed
procedures for transferring power from one government to another must exclude
any form of military intervention (and this is undoubtedly what Finer meant). It
is certainly the case that any democratic method devised for the transfer of power
must, by definition, preclude military intervention, for modern democratic theory
and practice is founded, inter alia, on strictly constitutionalist principles which
deny the legitimacy of force, or the threat of force, in determining succession of
government.
Another critic of orthodox regime vulnerability theory, Thompson (1975:459,
466), suggests that hypotheses subscribing to the weakness of governmental insti-
tutions as a standing invitation to domestic military intervention are virtually
tautological and, further, that overemphasis on the themes which support such
hypotheses has obscured the role of the military as a homus politicus in its own
right. Four themes are identified by Thompson (1975:460-64). One is that the
study of unique historical and cultural legacies provides an essential explanation
for present behavior. A second concerns the ‘failure of democracy’ which is
predicated on excessive diversity within the polity, a lack of democratic precon-
ditions, and a general disillusionment when economic improvements lag well
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behind expectations. Another theme extends the second by employing the notion
of a political void. This void is created by the absence of traditional loyalties to
constitutionalist forms which leads in turn to institutional atrophy. The military,
acting as a Hobbesian trump, is drawn into the void. Finally, the ‘disjointed sys-
tem’ theme concentrates on the lack of authoritative formulae for the resolution
of conflict. In this situation, rival groups seeking to establish their own primacy
continually undermine that sense of community essential to the structural de-
velopment of central, legitimate institutions. In the absence of such institutional
development – and depending on the evolutionary stage of class relations – the
military may be pulled into a praetorian role of conservative guardianship.
Thompson (1975:466) comes to the unremarkable conclusion that all these
themes ‘share a common image of the military coup: weak political systems pull
the military into action’. A key purpose of Thompson’s review of these themes,
however, is not to demonstrate the obvious, but to construct an alternative image
of the location of the military within the state. This location is described by
Thompson (1975:486-87) from a praetorian perspective insofar as the military
is perceived to be an integral part of the political system rather than an entity
which operates outside it. This has some important implications for the present
study, to which we shall return at a later point. For the present it is necessary to
clarify the conceptual issues further by examining the notion of ‘regime’ itself.
In most of the literature on military intervention, the terms ‘regime’ and ‘gov-
ernment’ are used interchangeably. This is perhaps because the overthrow of a
government generally entails, ipso facto, the overthrow of the regime. Further-
more, most writers in the area are content to utilise the concept of ‘regime’ simply
as a term to attach to ‘civil’ or ‘military’. But although regime and government
are closely related, they are not the same thing, and it is important to understand
the basic analytical distinctions between them. This is especially so in the case
of Fiji when we come to consider the notion of legitimacy and how it operates at
different levels. Also vital to the study of political structures and their legitimacy
is, rather obviously, the state. Control of the state apparatus is the focal issue in
cases of military intervention, and associated ideological contestations revolving
around nationalism are usually linked directly with this quest for control. The
relationships between state, regime, and government are complex, and to deal
with these properly would require much more scope than is available here. In
order to at least differentiate these structures for the purpose of the present
discussion, it must suffice to say that the state itself is the locus of political power
while the concept of regime is concerned with how, and by whom, that power is
exercised. In other words, ‘regime’ is concerned with the form of rule (see Chazan
et al. 1988; Lawson 1993).
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Governments are awarded management or control of the state apparatus in
accordance with the norms and principles of the regime which are embodied,
for practical purposes, in certain rules and procedures. Governments derive much
of their legitimacy as controllers or managers of the state apparatus from the
norms and rules of the regime. These are generally embodied in a constitution
which sets out those ‘publicly agreed procedures for the transfer of power’. All
this is implicit in the democratic doctrine of constitutionalism. At another level,
however, the regime itself requires legitimacy. And where this is weakly support-
ed, it follows that the regime – and governments formed under it – are vulnerable
to challenges which, in the particular case we are dealing with here, came in the
form of military intervention. The point in setting up this rather formalised schema
here is to clarify the point that ‘regime vulnerability’ entails more than just
‘government vulnerability’.
In the case of Fiji, both the government that was overthrown, and the regime
under which it was formed, were regarded by the military and other opponents
of the government as lacking an essential legitimacy. This is clearly evident in
the justifications surrounding the coup and the subsequent process of constitu-
tional change. But to understand the problems associated with political legiti-
macy, it is important to investigate the historical context which gave rise to the
civil institutions of post-colonial Fiji, and the specific factors which contributed
to their essential ‘weakness’. Through this it will be seen that the various hypo-
theses concerning regime vulnerability are indeed relevant, not only to the analysis
of the original coup in Fiji, but to the future of civil-military relations there.
Fiji’s Colonial Legacy 2
British colonial rule was established in Fiji in 1874 following a period of internal
strife occasioned partly by the activities of European settlers and traders in the
eastern regions of the island group. It was in this region, too, that the most power-
ful of the Fijian confederacies were located and rivalries between leading chiefs
there exacerbated the general deterioration in domestic politics that followed
European contact. The British government was to some extent a reluctant colo-
niser at this time. The further extension of empire in the remote Pacific promised
little in the way of economic rewards and only the potential for strategic advan-
tage offered any return on their ‘investment’. The general policy towards the new
colony of Fiji, then, was that its administration should pose as small a financial
burden to Whitehall as possible and, ideally, that it should be economically
2 This section is based on a much more detailed account set out in Lawson (1991).
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self-sufficient. Fiji’s first substantive governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon,
therefore set about implementing a set of policies which were directed not only
towards establishing a solid financial base for the new colony, but which reflected
also a relatively new approach to the ‘management’ of colonial subjects. The
strategies adopted by Gordon to secure these objectives were decisive for the
later development of politics in Fiji.
The first of these strategies concerned ‘native policy’ and this was aimed partly
at making the colonial experience for Fijians an exception to the dismal history
of colonised people in other parts of the empire. One of the measures introduced
was the reservation of those Fijian lands not already ‘legally’ alienated to white
settlers, and the prohibition of any further land alienation. Although this measure
was sound in principle, the method by which land tenure was assigned on the
basis of certain kinship groups, and which remains in place to this day, imposed
a uniformity and inflexibility that bore little resemblance to pre-colonial Fijian
practices. The land tenure system has since served as a serious impediment to
the efficient and equitable utilisation of land resources amongst Fijians. In addi-
tion, the bureaucratic structures relating to the administration of land, including
the leasing of agricultural land to both Fijian and Fiji Indian tenants, have creamed
off much of the income from leases. A substantial proportion of the remaining
funds is distributed to chiefs. Fijian ‘commoners’ receive few direct benefits from
the leasing of their lands, and this was one of the issues that the Labour/NFP
coalition government had placed on the political agenda. Concern for the security
of indigenous land rights was made a focal issue by the Alliance Party during
the 1987 elections and figured prominently in the rhetoric surrounding
justification of the coup. It is therefore important to note that the 1970 constitution
of independent Fiji provided triple entrenchment of Fijian rights with respect to
land and other customary entitlements.
A second strategy for securing the principles of the new enlightened native
policy was the establishment of a system of indirect rule. This was achieved by
taking the relatively authoritarian chiefly structures of control which character-
ised socio-political organisation in the eastern regions as the basis for the system,
and imposing these uniformly over the entire island group. In addition, selective
recruitment to the colonial bureaucracy from amongst easterners served to mar-
ginalise Fijians from other regions. One consequence of this was that eastern
chiefs achieved much greater prominence within the colonial regime. As political
institutions evolved from an initially rigid crown colony system to something
resembling responsible government in the pre-independence period, eastern
chiefs retained their political prominence and reinforced their prospects for future
control through the formation of the Alliance Party. This underscored exclusive
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claims to political legitimacy by eastern chiefs vis-à-vis any other political group
in Fiji.
The third strategy employed by the colonial administration involved balancing
the policy of ‘native protection’ with the requirement of financial self-sufficiency.
The use of Fijian labour in the emerging plantation economy was viewed as detri-
mental to the traditional Fijian way of life and Governor Gordon looked immedi-
ately to the Indian sub-continent from which other British colonies had success-
fully recruited their ‘helots of empire’. The first Indian indentured laborers arrived
in Fiji in 1879 and by the time the system was abolished in 1916, Fiji had acquired
a substantial, and permanent, population of Fiji Indians whose descendants now
comprise around 46 per cent of the total population. This created what is
commonly described as Fiji’s ‘plural society’ in which the two major ethnic groups
are perceived as constituting monolithic entities in a two-sided contest for political
power. This perception is largely responsible for popular conceptions concerning
the essentially ‘racial’ cause of the May 1987 coup. And although most academic
commentators – with the notable exception of Scarr (1988) – have evinced a
complex array of causes which point to the salience of other decisive factors (see,
for example, Lawson 1991; Ewins 1993), the general perception of contemporary
developments in Fiji remains fixed firmly within a racially-oriented paradigm.
Another aspect of Fiji’s colonial legacy which is closely related to the develop-
ments outlined above, and with the issue of eastern chiefly legitimacy, concerns
the doctrine of Fijian ‘paramountcy of interests’. This doctrine upholds the sup-
remacy of Fijian interests over and above the interests of any other racial or ethnic
group in Fiji. It developed as a colonial version of an indigenous rights charter
which, although never formally codified, developed into a powerful orthodoxy.
The doctrine’s initial purpose was to underscore the early policies instituted by
Gordon. As we have seen, these had been designed largely to protect Fijians from
European settler exploitation. But as the Fiji Indian community grew, the doctrine
was employed by European and Fijian leaders alike as a counter to the Fiji Indi-
ans’ quest for social, political, and economic rights. It became, in effect, a forceful
rhetorical weapon in a war of subjugation which was at first prosecuted most
vigorously by the small but influential European commercial elite concerned to
retain their own privileged position in the colony. This enabled Europeans, inter
alia, to represent themselves as champions of the Fijian people and guardians of
their interests. For their part, Fijian political leaders, who were drawn almost
exclusively from chiefly ranks (with easterners predominating), took up the same
rhetorical stance and denounced Fiji Indian claims for equal political rights as
anathema to the interests of the Fijians as a whole.
This of course raises questions as to the precise nature of the interests of each
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‘group’, and especially whether the interests of Fijian chiefs are automatically
consonant with those of commoners. One must question also the notion that any
interests espoused by the eastern chiefly elite necessarily accord with the interests
of Fijians in other regions. These issues will be considered later in the context of
contemporary politics. For the moment it is important to note that the doctrine
of Fijian paramountcy developed a political salience which went far beyond its
original utility. We have seen already that Fijian rights relating to land and other
resources were well established in the early colonial period and firmly secured
through the 1970 constitution. But the general themes of the doctrine, combined
with the spectre of an ‘Indian land-grab’, continued to be pursued by Alliance
and other nationalist leaders at the level of political rhetoric (and invective) in
post-independence electoral campaigns. With respect to the Alliance and the east-
ern chiefly elite, this served the instrumental purpose of uniting the bulk of the
Fijian electorate behind their leadership in direct opposition to Fiji Indians.
Furthermore, the Alliance presented its leadership as the embodiment of all that
is distinctively, traditionally, and legitimately ‘Fijian’.
Both the formal political institutions and the party system that emerged in the
late colonial period reflected these earlier developments, as did the 1970 constitu-
tion of independent Fiji. Apart from recognising and securing the special rights
and interests of indigenous Fijians, the constitution provided for a complex sys-
tem of communal representation through which equal numbers of Fiji Indians
and Fijians were returned as members of the House of Representatives. In
addition, eight ‘general’ members were to be returned as representatives of ‘other
races’. Most of these were of European descent and were aligned politically with
the Alliance Party. This meant that despite formal parity of representation for
Fiji Indians, the racial allocation of seats gave an immediate electoral advantage
to the Alliance and, indeed, seemed designed to ensure that the Alliance would
continue indefinitely in office. Viewed in this light, the 1970 constitution cannot
be seen as an instrument for securing the practice of democratic politics beyond
the formal superficialities of parliamentary government. More specifically, the
principle of alternation in government, which is an essential hallmark of modern
representative democracy, was undermined to the extent that the legitimacy of
the opposition party as a potential or actual government was not recognised by
the Alliance leadership.
Continued Alliance dominance, however, depended on their maintaining a solid
electoral base amongst Fijians. Any intra-Fijian disunity would necessarily erode
this base and leave the Alliance vulnerable to electoral defeat, and this is precisely
what happened in the elections of 1987. Although the Labour/NFP coalition was
unable to attract more than around 10 per cent of the overall Fijian vote, it was
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able to muster sufficient Fijian and ‘other races’ support in several crucial urban
and peri-urban constituencies. This, combined with a further slippage of Alliance
support to minor parties and independents as well as a significant level of Fijian
abstention from voting, gave the coalition a majority of seats. But the events which
followed the formation of the new government indicated clearly the extent to
which it lacked that widespread legitimacy essential to the principle of alternation
in government. Despite Ratu Mara’s formal concession of defeat, Alliance
members boycotted the opening of parliament and several became involved in
the activities of the extremist Taukei movement – a nationalist Fijian group which
emerged in the aftermath of the Alliance’s defeat and which resolved to bring
down the new government. Mara maintained a public silence which was seen
to implicitly endorse their activities. And when the army intervened less than
six weeks after the elections, Mara was amongst the first to join the initial
administration set up by coup-leader Rabuka.
The point of the foregoing discussion has been to highlight a number of
 important factors which, taken together, served to undermine the legitimacy of
the political institutions established by the 1970 constitution, thereby rendering
them ‘weak’ and vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability operated at two levels.
First, it is evident that any government other than the Alliance could be portrayed
rhetorically as a significant threat to Fijian rights – a logical corollary to the idea
that only the Alliance could guarantee the rights and interests of all Fijians. These
ideas were taken much further than the original doctrine of paramountcy of
interests implied, for this was basically concerned with the protection of lands
and customary matters which remained constitutionally entrenched no matter
which government was in power. In turn, this doctrine was invoked to deny virtu-
ally any political legitimacy to Fiji Indians and, it must be added, to those dissident
Fijians who formed the backbone of the Fiji Labour Party. Put simply, the
legitimacy of the new government was weakly supported, and therefore vul-
nerable to challenge, since it was opposed by a dominant political discourse which
had succeeded in elevating a particular group of Fijians to a position of almost
exclusive authority.
The second aspect of vulnerability operated at the regime level. Although the
constitution was, arguably, designed to entrench a one-party dominant system,
it nonetheless supported formally all those democratic constitutionalist principles
associated with the notion that no one political group is entitled to lay exclusive
claims to legitimacy and, through this, control of the state apparatus. It is clearly
evident that neither the Alliance Party nor the military accepted the legitimacy
of a regime which allowed succession of government according to democratic
constitutionalist norms and principles. In other words, those ‘publicly agreed
The Military Versus Democracy in Fiji 141
procedures for the transfer of power’ provided by the constitution were, when
put to the test, shown to lack universal acceptance. This view has been reinforced
by the promulgation of the new republican constitution, the rules of which seek
to prevent the possibility of any such succession occurring again.
The new constitutional order, however, is one which undoubtedly lacks the
support of a majority of the population in Fiji. Although this has not been tested
by way of a referendum, one can assert fairly confidently that most Fiji Indians
would regard it as illegitimate. And since the new electoral provisions for Fijians
are grossly biased in favour of the eastern provinces, it is not unreasonable to
assume that Fijians on the main island of Viti Levu will resent and resist eastern
dominance – especially those in the west whose history of dissidence suggests
more than a little reluctance to endorse eastern legitimacy. In addition, the
allocation of Fijian seats is weighted most heavily against the more ‘progressive’
urban Fijians who make up around one third of the Fijian population but who
have been awarded only five of the thirty-seven Fijian seats. Taken together, these
factors suggest weak support for the new regime and, as a consequence, for any
government formed under its provisions. Whether this will promote susceptibility
to further military intervention, or at least a praetorian role for the military, is
another question, and one best addressed now by reference to the development
of Fiji’s military forces and its role in contemporary politics.
The Military in Fiji
The origins and development of Fiji’s military forces reflect clearly the socio-
political dimensions of Fiji’s pre-colonial and colonial history. When Governor
Gordon took over the administration of the colony, there was already a small
military force known as the Royal Army, which had been used by Fiji’s leading
eastern chief, Cakobau, and his British supporters in an attempt to control the
central and western regions. Gordon continued to employ this unit for its original
purpose of subjugation, thereby reinforcing eastern chiefly authority and interests.
Following the relative success of these early pacification operations, the unit
(which had meanwhile been renamed the Armed Native Constabulary) was
amalgamated with the police of the Fiji Constabulary. In the early 1920s, further
‘pacification’ operations were conducted against striking Indian workers (Sanday
1989:3).
From the beginning, then, the armed forces in Fiji were utilised largely for
coercing troublesome groups in the interests of internal political stability. This
early emphasis, and the identification of ‘troublesome’ with dissident western
Fijians and Fiji Indians, saw the already dominant position of ‘loyal’ easterners
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further reinforced through selective recruitment to the constabulary – and later
to the regular armed forces. This is a very clear manifestation of Enloe’s (1980:
16) conception of ‘security mapping’ where the ethnically-determined basis of
recruitment involves convenient geographical concentrations. Further, it is evi-
dent that the early orientation of state security in Fiji was strongly biased towards
‘the maintenance of congenial domestic class and ethnic patterns of order’ (Enloe
1980:14).
The later development of Fiji’s military as an entity distinct from the police,
and as a standing army in its own right, was given its major impetus by the call
of empire. Two world wars and the Malayan Emergency saw troops from Fiji
serve monarch and empire in defence, presumably, of ‘democracy’. Back home,
however, little progress had been made with respect to democratic rights for Fiji
Indians, and this had a direct effect on military recruitment for World War II.
Many Fiji Indian grievances had been centred on the issue of parity of political
rights and status with Europeans (not Fijians). When the war broke out, the sense
of inequitable political treatment was further exacerbated by differential pay rates
for Fiji Indians and Europeans in the army and most Fiji Indians declined to
volunteer for service for this reason. The only Indian platoon in the army, which
had been formed in 1934 despite some resistance on the part of the colonial ad-
ministration and the chiefs, was disbanded (Sharma 1990:63). This not only
strengthened the apparent political divide between Fiji Indians and the other
communities, but served also to consolidate the army as an essentially Fijian
institution.
At the time of the coup in 1987 the composition of the Royal Fiji Military Forces
(RFMF) was 98 per cent Fijian. They were led by Brigadier Ratu Epeli Nailatikau,
a high chief from the east and also son-in-law of Prime Minister Mara. Although
many able commoners had been admitted to high-ranking positions, including
the then third-ranking officer Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, those from
eastern chiefly families were disproportionately represented in the officer corps.
Commoners like Rabuka, who had achieved high rank, were also drawn in
disproportionate numbers from the east. Saffu (1990:162) suggests that the extent
of eastern dominance in the RFMF, together with the historical factors outlined
earlier, was responsible for the development of a ‘traditional-aristocratic’ pattern
of civil-military relations which operated alongside the liberal-democratic pattern
throughout the independence period until May 1987. Saffu (1990:159) argues
also that both patterns were compatible with civilian political supremacy until
the electoral victory of the coalition when the liberal-democratic pattern was
abrogated abruptly ‘because it did not guarantee control of the state by chiefs
and other traditionalists’. This is consistent with the arguments put forward earlier
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concerning the lack of legitimacy accorded both to the coalition and to the regime
under which the new government was formed.
Another aspect of the analysis, and one which is vital to future developments
in civil-military relations in Fiji, concerns the prospects for the traditional-aristo-
cratic model. Saffu (1990:159) draws on Nordlinger’s (1977) work in identifying
the core features of the model. The most basic indicator supporting civilian sup-
remacy is a strong identification of social and political values between civilian
and military leaders in an essentially ‘pre-democratic’ system. Civilian leaders
are regarded as legitimate insofar as they are part of the same social network of
aristocratic families that provides military leaders. Sanday (1991:253) says that
this pattern was reflected in a pervasive belief amongst indigenous Fijians that
political power was the exclusive preserve of the chiefs. The role of the military
in post-coup Fiji seemed to point to a continuation of the traditional-aristocratic
pattern.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Rabuka established a sixteen-member
Council of Ministers comprising eleven Alliance parliamentarians (including
Mara) and four members of the nationalist Taukei movement. Rabuka himself,
as head of this body, was the only military member. This was replaced shortly
afterwards with an eighteen-member Council of Advisors which, as a necessary
façade for at least qualified domestic and international acceptance, included three
Fiji Indians as well as Bavadra. Rabuka, however, remained a leading member.
The new arrangements, and of course the coup itself, were endorsed wholeheart-
edly by the Council of Chiefs who had resolved that the military should be asked
to review the 1970 constitution to ensure that Fijians were guaranteed control of
government at all times (Lal 1988:87). And Rabuka’s ambitions for the military
were expressed unambiguously in numerous statements on its future role, includ-
ing an assertion that the military would remain an integral part of any kind of
political system, irrespective of what form it might take (Lal 1988:113).
In the meantime, some rapprochement had been reached between the civilian
actors in the play of negotiations. A degree of moderation had started to prevail
as Taukeist leaders, and Rabuka himself, became increasingly marginalised in
the process of negotiations which led eventually to the ‘Deuba Accord’ – an
agreement under which both the Alliance and the deposed coalition were to
participate on equal terms in a caretaker government under the governor-general,
Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:138). Although Rabuka
had apparently agreed to support the new accord, it is evident that his intentions
were otherwise. Two hours before the governor-general was scheduled to inform
the nation of the new caretaker government, Rabuka led a second coup to enforce
his original ‘objectives’. Within days Rabuka announced the complete abroga-
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tion of the 1970 constitution and declared himself head of a republican govern-
ment (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:142). But Rabuka’s position as head of
the republic, although supported by military force, was untenable politically.
Leaving international opinion aside, Rabuka could not, as a commoner, hope to
legitimate himself as leader at that time. In his own rationale for both coups,
Rabuka had consistently promoted the paramount importance of Fijian ‘tradi-
tion’ and the virtually sacrosanct political position of chiefs in this context. So
powerful had the rhetoric about chiefly authority become that it left Rabuka in
the position of being unable to command personally the symbolic resources asso-
ciated with political legitimacy in Fiji. In his own words, Rabuka had claimed
that the military was ‘trying to protect the chiefs and their people’ and, further,
that it was the ‘duty of the warrior tribe to protect the chief’ (quoted in Norton
1990:139).
In the wake of the second coup, then, the eastern chiefly elite returned once
more to the helm of government, replacing the Taukeist council which Rabuka
had installed as an interim measure. Rabuka continued for a time as a member
of the ministry but was later forced to ‘return to barracks’ at the behest of Mara
who had given him the choice of resigning either from the military, or from the
government. In August 1991, however, Rabuka decided to quit the military in
order to pursue a political career, and returned to the post of co-deputy prime
minister and minister for Home Affairs in the interim government. Ganilau con-
tinued to occupy the position of president while Mara remained prime minister
until the 1992 elections. Rabuka’s political ambitions, however, were well known
and his decision to enter civilian politics as a leading member of the Fijian
Political Party (which was formed with the backing of the leading chiefs) was a
clear enough indication that he would be a contender for the prime ministership
in the elections. Given the lack of suitable chiefly successors to Mara in the FPP,
as well as the emergence of several rival Fijian parties, the longer-term outlook
for stable government under the chiefly establishment was beginning to look more
uncertain. This brings us back to the question, posed at the beginning, concerning
the prospects for continuing civilian supremacy and whether the new regime is
itself vulnerable to some kind of intervention.
Future Prospects
In looking at possible future directions for politics in Fiji, we must again con-
sider the notion of regime vulnerability and, in this context, examine also the
concepts of overt and covert regimes. In the earlier discussion of the 1970-1987
period, it was evident that although the liberal-democratic framework operated
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at a superficial level as an ‘overt’ regime, there was at the same time a stronger
‘covert’ regime operating through traditionalist conceptions of legitimacy. But
it took a change of government under the democratic provisions of the constitu-
tion to reveal the relative strength – or weakness – of each of these. Following
from this, it is logical to depict the liberal-democratic pattern of civil-military
relations during the same period as an overt but weakly supported model, whereas
the traditional-aristocratic pattern operated at a covert level, but was more strong-
ly supported by the same traditionalist legitimator. The coup of May 1987, then,
can be viewed not only as an act of intervention for the purpose of destroying
the liberal-democratic façade, but also as an exercise in regime maintenance
insofar as it restored the eastern chiefly elite to power – but this time as the overt
regime.
The traditionalist regime is now supported formally (and overtly) by a constitu-
tion which does little to disguise its essentially undemocratic character. As sug-
gested earlier, however, it lacks the support of a majority of the population, espe-
cially as it is explicitly designed to relegate the substantial population of Fiji
Indians to electoral irrelevance. In addition, it discriminates heavily against urban
Fijians, as well as those from the central and western regions, in favour of the
eastern provinces. It is primarily for these reasons that the new regime may, in
the final analysis, carry within it the seeds of its own destruction. Far from keep-
ing the indigenous Fijians united in opposition to Fiji Indians, the new consti-
tution is much more likely to serve as an instrument for its political fracture. How
long this process may take depends on too many variables for any certain answer
to be given. But on any reasonable assessment, the future stability of the chiefly
regime must be in doubt – an assessment which has obvious implications for the
role of the military. For whatever happens in the arena of civil politics, the military
has established itself in a guardian role. In the terms expressed by Luckham
(1971:27), the military now has a strong ideological disposition towards regarding
itself as the ‘Platonic guardian’ of the national interest. This points to the
continuation of a covert military regime operating beneath the level of the overt
chiefly/traditionalist regime. And the praetorian character of this development
does indeed suggest that the military in Fiji has become a homus politicus in its
own right.
Conclusion
Whatever specific pattern of civil-military relations emerges in Fiji, it can be
said with some certainty that democratic constitutionalist principles are unlikely
to prevail in the shorter term. Despite the high-sounding title assigned to the new
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republic, there is no commitment on the part of either chiefly or military leaders
in support of these principles. Indeed, much of their traditionalist rhetoric since
the coup has been directed explicitly against the ‘alien’ concepts associated with
democratic politics (see especially Dean and Ritova 1988). The logical founda-
tions of the traditionalist view, and the ideology supporting it, have been dealt
with critically elsewhere (see Lawson l990a and l990b). But whatever claims
can be mounted against the logical and ethical bases of political legitimacy in
contemporary Fiji, the strength of the prevailing orthodoxies lends sufficient
rhetorical force to arguments countering both domestic and external pressures
for ‘democratisation’. The efficacy of this rhetoric is further strengthened by
appeals to the slogan, increasingly popular in international discourse, of ‘indi-
genous rights’. In addition, there is a pervasive belief that ‘plural societies’ are
incapable of sustaining peaceful democratic politics, and can only be managed
effectively through relatively authoritarian institutions (see Lawson l990a). This
means that both the military and the current civilian regime have escaped much
of the international invective that might otherwise have been directed against
the constitutional entrenchment of a system of political apartheid.
Most importantly, it needs to be emphasised that the homus politicus role of
the military in Fiji is incompatible with any notion of civilian supremacy. It is
especially contrary to the democratic principles embodied in the doctrine of
constitutionalism. In other words, if the military becomes a de facto part of the
political system insofar as it plays a covert role in determining political leader-
ship, it can no longer be considered the apolitical institution that democratic
theory demands. Finally, the effective guardianship of Fiji’s ‘national interest’
by the military betrays an essential weakness in the political culture that has sus-
tained the chauvinistic assertion of ‘indigenous rights’. For wherever the threat
of force is a necessary condition for maintaining a particular political order, it
follows that the order itself lacks the degree of legitimacy required for long-term
stability.
Postscript
The original version of this chapter was written before the general elections of
1992 – the first held after the 1987 coup. There has since been another round of
elections in 1994, occasioned by the failure of Rabuka’s government to have the
budget passed. The text has been modified slightly to take account of these events,
but it is worth elaborating a few further points. The 1992 elections held some
surprises for those expecting that the ‘party of the chiefs’ would make a clean
sweep of the Fijian seats. Under the leadership of Rabuka, who succeeded in
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replacing Mara as the effective leader of the Fijian party on the latter’s retire-
ment, the party (officially called the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei or SVT)
failed to gain an absolute majority of seats in the House of Representatives. Seven
of the Fijian seats went to opposing Fijian parties and independents. The Fiji
Indian seats were fairly evenly divided between Labour and the National Federa-
tion Party, while the General Voters’ Party (which is basically supportive of the
SVT, although not necessarily of Rabuka himself), won all five of the General
Voters’ seats. Rabuka subsequently secured sufficient support from other parties
and independents to gain the president’s endorsement as prime minister. Rabuka’s
SVT government, however, lasted just over eighteen months before it fell. This
was precipitated by the defection of seven SVT ministers, and followed a period
of intense dissent within the government’s ranks. Rabuka’s party was returned
at the next elections with the same majority, and again managed to put together
a coalition, but the overall result confirmed that intra-Fijian disunity has become
an important factor in current politics. Both elections have shown that the chiefly
establishment has been sidelined to some extent in terms of electoral office, but
their constitutional powers and prestige remain significant, as does the rhetoric
of chiefly traditions.
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10
GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  MILITARY
IN  PAPUA  NEW  GUINEA
R.J. May
On the eve of Papua New Guinea‘s independence, achieved in 1975, there was
much speculation about the future prospects for democracy in this Pacific island
state. As an Australian-administered territory, Papua New Guinea had been
brought towards independence within a solid Westminster tradition. National
elections had been conducted since 1964 (though the early parliaments tended
to be dominated by members appointed by the colonial administration); a Papua
New Guinean chief minister had led the government since 1972; tentative at-
tempts had been made to foster the growth of political parties; and the traditions
of an independent judiciary and a professional public service had been estab-
lished. In the deliberations which culminated in the presentation of a ‘home-
grown’ draft constitution in 1974, however, a range of institutional options was
considered, the Constitutional Planning Committee drawing on a number of con-
stitutional documents, especially those of the post-colonial states in East and
West Africa.
In the light of then-recent experiences among the new states of Africa and Asia,
and considering the comparatively shallow roots of national political sentiment
in Papua New Guinea, particular concerns were expressed about the possibility
that, in a post-independence Papua New Guinea state, democracy would yield
to either a one-party state or a military takeover.
To counter any tendency towards military intervention, some commentators
suggested that specific provisions be made to give the military institutional repre-
sentation in government (see below). In the event, this suggestion was not taken
up, and the military maintained a fairly low profile in post-independence society.
But in 1987 political developments in Papua New Guinea and military coups in
Fiji prompted some observers to again raise questions about the possibility of
military intervention in Papua New Guinea. While a military coup seems to re-
main a very remote possibility, internal security problems in Papua New Guinea
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over recent years have brought about significant changes in the role of the military
and in its relations with government.
The Colonial Heritage
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force has its origins in the formation, during
World War II, of four infantry battalions in the then separate territories of Papua
and New Guinea. The four battalions were brought together as the Pacific Islands
Regiment (PIR), though all officers and most NCOs were Australian. The PIR
fought with distinction alongside Allied troops in Papua New Guinea. It was
disbanded in 1946 but was re-formed five years later.
Until well into the 1960s the PIR was essentially a component of the Australian
army, and was there primarily to serve Australian defence interests. A former PIR
commanding officer, Lt. Colonel Maurie Pears, later wrote, ‘We saw PIR as
Australia’s Ghurka Unit’ (Sinclair 1992:153).1
During the early 1960s, Indonesia’s campaign against the Dutch in what was
then Dutch New Guinea (now the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya) and its
confrontation with Malaysia sparked fears of possible Indonesian expansionism
towards Papua New Guinea, and prompted a surge of activity on Australia’s part
to expand the military in Papua New Guinea and to strengthen security infra-
structure along the Indonesian-Papua New Guinea border. Within the space of
a few years the PIR was increased from about 700 ‘native soldiers’ with Australian
officers to a force of over 3000. Indigenisation of the officer corps began, the
first two officers (Ted Diro and Patterson Lowa) graduating from the Australian
Officer Cadet School in Portsea in 1963. A Military Cadet School (to prepare
recruits for further training at Portsea) was established in Lae. A water transport
base was established in Port Moresby and the wartime naval base on Manus was
resuscitated. An Army Aviation Corps was created and several Royal Australian
Air Force transport aircraft were posted to Papua New Guinea.
By the mid 1960s, coincident with the perceived threat from Indonesia dimin-
ishing, the military build-up levelled off, though Papua New Guinea continued
to occupy a significant place in Australian strategic planning. More significant
for Papua New Guinea, however, along with the increased expenditure on the
military came more serious consideration of the possible future role of a Papua
New Guinea defence force. In 1966 the force’s incoming commanding officer
said:
1 For a detailed history of the PIR, and its involvement in World War II, see Barrett
(1969), Mench (1975), and Sinclair (1990, 1992).
150 R.J. May
The Army’s role in PNG falls basically into two parts – to build an Army capable of
playing a major role in the defence of the Territory against external aggression, and
to provide for the future a loyal and well-disciplined indigenous force capable of
supporting the Government of an independent PNG (quoted in Sinclair 1992:222-23).
In the House of Assembly, at forums at the recently-established University of
Papua New Guinea (UPNG), and elsewhere, however, a number of Papua New
Guineans expressed apprehension about the growth of a well-provisioned mili-
tary. In a paper published in 1967, for example, a pseudonymous Papua New
Guinean school teacher questioned the Australian government’s expenditure on
the army, suggesting ‘that the army is probably the biggest single threat to the
peace, security and development of our country’ (Heatu 1967:33; similarly see
Warubu 1968; Olewale 1972).
The issue of the military’s relations with civil authorities was officially ad-
dressed in 1969 by the Australian minister for the Army, Peter Lynch. Lynch
described the ‘current basic roles’ of the army as being to build an efficient force
capable of playing a vital part in the defence of Papua New Guinea and to provide
a well-disciplined, stable and reliable indigenous force completely loyal to the
government (Lynch 1969:22). He went on to say:
Emphasis is placed on loyalty to legally constituted authority. This is implicit in
the Australian Government’s aim of developing in the Territory a sound political
structure in which the Public Service, the [Police] Constabulary and the Army have
all been thoroughly trained in the concept of subordination to a legally constituted
democratic government (ibid.:23).
To this end the army was involved in a ‘heavy education effort’, including group
discussions of ‘civics and christian ethics’ (ibid. Also see O’Neill 1971:16-17).
Also, although civic action work had been carried out since 1951, from 1967
all major patrols and operational exercises by the PIR included civic action pro-
jects designed to ‘create constructive attitudes in the minds of soldiers towards
the people, and help identify the people with their Army’ (Lynch 1969:23. Also
see Hussey 1968).
Ironically, the success of the civic action program fuelled concerns about the
future role of the military in Papua New Guinea. Vincent (Serei) Eri (who later
served as defence secretary before becoming governor-general) suggested in
1969 that the army was ‘replacing the Administration in the minds of the people’
and ‘preparing the ground for some future action’, and he warned, ‘it is a very
dangerous situation that we are getting into’ (quoted in Sinclair 1992:136). Such
concerns appear to have been quite widely shared among educated Papua New
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Guineans, but were countered by army commander Brigadier Hunter, who said,
It is better to have the army out with people, learning to understand them, than to be
sitting in their barracks getting big heads. What Papua-New Guinea needs is a
people’s army, though not in the Maoist form (Canberra Times 23 January 1969).
Not specifically mentioned in Lynch’s 1969 statement was the army’s possible
future role in internal security. This issue was not long in surfacing. Following a
disturbance in East New Britain in mid 1970 the Australian government placed
the army in readiness to assist the administration should the situation escalate,
and troops were given a hastily-arranged course in riot control. In the event the
situation was resolved without the army being called in, and there was a general
feeling that the administration had acted prematurely. But the events of 1970
clearly signalled a recognition of the broader role the army might be called upon
to play in an independent Papua New Guinea, and, along with growing unrest
on Bougainville, stimulated further debate.
Australian defence expert Robert O’Neill (1971) suggested that internal law and
order was likely to become the army’s major preoccupation. Australian journalist
Peter Hastings endorsed this view, referring to the ‘inescapable similarity between
Africa and Papua New Guinea’, and suggesting that after independence ‘the Army
will inevitably be involved in the political direction of the country’ (Hastings
1971:32). The future role of the army was also the subject of a local radio
program,2 which brought together defence force personnel, politicians, and
civilian commentators. Papua New Guinea’s newly-elected chief minister, Michael
Somare, expressed the view that ‘we do probably need a defence force’ – for
patrolling borders and territorial waters, and ‘to react in the first instance to any
armed aggression’ – but he suggested that it should be of a smaller size and that
it should only be involved in internal security operations in ‘a real national emer-
gency’. As against this, senior Papua New Guinean officer, Major Ted Diro, saw
the army as having a role to play in internal security matters, and UPNG lecturer
Ulf Sundhaussen argued that given the very low level of national consciousness
and ‘already surfacing tendencies for separatism’ the maintenance of internal
security would be a task for the army in Papua New Guinea, as it was in Asia and
Africa, and that the army should have ‘some sort of political say’. Sundhaussen
(who had studied the military’s role in Indonesia) advocated the development of
working relationships between officers and politicians and the integration of the
military into the political and social structure. At this time there was some debate
2 ‘The Sword and the State’. Two-part program by Australian Broadcasting Com-
mission, 2, 9 November 1972.
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over Sundhaussen’s suggestion that the military be represented in cabinet (see,
for example, Sundhaussen 1973a, 1973b; Mench 1975: chapter 5, and
Premdas’s 1974 critique of Sundhaussen), and there were proposals, supported
by Australian External Territories Minister Morrison, to combine the army and
police in a paramilitary force (Morrison advocated a Malaysian-style field force).
But when in 1974 the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) presented its
report, its recommendations followed the approach outlined earlier by Somare.
The CPC began by emphasising its belief in the general principle, ‘that the
disciplined forces should at all times be subject to the control of the elected gov-
ernment’ (CPC 1974:13/1). It went on to express the view that the Defence Force
should be ‘firmly oriented towards external defence’ (ibid.:13/3):
. . . we have very serious reservations about the possibility of a future Papua New
Guinea Government using the army against its own people in any but the most ex-
treme cases of civil disorder, and then subject also to specific conditions (ibid.).
Its reservations on this issue were reinforced by concerns about what it saw as
the provision of installations and equipment ‘at a standard that has little relevance
to the circumstances of Papua New Guinea’ and about ‘the elitist nature of the
Defence Force’ (ibid.). It consequently recommended an expansion of the police
force and the appointment of a commission of inquiry to recommend on the rela-
tive size of, and allocation of resources between, the police and the military.
With minor modifications, the CPC’s recommendations on the disciplined
forces were accepted by parliament and were written into the constitution of the
independent state (see May 1993:10-13). The supremacy of the civilian authority
is laid down in Section 201, which states that the force is subject to the ‘super-
intendence and control’ of the National Executive Council (NEC) through the
minister responsible for the defence force (who may not be a serving member of
the force). Contrary to the CPC’s recommendation, the constitution specifically
excluded the office of commander-in-chief. The question of the relative size of
the police and the army was not taken up, the level of military expenditure being
effectively underwritten by an Australian military assistance program.
In 1973 the former PIR was redesignated Papua New Guinea Defence Force
(PNGDF) and shortly before independence the formal transfer of defence powers
took place. Brigadier-General Diro became the PNGDF’s first Papua New
Guinean commander.
The Role of the Military in Post-Independence Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea had an easy transition to independence in 1975. Indeed it has
frequently been observed that the absence of a significant anti-colonial
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nationalist struggle in Papua New Guinea not only meant that Papua New Gui-
nean soldiers had no heroic role to play in the winning of independence but that
the new state was deprived of the unifying forces which such struggles were
seen to have provided in many post-colonial societies.
The government which emerged from pre-self-government elections in 1972,
under the leadership of Michael Somare, was a coalition government, and in
the first post-independence elections in 1977 it was returned to power. Since
then there have been three national elections and five changes of government.
All changes of government have taken place through normal constitutional
channels (three as the result of votes of no confidence and two through elections)
and all have been smooth transitions. All governments have been rather fluid
coalitions. The two-party Westminster-style politics envisioned by some in the
1970s has not materialised; but neither has a tendency to one-party or military
regime. Papua New Guinea remains a robustly competitive political system.
Separatist movements which emerged on the eve of independence, and resulted
in unilateral declarations of independence in Papua and in the North Solomons
(Bougainville) (Griffin 1976; May 1982) were dealt with by a combination of
disregard and political negotiation. That in the North Solomons (where disputes
had arisen over a large gold and copper mine) precipitated moves for political
decentralisation. Following the establishment of provincial governments and the
renegotiation of the Bougainville mining agreement this problem seemed to have
been solved.
Preoccupied with the problems of policy making in the new state, and facing
no serious external threat, Papua New Guineans were not greatly concerned about
the role of the army, which maintained a fairly low profile. It was not until the
1980s, with a progressive breakdown in law and order nationally and the re-
emergence of friction on Bougainville, that the role of the PNGDF again came
under serious scrutiny.
At the time of the transfer of defence powers in 1975, the PNGDF had a posted
strength of 3614, 14 per cent of whom were Australians, mostly officers and
specialist NCOs. Less than 35 per cent of the 375 officer positions had been local-
ised. By 1979 the number of loan personnel had fallen to 141 and by 1988 to 30,
most of whom were with the Air transport Squadron. There were by 1979 almost
300 Papua New Guinean officers. Since independence, military assistance to
Papua New Guinea has been provided through the Australian Defence Co-
operation Program (DCP). In 1991 Australian Defence sources estimated that
some 3000 PNGDF personnel had undertaken some form of training in Australia
since 1975, and that about 90 per cent of the officer corps had trained or studied
in Australia (JCFADT 1991:174 and JCFADT, Hearings, 22 October 1990,
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p.733). Additional assistance has been received from the US and New Zealand,
and in 1992 Papua New Guinea signed status of forces agreements with Indonesia
and Malaysia; Defence Secretary Peipul said, ‘We may be able to learn from
Malaysia on handling domestic security and from Indonesia on civic action’.3
Notwithstanding the high level of Australian assistance under the DCP, as early
as 1977-78 the Defence Report contained complaints about deficiencies in the
size and structure of the PNGDF. The Defence Report 1980 commented that with
its present budgetary allocation the PNGDF could not meaningfully achieve its
primary object of defending the country from external attack. In 1983 a defence
policy review recommended that the PNGDF’s force strength be reduced to 3050.
The proposed cut was bitterly received in defence circles, where morale was
said to be low. In 1984 a Defence manpower review revealed a wastage rate
among officers of 7.7 per cent and among other ranks of 15.8 per cent (Defence
Report 1984-85:44), and the Defence Report 1984-85 reported that the standard
of discipline during 1985 was ‘below the required standard’ (ibid.:39). This grow-
ing frustration within the PNGDF coincided with demands for increased opera-
tions on the Irian Jaya border and the first call-out of the PNGDF to assist police in
1984. In 1988 the annual Defence Report noted that most operational units were 70
per cent below strength and that the PNGDF was having difficulty retaining
specialists. That year, however, a Defence Policy Paper outlined proposals for
a ten-year program to replace major equipment, reorganise force structure and
enhance capabilities in several areas. (See also Defence Report 1988.) Although
cabinet approval for the PNGDF’s Ten-Year Development Plan did not come until
late 1991, after the government had undertaken a review of internal security,
several policy changes were initiated in 1988-89, against the background of the
emerging conflict between the security forces and rebels on Bougainville (see
below). These included decisions to increase the strength of the Force to 5200
by 1995, and to proceed with plans (approved in 1985) for the development of a
reserve force.
By 1992 force strength had risen to around 4200. But in presenting the 1993
budget, the minister for Finance announced new strategies in the law and order
sector, which recognised ‘that there are limitations on the ability of the agencies
concerned to control the current situation’ (1993 Budget Documents. Volume I.
Economic and Development Policies, p.122). With respect to the PNGDF:
. . . it is recognised that the Defence Force needs to be scaled down, become more
involved in civic action, more involved with the village and community, more co-
3 Peipul, at a seminar at Australian National University, 19 June 1992.
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ordinated with other agencies in both the law and order and other sectors, and better
disciplined’ (ibid.).
The ‘move into Civic Action’ was to be accompanied by a reduction in force
strength, through attrition, from 4200 to 2500-3000, ‘most of whom will perform
CAP activities at the village level’; a core group of 1000 to 1500 ‘will receive
specialised combat training to prepare them to effectively counter any major
internal threat’ (ibid.).
Towards the end of 1993 the PNGDF faced a financial crisis. For several years
defence spending had been substantially in excess of budget allocation (in 1991
defence spending was overbudgetted by an extraordinary 81 per cent). By 1993,
outstanding accounts with local suppliers and unpaid special allowances to
defence force personnel amounted to several million kina, and in September it
was announced that naval and air craft could not be used because of a lack of
funding. In Port Moresby soldiers returning from Bougainville attacked the pay
office when they failed to receive due pay and allowances. The government
responded by increasing the Defence budget.
As of 1994, it remains to be seen how the conflicting pressures, on the one
hand for an enlarged, better-equipped fighting force and on the other for a
reduced civic-action oriented force, will be resolved.
In the period leading up to independence the possibility of ethnic fragmentation
was a major concern both of the Australian administration and of the rising
nationalist politicians. The emergence of a number of subnationalist or ‘micro-
nationalist’ movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s exacerbated these fears
(see May 1982). Recognising this (and bearing in mind that ethnic tensions had
been a reason for the disbanding of the PIR in 1946), as early as 1951 the army’s
recruiting policy was carefully designed to achieve a regional balance. Initially
the PIR sought to recruit equal numbers from Papua, the New Guinea islands, and
the New Guinea mainland; but with the highlands closed to labour recruitment
and difficulties of reaching more remote areas, in fact recruitment was biased
towards the groups closest to Port Moresby, Lae and Rabaul. In 1967 an Australian
officer serving with PIR, noted that ‘Mutual suspicion remained high and clashes
between tribal factions could, and did, flare up at any time’ (Bell 1967:50).
The expansion of the PIR in 1963-65 gave the army the opportunity to achieve
a better regional balance, although the fact that the army now sought higher edu-
cation levels, for technical and officer training, meant that some coastal groups
were still overrepresented. Thus, five of the first six officers commissioned were
from the Rigo district of Central Province, and NCO ranks were said to be domi-
nated by ‘Bukas’ from the North Solomons.
156 R.J. May
Initial fears of an ethnically divided army seem to have fairly quickly dissi-
pated. In fact, Bell observed in 1967 that with the new generation of 1960s recruits
came a breakdown of ‘tribal loyalty’ and a rise in Papua New Guinea national-
ism, even though some ‘inter-tribal prejudices’ remained (Bell 1967:56). The
achievement of integration in the PIR – the creation of what Olewale (1972:223)
described as ‘a sort of super-tribe’ – did not go unnoticed among those appre-
hensive about the future role of the military, who saw the unity of the army in an
emerging state characterised by fissiparous tendencies as a potential threat to
democratic rule (for example, see Hastings 1971).
An official policy of recruiting ‘from each region to maintain a reasonable
balance within the Force vis-à-vis the population distribution throughout PNG’
(Defence Report 1977-78:32) has been maintained since the 1960s. However the
analysis of figures of force strength by rank and province (see May 1993:28)
suggests that regional representation is by no means balanced. In particular, it
shows a marked ‘underrepresentation’ of the populous highlands provinces, par-
ticularly at senior officer level, and a significant ‘overrepresentation’ of coastal
Papuans and New Guinean islanders at senior levels.
In the latter part of the 1980s there was a hint of regionalism in rumours of
collaboration between some Papuan colonels and PNGDF-commander-turned-
politician Ted Diro, and regional sentiment was certainly evident in reaction
outside the Force to the sacking of Nuia and three other Papuan colonels (see
below); however this does not appear to have reflected any basic ethnic division
with the Force.
In the early discussion of the role to be played by a defence force in
independent Papua New Guinea, primary emphasis was placed on its function
of defence against external threat. There was ambivalence about its possible use
in maintaining internal security. As early as 1971, in the wake of increasing
lawlessness in the highlands, highlands politicians called for the use of the PIR
‘for security purposes’ and supported proposals for the secondment of PIR officers
to train police, particularly police riot squads. There was initial opposition to
this but in 1973 four Australian Army officers were seconded to assist in training
and administration; three of them were posted to riot squads.
As the general law and order situation in the country deteriorated, and particu-
larly after the declaration of a state of emergency in the five highlands provinces
in 1979, opposition to the use of the army for internal security purposes dimin-
ished. From 1977 there were calls for the deployment of the PNGDF to assist
police in dealing with tribal fighting and criminal activity in the highlands.
The first actual call-out in aid of the civilian authority, however, did not occur
until 1984.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In 1984 the government announced a list of measures to deal with law and
order problems, including call-out of PNGDF personnel to assist police. Diro,
by then a member of parliament, supported the use of troops. At the end of that
year the PNGDF was called out to assist police following the declaration of a
state of emergency occasioned by rising urban crime and violence in Port Mores-
by. ‘Operation Green Beret’, as the exercise was called, lasted for about four
months and was generally regarded as a success, though the urban crime rate
quickly rose again when the state of emergency ended, and two months later
the troops were called out again in the National Capital District, in an operation
which lasted five months.
On several occasions in the early 1980s there were demands from national
politicians to use the PNGDF to quell tribal fighting, particularly in Enga Prov-
ince. In a Post-Courier article in 1985 former PNGDF officer Ian Glanville op-
posed such suggestions, arguing
To have a disciplined, armed and trained Papua New Guinean in uniform, shooting
other Papua New Guineans in a situation other than where ‘the national security or
the preservation of public order exists’ [sic] will forfeit any claim we might have to
being a Christian, democratic, and enlightened country, and destroy forever our fragile
national unity (Post-Courier 10 December 1985).
However, in 1987 the PNGDF was called out to assist police in law and order
operations in Morobe, Madang and Eastern Highlands provinces, and the
following year was mobilised to assist in ‘Operation LOMET 88’ in the
highlands provinces, Morobe and Madang, and later East Sepik. LOMET
88 lasted for over three months and it attracted a great deal of publicity (see
below); but the PNGDF’s role in it, though conspicuous, was limited – of
519 security forces personnel involved (including 308 from the Police Mobile
Squad) only 33 were from the PNGDF (Draft Hansard 10 November 1988,
p.28). Late in 1988 there was a further request, from the Morobe provincial
law and order committee for PNGDF assistance to counter serious crime in
Lae and Garaina (Post-Courier 20 December 1988). But by this time the Force
was on standby awaiting a government decision on whether it was to be
called out to assist the police on Bougainville. (The subsequent role of the
PNGDF in the Bougainville crisis is discussed in more detail below.) PNGDF
personnel were used again 1991 to provide additional security during the
South Pacific Games in Port Moresby and to assist police in ‘crime busting
operations’ in Morobe Province.
In 1992 it was something of a measure of the extent to which the army had
come to be accepted as having a ‘law and order’ role that in outlining arrange-
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ments for the conduct of the national election is was said to be ‘necessary to call
upon the services of the Defence Force . . . to assist the Electoral Commissioner
before, during and after the election’ (Post-Courier 24 March 1992). On the eve
of the elections some 1300 police and 50 soldiers paraded through Mount Hagen
in a display of force.
Despite the general acceptance of the PNGDF’s role in internal security situa-
tions, however, the acceptance was slow to be recognised in official statements.
In 1984, shortly before the first call-out of the PNGDF to aid the civil authority,
the NEC’s list of priority functions put internal security last. The Defence Report
1984-85 (p.54), however, stated that ‘national security and development was fore-
most in our activities’. In 1987, in a statement delivered on resigning from cabi-
net (see below), Diro said
Clearly a military option for the defence of Papua New Guinea is out. The Defence
Force must now be tailored to give priority to training in low intensity type of opera-
tions, civil aid tasks, internal security problems, rapid deployment to assist police
or in instances of hijacking and of course surveillance of both land and sea boundaries
(Times of PNG 19-25 November 1987).
The following year Defence Secretary Mokis told an Australian seminar that his
department’s view was that ‘there is a far greater prospect of PNG being troubled
seriously by internal rather than external security problems’; he saw the main
challenges coming not from tribal fighting or separatism but from increasing
criminal activities:
. . . concentrations of unemployed people, many of whom are young and smarting
from unfulfilled expectations, have provided a fertile breeding ground for criminal
activities. These trends have coincided with a general decline in the efficiency of PNG
administration and, perhaps most notably in this context, a significant weakening of
the system of justice; the police, the courts and the gaols. Other potential sources
of internal security, such as tribal fighting and separatism, have caused difficulties
in the past but at present seem of far less concern (Mokis 1988:2).
Yet in 1989, having noted the PNGDF’s responsibility for defending the nation
from ‘external threats and internal uprisings’, the Defence minister went on to
say that ‘internal uprising and internal security [was] the responsibility of the
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary’ (Defence Report 1989).
In 1990, facing an escalating law and order problem across the country, and
with a crisis in Bougainville still unresolved, the Namaliu government set up a
Security Review Task Force and, shortly after, convened a National Summit on
Crime. As an outcome of these initiatives it released a report (PNG 1991) in
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which it was observed that ‘perceived political instability…is sometimes thought
to have given rise to public questioning of the durability of particular leaders,
policies and even laws’, and that the disciplined services had not been able to
cope with ‘sources of law-breaking and disorder’ (ibid.:11, 17, unnumbered).
It also referred to ‘the growing frequency with which call-outs of the PNGDF
in aid to the civil power and states of emergency have been declared’ (ibid.:24).
Among a number of recommendations the report proposed the establishment of
a Joint Services Command Centre and the progressive integration of the
disciplined forces (‘subject to review and even possible reversal’) (ibid.:23-30).
It also suggested that ‘the most serious, foreseeable threats facing Papua New
Guinea are internal’ and that the priorities of the PNGDF ‘should be reviewed
and, as may be appropriate, re-ordered’ (ibid.:36). The demand for a change of
focus was supported by Defence Minister Benais Sabumei, who in 1991 told a
PNGDF passing out parade that ‘The real future of our Defence Force is to assist
the civil authorities deal effectively with these threats’ (Post-Courier 2 July
1991).
Coincidentally with the Papua New Guinea government’s security review, the
Australian government undertook a review of its security assistance programs
for Papua New Guinea, and in September 1991 the two governments released a
statement which announced that Papua New Guinea was to give highest priority
to internal security needs, and that Australian assistance would be geared to sup-
porting Papua New Guinea’s disciplined forces in maintaining internal security,
including law and order. This was to be done by way of training and the provision
and funding of infrastructure, equipment and other support facilities. But it is
notable that, following well-publicised reports of abuses by Papua New Guinea’s
security forces on Bougainville, an Australian government document described
Australia’s military training efforts as having several components ‘designed to
strengthen soldiers’ awareness of humanitarian law to provide guidance concern-
ing proper treatment of civilians during security operations’. Operational train-
ing, it said, was ‘based on Australian Defence Force doctrine, which in turn draws
on the Geneva Convention’ (Evans 1992:34-35).
Thus within sixteen years of independence the priorities of the PNGDF had
been effectively reversed and the possibility of an integrated paramilitary force
revived, though to date there has been no move to implement the latter proposal,
which remains unpopular among both RPNGC and PNGDF personnel.
Military-Civil Relations in the Independent State
From a very early stage, the Australian officers responsible for the training of
Government and the Military in Papua New Guinea 161
Papua New Guinean soldiers were anxious to instil in their protégés the idea of
the subservience of the military to the civil authority, and to ensure that relations
between the military and politicians were cordial.
The achievement of cordial civil-military relations should have been rendered
easier in post-independence Papua New Guinea by the fact that, given the nature
of pre-colonial Papua New Guinean societies (for the most part small and non-
hierarchical) and the recency of effective colonial administration in much of the
country, defence force personnel and the emerging nationalist politicians and
civil servants came from similar village backgrounds, and in the case of the better-
educated had been to the same government-run schools in much the same age
cohort. The PNGDF’s first Papua New Guinean commander, Ted Diro, for exam-
ple, came from a village in the Rigo district, where his father had been a plantation
labourer and a carrier for the Allied troops during World War II. In common with
the other two young men selected for early officer training, and with many of
the leading politicians and civil servants of the late 1960s and 1970s, Diro had
attended the government high school at Sogeri. But perhaps because of the mili-
tary ethos inherited from the colonial period, and the nature of the military train-
ing, relations between senior military officers on the one hand, and politicians
and public servants on the other, were not particularly close; indeed Sinclair
(1992:297) describes relations in the early 1970s as ‘frosty’ (also see O’Neill 1971;
Sundhaussen 1973b). Politicians tended to see the military as elitist and a possible
threat to civilian rule, and the military had misgivings about politicians who
questioned the future role of the defence force and suggested that it might be
too big.
Despite this degree of separation of military and civilian circles, within the first
few years of independence there were suggestions that the higher echelons of
the military were being politicised.
Diro and Lowa had been rivals for the top position during their early military
careers and on the eve of independence, as it became clear that Diro was the likely
choice for commander, Lowa resigned and joined Prime Minister Somare’s office.
He subsequently contested the national elections in 1977 as a Pangu candidate,
was elected to a seat in Port Moresby, and became minister for Police in the
second Somare government. In the following months there were rumours that
within the Somare government there were moves to oust both General Diro and
the police commissioner, Pious Kerepia, both of whom were felt to be ‘politi-
cally unreliable’. Lowa was said to be prominent in these moves. In November,
following a series of disputes among senior police officers, Kerepia’s tenure was
terminated, though he protested, alleging political interference. The same month
a challenge to Lowa’s residential eligibility was upheld and he lost his parliamen-
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tary seat. (Lowa later became national organiser of the Melanesian Alliance party
and was re-elected to parliament in 1987.)
Meanwhile, tensions in the relations between members of the government and
senior PNGDF officers came to a head in what was termed ‘the Diro affair’.
During 1977 Diro had held discussions with a leader of the West Papuan separatist
movement, Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). Although Diro claimed that the
Defence minister had been fully briefed on the talks, there was a feeling in cabinet
that Diro had exceeded his authority and in late September it was announced
that he would be officially reprimanded. The reprimand came a week later. By this
time Diro had sought and received a commitment of support from senior officers,
and there were rumours in Port Moresby of a possible coup (see SMH 6 October
1977; Hegarty 1978:402). At the time Diro told cabinet:
. . . I have now been able to assess who my friends are and who aren’t . . . Mr Prime
Minister, I want you to know that the force is becoming sick to death of being made
a political football by certain politicians and ex-politicians (quoted, SMH 6 October
1977).
Though one commentator described the incident at the time as ‘the most serious
threat to the authority of the government since independence’ (Hegarty 1978:402),
it appeared to blow over fairly quietly. Six years later, however, an anonymous
former PNGDF officer4 told an Australian Broadcasting Commission
correspondent5 that had Diro been sacked in 1977 PNGDF officers would have
staged an already-rehearsed operation, codenamed ‘Electric Shock’, in which
the prime minister and certain other politicians and public servants would have
been taken hostage. The former officer claimed that PNGDF officers had been in
contact with the Indonesian government during this period; indeed one of their
major concerns had been the Papua New Guinea government’s poor handling
of the border situation. Diro’s role in all this was unclear and the story was denied
in some quarters (see Times of Papua New Guinea 26 August, 15 September,
7 October 1983); certainly it may have been embellished by 1983. But it served
as a reminder that military intervention was not an impossibility.
Four years after the 1977 incident, Diro announced that he was resigning from
the PNGDF to contest the 1982 national elections. He stood as leader of a (mostly
Papuan) PNG Independent Group and was elected. In the process of coalition
4 The former officer was Tom Poang, a colonel and chief of personnel at the time,
who left the PNGDF soon after and in 1983 was speaker in the Morobe provincial
assembly.
5 Geoff Heriot, ABC ‘Background Briefing’ 21 August 1983.
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formation the ambitious Diro was at one stage tipped as possible prime minister,
but he ended up in opposition, briefly accepting leadership of the National Party,
and becoming minister for Forests in 1985 when a vote of no confidence brought
a change of government.
Diro was not the only former PNGDF officer to contest the 1982 elections: in
Manus, James Pokasui, who had been transferred to Manus the previous year
as adjutant of the Maritime Element, stood as an Independent Group candidate
and was initially declared winner, though the result was subsequently overturned
by the Court of Disputed Returns;6 in Wewak, former PNGDF major Michael
Malenki, who had left the PNGDF in 1977 to become electoral secretary to Prime
Minister Somare but had fallen out with Somare and became national secretary
of the Melanesian Alliance, stood unsuccessfully (he was later elected to the
East Sepik Provincial Assembly).
With Diro’s resignation from the PNGDF it was generally expected that Colo-
nel Ken Noga, who had been the third most senior Papua New Guinean officer
after Diro and Lowa, would succeed him. Instead, the position was given to Colo-
nel Gago Mamae. In 1980 a split in the ruling Pangu-led coalition and a subse-
quent vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Somare had brought a new
coalition government to power, headed by Somare’s former deputy prime minis-
ter, People’s Progress Party (PPP) leader Sir Julius Chan. In 1977 Noga had re-
signed from the PNGDF to contest the national elections as a pro-Pangu candi-
date, having rejoined the force when he failed to be elected.7 Some suggested
that Mamae had been appointed over Noga in 1981 for political reasons. The
suggestion that political considerations had entered into the selection of the
PNGDF command was reinforced in 1983 when, having been reelected to office
in the national election of the previous year, the Somare government replaced
Mamae with Noga as commander of the PNGDF. A newspaper editorial at the
time asked: ‘Must we continue to entertain political appointments in the public
service …?’ (Times of PNG 26 August 1983). Mamae, after serving for a while
as military attaché in Australia, resigned and became executive officer in Chan’s
PPP office (standing unsuccessfully as a PPP candidate in the 1987 national
elections).
The politicisation of the senior PNGDF appointment was demonstrated even
6 Pokasui subsequently worked for Fr John Momis, parliamentary leader of the
Melanesian Alliance, and was elected in 1987, becoming minister for Defence.
7 Under the provisions of the Defence Act 1974 it is possible for a member of the
PNGDF to transfer to the reserve force, and later apply for re-admission to the
regular force.
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more blatantly three years later, when another vote of no confidence again re-
moved a Somare-led coalition and brought to office a government headed by
Paias Wingti and Julius Chan. Noga was himself removed and replaced by
Colonel Tony Huai. Huai had been in consideration for the top position in
1982. In 1984 he resigned, criticising the government’s handling of the PNGDF.
He initially joined Mamae in Chan’s PPP office and indicated his intention of
standing for parliament in 1987. At the time of his appointment Huai was a
security officer with Air Niugini and the appointment of a commander from
outside the PNGDF was reportedly opposed by the Defence Department and
resented by some senior officers. Opposition leader Somare described it, not
without irony, as a ‘dangerous precedent’ (Post-Courier 3 December 1985).
Huai proved to be a controversial figure as PNGDF commander. Early in 1986,
on his return from a visit to Indonesia, Huai told a press conference that he would
closely cooperate with Indonesian army forces commander, General Benny
Murdani, to stamp out the OPM. His statement attracted criticism, notably from
prominent lawyer (later Justice minister) Bernard Narokobi, who said that Huai
had no authority to make public statements about matters of defence policy, and
called for his dismissal. Huai resigned in late 1986 but was reinstated. The fol-
lowing year Huai again attracted public attention when it was reported that, hav-
ing been opposed to the defence provisions of the Joint Declaration of Principles
then being negotiated between Papua New Guinea and Australia, on the grounds
that a reference to possible ‘attack from an external source’ could be misread by
Indonesia and create unnecessary tension, Huai had made unauthorised visits to
Indonesia and had leaked details of the progress of discussions to General
Murdani (see Times of PNG 4-10 February 1988). He was also said to have ac-
cepted gifts of uniforms and furniture from the Indonesian army chief. According
to a Times of PNG report (24 December 1987-7 January 1988), Huai’s close rela-
tions with Murdani had nearly resulted in a mutiny by senior officers and NCOs.
Partly as a result of this, but also, according to Defence Minister Pokasui, because
Huai had allowed infighting and political lobbying among senior officers, Huai
was dismissed in late 1987. He was replaced by Colonel Rochus Lokinap. Loki-
nap was the first non-Papuan commander of the PNGDF, coincidentally coming
from a village in Sir Julius Chan’s New Ireland electorate.
By this time, too, Diro’s political fortunes had begun to turn. Having been re-
elected in 1987 Diro managed to swing the entire bloc of members from Papuan
electorates into a coalition with Paias Wingti, thus delivering government to
Wingti when it looked as though a Pangu-led coalition would be returned to
power. He became deputy prime minister in the new government. However, an
enquiry set up by Wingti in 1987 to investigate allegations of corruption in the
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forestry industry had accused Diro of involvement in a number of illicit transac-
tions and recommended prosecution. Further, in the process of investigation it
was revealed that Diro had received from Indonesia’s General Murdani
some $US139400, ostensibly as a contribution to his 1987 election campaign
expenses. This ‘contribution’, which had not been declared, was in defiance of
a provision of the Papua New Guinea constitution which states that an organic
law will be passed to prevent candidates or parties accepting contributions from
foreigners (though in fact the organic law had never been passed).
Charged with perjury and facing possible prosecution, and with calls for his
resignation from parliament, Diro resigned from cabinet. In subsequent state-
ments to the press he said:
. . . the events of the past couple of months have had implications leading to rumours
of disobedience in the disciplined forces . . . I have been one of the experts on military
coups through the world [and] . . . the ingredients are here for a coup . . . I do not
want to be blamed when that arises. (Post-Courier 9, 16 November 1987; Times of
PNG 19-25 November 1987).
In the wake of the military coups in Fiji in 1987 – the first in the island Pacific
and generally unexpected – such comments were not dismissed lightly. With
rumours circulating in Port Moresby about an impending coup (Saffu 1988:259-
60), three senior colonels (Kwago Guria, Lima Dotaona and Robert Dademo),
all of them Papuans, were removed, although the possible links between the talk
of coups and the government’s actions were never made clear. This action was
bitterly criticised within the Papuan community, especially from within the then-
recently-formed People’s Action Party (PAP), a predominantly Papuan group of
which Diro was parliamentary leader. Following a change of government in 1988,
the three were reinstated (though Guria chose not to return).
Shortly after resigning from cabinet, Diro shifted the parliamentary allegiance
of his bloc and in so doing brought about a change of government. He became
minister of state in the new (Namaliu) government and having been acquitted of
the perjury charges subsequently became deputy prime minister. But in 1991 he
was found guilty by the Leadership Tribunal of eighty-one counts of miscon-
duct and was forced to resign from parliament. This threatened to precipitate a
constitutional crisis when the governor-general, Sir Serei Eri, formerly president
of Diro’s PAP, refused to sign the dismissal papers and attempted to reinstate
Diro as deputy prime minister. Eventually both Diro and Eri resigned. Ironically,
remembering the events of 1977, the PNGDF was placed on alert at the time ‘in
case of violence between ethnic groups’ (Times of PNG 3 October 1991).
The following year, after another, Wingti-led, coalition had come to office fol-
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lowing national elections, there was a further major reshuffle within the PNGDF.
In November 1992 Lokinap’s extended term as commander came to an end; criti-
cised for his handling of the Bougainville situation, he was not reappointed. In
his place Colonel Robert Dademo, one of the Force’s longest-serving officers
(and one of the three Papuan officers dismissed under a previous Wingti govern-
ment) was appointed as Brigadier General. Dademo was generally regarded as a
sound choice, though some claimed that his appointment was ‘political’.
Soon after his appointment, a leaked document claimed that Dademo had
recommended that five senior officers be replaced, but had been overrruled by
Defence Minister Tohian. Subsequently, while Tohian was in Australia, the NEC
approved the transfer of the five officers (one was posted to Indonesia, one to
Australia, one to New Zealand, and two to other government departments); four
officers were promoted to colonel to fill vacant positions. A Times of Papua New
Guinea report (30 December 1992) said the moves ‘strengthen the commander’s
position enormously and remove a number of his former rivals from key jobs in
the force’.
In early 1994 Dademo reached retirement age and, in the absence of Prime
Minister Wingti, Chan as acting prime minister announced the appointment, as
acting commander, of Colonel Lima Dotaona. On his return a day later, however,
Wingti overruled his deputy prime minister and Defence minister; the Defence
Retirement Regulations were amended to raise the retirement age and Dademo’s
appointment was, controversially, extended.
With the politicisation of senior levels of the PNGDF and increasing pressures,
budgetary and operational, upon the military, came also suggestions of declining
morale and deteriorating discipline in the force.
As early as 1985 the standard of discipline in the PNGDF was said to be ‘below
that required’ (Defence Report 1984-85: 39, 44) and a concentrated effort was
made ‘to purge the force of soldiers whose service was considered unsatisfac-
tory’; 190 ‘other ranks’ were discharged. The same year some forty Air Transport
Squadron groundcrew were accused of ‘mutiny’ when they staged a strike over
pay and conditions.
More serious allegations of undisciplined behaviour by the security forces
arose during Operation LOMET in the highlands in 1988. Foreshadowing later
developments on Bougainville, there were widespread reports of village houses,
stores and community centres being burned, of pigs and cassowaries being shot,
of looting, and of village people being beaten and raped (Draft Hansard 11
November 1988 pp.10-11, 18 November 1988 pp.16-17; Post-Courier
20 October 1988, 15, 17, 18 November 1988). Much of the blame was attributed
to the Police Mobile Squad, which already in the mid 1970s had acquired a bad
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reputation in the highlands, but PNGDF personnel were also accused of offences
and there were calls for its withdrawal from such operations. (Nevertheless, four
years later Standish [personal communication 1992] reported similar abusive
behaviour by police and PNGDF soldiers in the highlands during the 1992
elections.)
In 1988-89 problems of discipline were manifested on a larger scale in open
challenges to the government’s authority by elements of the military. In June 1988,
the minister for Civil Aviation announced a decision to close Lae airport (it had
been decided, in accordance with a recommendation of the 1983 Defence review,
to relocate the airport some 40 kilometres outside Lae at an old wartime strip at
Nadzab). The PNGDF, whose air element had opposed the move, responded by
flying personnel from Port Moresby to Lae to ‘secure the airport’ against Civil
Aviation authorities. Lokinap subsequently announced that all Defence Force
planes would be grounded. Several days later, having been severely reprimanded
by Prime Minister Wingti, Brigadier Lokinap apologised for the PNGDF’s actions
and assured the prime minister and the people of Papua New Guinea of the
PNGDF’s undivided loyalty. Nevertheless the Defence Report 1988 (pp.5, 13)
listed amongst the year’s military operations: ‘Operation Albatross’. This
operation secured the Lae City airfield and prevented its destruction by elements
of the Department of Lands and Department of Civil Aviation’.
Then in early 1989, angered at not having received expected pay increases (the
first since independence), some 300-400 soldiers marched on the National
Parliament, where windows were smashed, vehicles overturned, and civilians and
politicians abused. There was also a smaller demonstration by PNGDF personnel
in Wewak. The government promptly suspended the commander, chief of staff,
and secretary for Defence, and set up a Defence General Board of Inquiry to
investigate the incident. But the government quickly implemented pay increas-
es, and while the Board of Inquiry noted a serious decline in discipline (‘There
is an apparent inability and or reluctance by commands at all levels to impose
discipline’ – Report p.49) and evidence of some misuse of funds and equipment,
its report was largely devoted to discussing problems of morale and recommend-
ing improvements in conditions of service within the PNGDF. While the board’s
analysis may have been accurate, it did little to reassure the public or political leaders.
Further incidents during the early 1990s (including a strike by maritime and air
element personnel in 1994) suggested that, notwithstanding action taken after
the 1989 review, problems of discipline remained (see May 1993:55-56).
Overarching all these incidents, however, from 1988 was the much larger issue
of the performance of the security forces on Bougainville.
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In 1988, simmering discontent within the landowner group around Papua New
Guinea’s immense gold and copper mine on Bougainville erupted into a major
confrontation.8 Mine installations were subjected to a series of arson and
sabotage attacks, during which pylons carrying power lines to the mine and town
at Panguna were blown up, and workers attempting to repair lines were threatened
by armed men. (Among the leadership of the militant landowner group was a
former PNGDF officer trained in the use of explosives.) Late in 1988 the mine
operator, Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), temporarily closed the mine and a
government committee attempted to negotiate a settlement with the dissident
group. But following further acts of sabotage against BCL installations and
government property, police reinforcements were called in and a curfew was
imposed in the mine area. Shortly after this riots broke out in the nearby town of
Arawa after a series of incidents, not directly related to the mine dispute, in which
three people were killed. With tension rising and longstanding separatist
sentiments regaining strength, the curfew was reimposed and PNGDF troops
(whose call-out had been authorised in December 1988) were brought in to assist
police restore law and order. By March 1989 there were approximately 600 police
and military personnel on Bougainville, under the direction of a joint planning
committee headed by the provincial administrative secretary. Within weeks of
its arrival the PNGDF had suffered its first casualties when a PNGDF patrol was
ambushed, and it was reported that the PNGDF had launched a ‘full-scale military
operation’ against ‘the rebels’. Shortly after, dissident leader Francis Ona
announced a revised set of demands against the mining company and the
government, which, apart from massive financial compensation, included a call
for the withdrawal of all security forces. ‘We are not part of your country any
more,’ he told the government, ‘We belong to the Republic of Bougainville’
(Niugini Nius 12 April 1989). Premier Joseph Kabui described the situation as
serious: the issue was no longer merely about land, he said, but also involved
the question of secession (Post-Courier 23 May 1989).
After further attacks on the mine had forced its closure, the government an-
nounced tighter security measures, including wider powers for the police and
army under an amended Defence (Aid to Civil Power) Regulation. However, the
government wanted to avoid at all costs a military operation, Prime Minister
8 For a more detailed account of the background to the ‘Bougainville crisis’, the
ongoing events, and their broader implications, see May (1990), May and Spriggs
(1990), Oliver (1991), Spriggs and Denoon (1992), Liria (1993) and The Contem-
porary Pacific 4(2), 1992, special issue, ‘A legacy of development: three years of
crisis in Bougainville’.
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Namaliu said, and was not entertaining the possibility of military action ‘at this
point’ (Canberra Times 26, 27 May 1989). But when talks failed, Namaliu or-
dered an all-out attack on the rebels, who were now calling themselves the Bou-
gainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).
The government’s repeated attempts to negotiate with Ona were seen by some,
both within and outside the security forces, as a sign of weakness on the part of
the government. Police Commissioner Paul Tohian was reported to have com-
plained of ‘political interference with essential police work and political inde-
cision’, and to have threatened to defy government directives in his attempts to
capture Francis Ona. When, in response, prominent Bougainvillean politician
and minister for Provincial Affairs, Fr John Momis, criticised Tohian and threat-
ened to move for his dismissal, a group of about one hundred angry policemen
marched on Momis’s home and warned him against sacking the commissioner.
Shortly after this, the acting PNGDF chief of staff, Colonel Leo Nuia, publicly
rebuked the Defence minister, saying he ‘should refrain from making wild state-
ments on matters affecting the operations of the soldiers and police’ on Bougain-
ville (Niugini Nius 12 April 1989). The acting commander and the chief of
PNGDF operations on Bougainville also publicly criticised the government’s
handling of the crisis. Within the PNGDF and RPNGC there were many who felt
that they could ‘clean up’ the situation on Bougainville if only they were not held
back by politicians. As against this, there is little doubt that heavy-handed actions
by the security forces – primarily, it seems, the police mobile squad, but also the
PNGDF – did much to alienate villages and catalyse demands for secession.
In June 1989 the government declared a state of emergency on Bougainville.
Police Commissioner Tohian was made controller of the state of emergency with
the PNGDF commander on Bougainville his deputy. Diro, whose decision to cross
the floor of parliament had resulted in a change of government, became minister
of state and chairman of the parliamentary National Emergency Committee, and
later, for a while, deputy prime minister. Diro’s comparatively ‘hard line’ approach
to the Bougainville situation was indicated in a statement he made in parliament
in proposing the extension of the state of emergency – that ‘It is a military
problem. It is no longer a police law and order problem’ – and in instructions
passed on to the Bougainville commander, Colonel Dotaona, which were leaked
to the press (see Post-Courier 12, 27 July 1989).
At the end of 1989 the Bougainville mine, which had provided Papua New
Guinea with around 40 per cent of its exports and about 17 per cent of its gov-
ernment revenue, was ‘mothballed’. The following month cabinet approved an
‘all out war’ against the rebels; the military option, Prime Minister Namaliu
declared, is now the only option.
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Yet shortly after this intensification of the conflict a ceasefire was negotiated
and the government agreed to the withdrawal of troops. This decision was not
well received within the security forces, and although it was apparently intended
by the government that the provincial police establishment remain to provide
some semblance of law, Tohian ordered the early removal of all police, as well as
the army, leaving the province virtually in the hands of the BRA. In submissions
to an Australian parliamentary committee the action was described as ‘a fairly
serious breakdown in the control by the Papua New Guinean Government of its
force’ and bound to lead to chaos (JCFADT, Hearings, 22 October 1990, pp.752,
783-84).
Subsequently, on his way from a party in Port Moresby, Tohian called over
his car radio for police and army personnel to arm themselves, arrest the prime
minister, and take over the government. He and the officer in charge of the police
riot squads were arrested and initially charged with treason, but the incident was
not taken very seriously (being commonly referred to as ‘the barbecoup’) and
the charges were subsequently dropped. (In 1992 Tohian was elected to the Na-
tional Parliament and became minister for Defence.)
Two months after the withdrawal of the security forces, with negotiations for
a settlement of the conflict failing to materialise, the national government cut off
communications with Bougainville and imposed ‘selective economic sanctions’.
This action, announced by the acting prime minister, Diro, shortly after Prime
Minister Namaliu left on an overseas trip, was seen by some as a deliberate at-
tempt to undermine proposed peace talks (see Australian 3 May 1990; May and
Spriggs 1990:113). Two days later the BRA made a unilateral declaration of
independence for the ‘Republic of Meekamui’. Among those named in the in-
terim government of the republic, the ‘minister for defence and police’, Joe Pais,
and the commander of the BRA, Sam Kauona, were both former PNGDF officers.
In September 1990 PNGDF troops landed on Buka Island in the north, following
a request from local leaders, and the BRA was reported to have surrendered
control of Buka soon after. The PNGDF was supported by a locally-organised
Buka Liberation Front (BLF); (the BLF chairman described the front as an
‘authorised unauthorised security force’ sanctioned by the PNGDF and the gov-
ernment) though according to one account many on Buka ‘feared the BLF more
than the BRA and Defence Force soldiers’ (Spriggs 1992:12; also see Post-Cou-
rier 19 December 1990). However, the arrival of troops on Buka did little to re-
solve the situation, which Spriggs (1992:12) described as ‘a state of civil war,
with fighting between the BRA and the BLF all over the island and the PNGDF
seemingly taking little part in proceedings’. On Buka there were mounting accu-
sations of human rights violations and military action against civilian targets; an
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Amnesty International report in November 1990 listed nineteen cases of ‘ex-
trajudicial execution’ and over fifty cases of torture and ill-treatment by the secu-
rity forces, as well as abuses by the BRA (Amnesty International 1990b. Also
see Spriggs and Denoon 1992). After a boat carrying supplies, authorised by the
prime minister, had been prevented from sailing by the PNGDF commander on
Buka, who threatened to fire on it, the Times of Papua New Guinea (13 December
1990) commented: ‘Confusion reigns . . . There does not seem to be any clear
directives [sic] as to who is in authority . . .’
In early 1991 a second round of peace talks was held, resulting in the Honiara
Declaration, which recorded the two parties’ commitment to a peaceful resolution
of the conflict. Among other things the Honiara Declaration agreed to the estab-
lishment of a civilian Task Force, appointed by the minister for Provincial Affairs
in consultation with a Bougainville Interim Legal Authority, to co-ordinate the
restoration of services, and to accept a Multinational Supervisory Team (MST)
to oversee the process of reconciliation and rehabilitation. While negotiations
over the implementation of the Honiara Declaration were still proceeding, how-
ever, and with Diro again acting prime minister, some 300 PNGDF soldiers, under
the command of Colonel Nuia, landed on north Bougainville and launched an
operation against the BRA. Nuia claimed that the troops had been requested by
local chiefs, but his action violated the terms of the Honiara Declaration and had
not been authorised by the government. He came under strong criticism,
especially from Momis, who described the incursion as ‘totally illegal . . . totally
irresponsible’ and likely to jeopardise peace initiatives. Momis called for the
sacking of officers involved. In the event, Nuia received a reprimand, but the
operation was retrospectively endorsed by cabinet.
In the following months the extent of the growing tension between civil and
military authorities in relation to Bougainville became evident on a number of
occasions. In May, responding to Momis’s attacks on Nuia’s ‘invasion’ of Bou-
gainville the previous month, an army major publicly accused the minister of
promoting secession and being a BRA collaborator (Post-Courier 17 May 1991).
And on Buka, Nuia physically attacked a leading member of the civilian Task
Force and had another arrested and charged with sedition. Not surprisingly the
civilian administrator on Buka expressed himself as not happy with the working
relationship between the military and the Task Force. PNGDF opposition to the
idea of a MST was also a reason for its failure to materialise.
Nuia’s somewhat erratic behaviour had already caused some concern among
the Defence establishment and in June 1991 his unauthorised disclosure, to an
Australian television reporter, concerning the use of Australian-supplied helicop-
ters on Bougainville (see May 1993:22, 65), embarrassed the government and
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finally led to his dismissal. Momis said: ‘If we don’t put a stop to it, we cannot
stop a coup’ (Post-Courier 25 June 1991). (Subsequently Nuia challenged the
legality of the action and in 1992 was reinstated and put in charge of Special
Projects.).
Resentment in military and defence circles of what was seen as indecision and
political interference in the handling of the Bougainville situation was sharpened
by Nuia’s sacking and was expressed in calls for clear directions on the specific
role of PNGDF commander on Bougainville and his relation to the Task Force,
and in reports that the PNGDF strength on Bougainville was ‘being scaled down
drastically’ (Post-Courier 11 July 1991).
But the removal of Nuia and the briefing of the new PNGDF commander on
Bougainville did not resolve the tensions between military and civilian officials.
In July 1991, on the eve of further peace talks, it was announced that the Bougain-
ville civilian administrator had imposed a curfew on parts of Buka and requested
the government to withdraw the security forces from north Bougainville back to
Buka. Subsequently it was reported that the security forces had imposed a new
blockade on Bougainville, ‘as a protest over what they claimed to be lack of
consultation with them about the national Government’s restoration program
particularly over the co-ordination of ship and aircraft undertaking the restoration
exercise’ (Post-Courier 24 December 1991). Ships and aircraft were being pre-
vented from travelling regardless of whether they had authorisation from civilian
officials. One of the casualties of this action was a chartered aircraft which was
to have taken Bougainville leaders to Honiara for talks with a national govern-
ment delegation. The following year an international delegation of church leaders,
whose visit to Bougainville had been authorised by the national government, was
turned away by the security forces, causing the Post-Courier’s editorial writer
to ask, ‘Who controls Bougainville? . . . What authority does the national Govern-
ment have over the military if its decisions about visits are going to be over-
turned?’ (21 October 1992).
In 1992-93 the Bougainville conflict spilled over the international border be-
tween Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, when PNGDF troops
launched several unauthorised raids into the Solomon Islands in pursuit of BRA
supporters. On one occasion shots were exchanged between Papua New Guinea
security forces and Solomon Islands police, and on another the Solomon Islands
island of Oema was ‘annexed’ by PNGDF troops. Echoing the earlier Post-
Courier editorial, a Sydney Morning Herald editorial (16 April 1993) asked:
What is going here? Who is calling the shots? . . . Increasingly [the PNGDF] will
equate its own worth, its very identity and honour with achieving a victory, whatever
the cost. In so doing it will grow less responsible to central control.
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Conclusion
On the eve of independence, many, especially among Papua New Guinea’s
emerging political leaders, looked with some apprehension to the future role of
the PNGDF. Well funded by the colonial government, well trained and possessing
a degree of cohesion unusual in the fragmented society of the emerging state,
and actively involved in village-level civic action, the military was seen by some
as a potential challenge to the authority of an independent government and a
threat to the continuation of a democratic political system. Not all of those who
foresaw a political role for the military, however, anticipated a coup-style take-
over. Hastings, for example, suggested that ‘Australian democracy’ was unlikely
to take root and that ‘we might be sensible to look towards ‘guided democracy’,
to a presidential system, to a strong army loyal to a strong central executive’
(1969:191-92. Also see Nelson 1972:208).
Concern about the future role of the Defence Force was reflected in the inde-
pendence constitution, which rejected the idea of the military’s participation in
government and defined the Defence Force’s primary function as that of defend-
ing the country against external threat, placing restrictions on its use for internal
security purposes.
Contrary to pessimistic predictions, after independence Papua New Guinea’s
democratic system prospered, and in the absence of external threat the military
languished, notwithstanding substantial financial assistance through Australia’s
Defence Co-operation Program. But within a decade of independence, growing
problems of lawlessness and disorder began to threaten the position of national
political leaders, and even some who had earlier looked apprehensively at the
PNGDF, began to call for an expanded role of the Defence Force in assisting police
to maintain internal security.
The first rift between civil and military leaders – the so-called Diro Affair of
1977 – was not long in coming; but though it generated rumours of an impending
coup it proved to be inconsequential. On the other hand, the resignation of
several senior officers, including the deputy commander and the commander, to
pursue careers in civil politics, established an early precedent and suggested a
possible safety-valve against the build-up of military antagonism towards the
civilian government. There was also, from the early 1980s, clear evidence of a
politicisation of at least the senior levels of the PNGDF.
With a resurgence of tribal fighting and a growing problem of criminality, more
and more politicians looked to the military to support the increasingly inadequate
attempts of the police to contain lawlessness and maintain the authority of the
state. From 1984 the army was regularly involved in ‘law and order’ operations
and there was growing acceptance that the PNGDF’s role in internal security was
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likely to be more significant than its function of safeguarding the country against
external threat.
In this respect, the emergence of the Bougainville crisis was a watershed in
changing perceptions of the PNGDF. What began as a police action against dis-
gruntled landowners developed into a full-blown insurrection in which the
PNGDF was called upon to maintain the integrity of the Papua New Guinea state.
In the process, severe doubts have been cast upon the capacity of the Defence
Force to act in internal security situations. A belief within the security forces that
they have been deprived of adequate funding and have been subjected to
‘political’ interference predates the Bougainville crisis but has been exacerbated
by events on Bougainville since 1988. The effects of such feelings have been a
growing tension in relations between military personnel and civil authorities,
factionalism within the PNGDF’s senior command structure, and a general
lowering of morale and discipline. Notwithstanding this, by the early 1990s, with
the Bougainville conflict still not resolved and growing threats to the authority
of the state from urban and rural lawlessness, a series of reviews and summit
meetings resulted in a significant shift in perceptions of the role of the PNGDF,
placing primary emphasis on its role in maintaining internal security.
Such developments have coincided with an apparent tendency towards tighter
social control in Papua New Guinea and an expressed admiration of Indonesian,
Singaporean and Malaysian models (see May 1993:74). In 1992 this prompted a
group of NGO and church organisations to warn against an ‘increasing and
dangerous trend towards the militarisation of [Papua New Guinea] society’; ‘We
need not have a military coup’, their statement said, ‘to militarise society’ (Post-
Courier 7 August 1992).
The spectre of a military coup has been raised on several occasions. Indeed,
in many respects Papua New Guinea presents the classic preconditions for mili-
tary intervention (see chapter 1). Most observers, however, continue to see a coup
as a remote possibility. This is not least because of the logistic difficulties which
an attempted coup would pose for a relatively small army with limited transport
capabilities in a physically and socially fragmented society in which even popu-
larly elected national and provincial governments have difficulty maintaining
their authority. Beyond this, even in relation to Bougainville the military’s cor-
porate interests do not appear to have been well defined in political terms, and
electoral politics has provided a well-trodden exit route for soldiers with personal
political ambitions. But while the military’s subordination to civilian authority
seems to be fairly well assured in the foreseeable future, the PNGDF has become
politicised at senior levels and appears increasingly prone to challenge govern-
ment decisions. If the integrity of the Papua New Guinea state becomes more
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dependent on the support of the security forces in the face of growing law and
order problems, these tendencies may increase. Such a development would
involve a slight shift along the ‘civilocracy’/‘militocracy’ continuum (Bebler
1990), but, at least in terms of participation and competition, within a continuing
essentially democratic political framework.
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